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Abstract 
This dissertation builds on the idea that there is much to be gained by bringing 
Western Marxism and Marxist theories of imperialism into engagement with each other 
through synthesis of the work of two key figures: Herbert Marcuse and Samir Amin. 
Using Marcuse to supplement Amin (and vice versa) provides for a more complete 
understanding of capitalist imperialism on a world scale. This lends Marcuse an 
applicability/relevance currently denied to him while also allowing for an updating of his 
theory that accounts for changes in the operation of capitalism since his time. It also 
enhances Amin’s work insofar as it can be used to augment his analysis of the capitalist 
centres and their relation to the periphery. A key objective of the analysis this dissertation 
undertakes is to produce a more robust theoretical approach capable of increasing our 
understanding of the world and positioning us to better meet the challenges posed for 
human emancipation from an exploitative, alienated existence of suffering. 
Chapter 1 provides the necessary background for engaging with both Amin’s and 
Marcuse’s analyses of alienation by focusing on the work of Marx, Lukács, and Freud. 
Chapter 2 engages in explicit discussion of Amin’s analysis of the world capitalist system 
and its development. Chapter 3 is concerned with Marcuse’s work and begins with 
discussion of the emergence of “one dimensional thinking” and technological rationality 
before turning to Marcuse’s analysis of alienation. The final chapter demonstrates the 
compatibility of Amin’s and Marcuse’s analyses and concludes by pointing toward some 
possibilities for future research.  
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Dedication 
With the spread of the bourgeois money economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated 
by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism 
are germinating. 
 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 
 
 
It is only for the sake of the hopeless that hope is given to us. 
 
Walter Benjamin 
 
…play your part creatively in all the struggles  
Of men of your time, thereby 
Helping, with the seriousness of study and the cheerfulness  
of knowledge 
To turn the struggle into common experience and  
Justice into a passion. 
Bertolt Brecht 
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Introduction 
 
 In 1959, C. Wright Mills wrote a seminal text in the discipline of sociology: The 
Sociological Imagination. In this work, he argues that the task of social science in 
general, and sociology in particular, is to develop and utilize the sociological imagination 
as the foundation of social inquiry. Fundamentally a critique of the positivist turn in 
social science research, Mills argues that what is needed is the cultivation of the ability to 
see the relationship between individual experience and the larger social order, to 
understand, in other words, the “intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger 
social realities” (2000 [1959]:15). The sociological imagination is a “quality of mind” 
that recognizes that “…the individual can understand his [sic] own experience and gauge 
his own fate only by locating himself within his period, that he can know his own 
chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances” 
(ibid:5); in other words, we must be able to see the connections between our “personal 
troubles” and “public issues” (ibid:8-9). Without this imagination, people become 
“falsely conscious of their social positions” (ibid) and we are left incapable of truly 
grasping “…the interplay of man [sic] and society, of biography and history, of self and 
world” (ibid:4).  
 Mills argues that classical sociological analysis has typically asked three 
questions: 1) what is the structure of a given society as a whole?; 2) what position does a 
given society occupy in human history?; and 3) what “varieties” of people have come to 
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dominate the given society in its particular historical period? (2000 [1959]:6-7). The 
sociological imagination, he argues, allows us to not only more thoroughly engage with 
each of these questions taken separately but also, perhaps more importantly, to 
understand and engage with these questions as fundamentally interconnected. No attempt 
to answer any one of these questions is complete without an understanding of the other 
two.  
 The importance of Mills’ call for the cultivation of the sociological imagination is 
at this dissertation’s core; it argues that in order to understand the current situation, we 
must engage with the questions of how we got here and of what this journey means, and 
has meant, for human experience. Its hope is that in engaging with these questions, we 
might be able to more adequately meet the challenges posed for human emancipation 
from exploitation and suffering. In this dissertation, I bring together the work of Samir 
Amin and Herbert Marcuse as a means of providing a sociological analysis of the 
development and organization of the capitalist imperialist world system and its 
ramifications for people reared in such a system. Amin and Marcuse are representatives 
of two very different traditions in Marxist thought: in the former case, Marxist theories of 
imperialism and in the latter, so-called “Western Marxism”. Before discussing the 
specifics of the work of Amin and Marcuse, I discuss the key characteristics of these two 
Marxist traditions. I do so to demonstrate how and at what point the intellectual roots of 
the two traditions diverged, in order to situate the synthesis that this dissertation offers.  
 3  
Marxist Theories of Imperialism  
 The focus on imperialism has been a central question in Marxist theory since at 
least Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital (Anderson 1976:10), and all Marxist 
approaches focusing on imperialism share two assumptions: imperialism can only be 
explained in terms of capitalism’s development and the evolution of the economic system 
plays a central role (Brewer 1990:11). These assumptions derive directly from Marx’s 
historical materialist method. That said, there has been a great deal of variation in how 
different theorists have approached the problem, and it is helpful to further understand 
Marxist theories of imperialism generally as taking either a classical or a dependency 
theory approach (ibid:16). Roughly speaking, the former “concentrate on the progressive 
role of capitalism in developing the forces of production” while the latter “…present 
capitalism as a system of exploitation of one area by another, so development in a few 
places is at the expense of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ in most of the world” 
(ibid:16).1  
 Brewer (1990) identifies the main authors of the classical approach as Rudolf 
Hilferding, Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladimir Lenin (p. 20; see also pp. 88-135). For these 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the separation of Marxist theories of imperialism into these two discrete camps 
is an oversimplification. In many cases there is some overlap, and as we will see in our discussion of Amin, 
not all theorists fit neatly into one approach or the other. There is, in fact, debate about who should be 
classified as belonging where (see, for example, Brewer 1990:195). Detailed discussion of the intricacies 
and nuance of Marxist approaches to imperialism is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation; for our 
purposes, it is enough simply to outline the general approaches to the problem.  
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authors, as well as for all those whose work can be understood as taking a classical 
approach more generally, imperialism  
…meant, primarily, rivalry between major capitalist countries, rivalry 
expressed in conflict over territory, taking political and military as well as 
economic forms, and tending, ultimately, to inter-imperialist war. The 
dominance of stronger countries over weaker is certainly implicit in this 
conception, but the focus is on the struggle for dominance, a struggle 
between the strongest in which the less developed countries figure mainly 
as passive battlegrounds, not as active participants (ibid:89). 
The classical theorists saw themselves as direct descendants of Marx and their work as an 
attempt to update his theories to reflect political and economic developments since his 
time. In the case of Luxemburg, the main contribution was the recognition of pre-
capitalist economic formations as having a role to play in “realizing surplus-value, and 
therefore the structural necessity of military-imperial expansion by the metropolitan 
powers” (Anderson 1976:10). Luxemburg insisted that “the mechanisms of primitive 
accumulation, using force, fraud and state power, were not simply a regrettable aspect of 
capitalism’s past, but persist throughout the history of capitalism at the margin where 
capitalist and pre-capitalist economic systems meet” (Brewer 1990:72). Hilferding, 
Bukharin, and Lenin were all concerned with the rise of monopoly (ibid:89; Anderson 
1976:8), and Hilferding’s explanation of the relationship between finance capital and 
monopolization influenced both Bukharin’s and Lenin’s work (ibid:109; Townshend 
1996:53; Anderson 1976:9-10). Hilferding argued that finance capital “consisted of the 
coalescence of financial, industrial and commercial capital under the control of the banks. 
The latter, in order to protect their loans and investments, encouraged this form of 
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monopolization” (Townshend 1996:53). However, since these monopolies “could not yet 
control the world market, they need[ed] the protection of tariffs” (Brewer 1990:108). 
They then sought to “extend their protected markets as far as possible” (ibid) through the 
“expansionist policies of their respective states” (Townshend 1996:53). To Hilferding’s 
analysis Bukharin and Lenin added examination of the development of the so-called 
“labour aristocracy”, the relationship between war and imperialism (i.e., inter-imperialist 
rivalry), and a critique of the notion of “ultra-imperialism”.2 Both Bukharin and Lenin 
argued that “capital export accelerated development in underdeveloped areas, …[that] 
workers in imperialist centres gain some (limited) advantages from the success of ‘their’ 
nations, thus explaining the material basis of working-class nationalism, and…that inter-
imperialist rivalry made inter-imperialist war inevitable” (Brewer 1990:134-135). Given 
that the classical Marxist approach starts from the assumption that capitalism plays a 
progressive role in the development of the forces of production, these theorists also 
placed the hope for socialist revolution in the most developed countries and saw this as 
“the necessary route towards socialism and the precondition for advance in less 
developed areas” (ibid:89). Unsurprisingly, a frequent criticism of the classical approach 
is that it is fundamentally Eurocentric in nature (ibid). 
                                                 
2 Ultra-imperialism is a concept put forth by both Karl Kautsky and John Atkinson Hobson, though the 
latter used the term “inter-imperialism” (Brewer 1990:129). It should be noted that Hobson is not a Marxist 
thinker, however, he was of substantial influence on Marxist theories of imperialism (see Brewer 1990:73-
87). The basic argument is that the major imperialist powers “would agree to exploit the world jointly, 
rather than fighting over the division of the world” (ibid:129). This idea was opposed by both Bukharin and 
Lenin; the latter was especially vehement (ibid:131; Townshend 1996:54-56).  
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 The classical approach reigned until after the Second World War3; it was Paul 
Baran’s work, particularly his Political Economy of Growth, published in 1957, that 
marked the break between the classical approach and that of dependency theory, which 
achieved dominance in the 1960s (Brewer 1990:137). This break is marked by Baran’s 
treatment of “the development of capitalism in underdeveloped countries as a different 
process from that which the advanced countries had gone through earlier” (ibid). In other 
words, Baran was the first major Marxist theorist to understand underdeveloped countries 
as worthy of study in and of themselves, rather than incidental to the examination of the 
advanced capitalist powers (ibid). Indeed, 
[t]he classical Marxists, from Marx to Lenin, had expected full capitalist 
development, in due course, throughout the world. Baran argued that the 
destiny of the underdeveloped countries was distinctively different from 
that of areas that developed at an earlier date. …Monopoly transforms 
capitalism from a force for development into a cause of stagnation, both in 
advanced and underdeveloped countries (ibid:21). 
The dependency theorists built upon Baran’s work and argued that capitalism itself is the 
cause of underdevelopment (ibid:161, 162). These theorists generally retain the emphasis 
on monopoly discussed by both the classical Marxists and Baran but add the notion that 
capitalism is a world system whose operation blocks, rather than liberates, productive 
forces in underdeveloped areas. Therefore, for these theorists, the world is divided into a 
core/centre and a periphery, the latter being exploited by the former, which ensures its 
ongoing dependency; this division/relationship is central to their understanding of 
                                                 
3 For further discussion see Anderson 1976:21 and Brewer 1990:136. 
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imperialism. Brewer identifies both a strong and weak form of this approach; in the 
strong form, Europe is seen as having “found countries that were developed for the time, 
and [making] them underdeveloped” while in the weak form, which is less prevalent, 
Europe simply “prevented underdeveloped countries from developing” (ibid:162). 
According to Brewer, the central Marxist figures in this tradition are Andre Gunder 
Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Samir Amin. It is important to note, however, that 
Amin is not as easy to locate as Brewer asserts, and Amin himself complains about being 
categorized in this way (see 2007:65; 1997). Indeed, the question of how Amin’s work 
can be categorized is a matter of debate, with some treating it instead as a “revival of 
classical Marxist ideas” (Brewer 1990:195 [emphasis added]). Ultimately, however, a 
preoccupation with the “proper” categorization of Amin’s work as belonging to one 
approach or the other is not the concern of this dissertation except insofar as it has 
unfortunately contributed to the ghettoization of his analysis. In other words, what is of 
concern here is the significance of Amin’s work on imperialism in general and the 
necessity to take it seriously, regardless of how one chooses to locate it; this case is made 
in further detail below.  
Western Marxism  
 Just as the period following World War II marked a turning point in the 
development of Marxist theories of imperialism, it was at this time also that Western 
Marxism was born. Though “[the] scale and force of imperialist expansion of the forces 
of production in both its Atlantic and Pacific zones presented in its own right a 
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formidable theoretical challenge to the development of historical materialism, [this] task, 
in all its dimensions, was never shouldered within the tradition of Western Marxism” 
(Anderson 1976:47). Its interests were, at least on the surface, different. The history of 
the emergence of this tradition is multifaceted and the theoretical perspectives falling 
under this moniker are also varied. That said, it is possible to identify some general 
tendencies and commonalities that are useful for understanding the tradition as a whole 
and Marcuse’s place in it.  
While the Marxists concerned explicitly with the problem of imperialism focused 
to a great extent on the economic realm, the Western Marxist tradition “as a 
whole…came to concentrate overwhelmingly on the study of superstructures”, most 
especially culture and, within the realm of culture, art (Anderson 1976:75-76 [original 
emphasis]). Indeed, in general, they were largely silent on those questions that had 
historically been of most concern to the classical traditions in Marxism: namely, 
“scrutiny of the economic laws of motion of capitalism as a mode of production, analysis 
of the political machinery of the bourgeois state, [and the] strategy of the class struggle 
necessary to overthrow it” (ibid:44-45). The reasons for this shift are complicated, 
however, broadly speaking,  
…from 1924 to 1968, Marxism…advanced via an unending detour from 
any revolutionary political practice. The divorce between the two was 
determined by the whole historical epoch. At its deepest level, the fate of 
Marxism in Europe was rooted in the absence of any big revolutionary 
upsurge after 1920, except in the cultural periphery of Spain, Yugoslavia 
and Greece. It was also, and inseparably a result of the Stalinization of the 
Communist Parties, the formal heirs of the October Revolution, which 
rendered impossible genuine theoretical work within politics even in the 
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absence of any revolutionary upheavals – which it in turn contributed to 
prevent. The hidden hallmark of Western Marxism as a whole is thus that it 
is the product of defeat. The failure of the socialist revolution to spread 
outside Russia, cause and consequence of its corruption inside Russia, is the 
common background to the entire theoretical tradition of this period. Its 
major works were, without exception, produced in situations of political 
isolation and despair (ibid: 42 [original emphasis]; see also Held (1980:17-
19).  
As a result, their work was both philosophical and academic in a way that classical 
Marxist theory was not; indeed, unlike the Marxists of the previous periods, many of 
those working within the Western Marxist tradition were professional philosophers who 
were integrated into and employed by the university system (ibid:49-50). Another 
important factor in the shift of Marxism toward philosophy in Western Europe was the 
discovery of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which had a 
profound influence on key figures in the tradition, such as Lukács, Lefebvre, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, and the members of the Frankfurt School, including Marcuse (ibid:50-52; 
see also, Feenberg 2014).4  
 Although Western Marxism has been criticized for this “retreat” into philosophy, 
its distance from actual revolutionary politics or practice, and its consequent alienation 
from its ostensible audience (i.e., the working class), this tradition has made important 
contributions to the study and understanding of capitalism, particularly as it exists in so-
                                                 
4 For more detailed discussion of the increasingly philosophical and abstract character of Western Marxist 
theory, as well as the influence of European idealist philosophy, see Anderson (1976:52-74). For detailed 
discussion of the influence of Kant, Hegel, and Weber on Lukács and the Frankfurt School, see Feenberg 
(2014). See also Bronner (2002:11-38), Held (1980:13-40), and Jay (1973:41-85).  
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called advanced capitalist centres. Indeed, “…the major intellectual systems within 
Western Marxism have typically…generated specifically new theoretical themes, of 
wider import to historical materialism as a whole. The mark of these conceptions is their 
radical novelty to the classical legacy of Marxism” (Anderson 1976:78). Examples of 
such innovations include engagement with concepts and themes such as hegemony, the 
relationship between human and nature, ideology, and scarcity (see ibid:79-88), as well 
as the incorporation of seemingly foreign concepts and ideas such as those originating in 
psychoanalysis. Also unique to Western Marxism is what many identify as an ever-
present and profound current of pessimism in their work, which is the mark of the context 
in which it arose. Nonetheless, as Anderson writes,  
[i]n its own chosen fields, this Marxism achieved a sophistication greater 
than that of any previous phase of historical materialism. Its depth in these 
was bought at the price of the width of its range. But if there was a drastic 
narrowing of focus, there was no complete paralysis of energy. Today, the 
full experience of… imperialism remains a central and unavoidable sum 
still to be reckoned up by the workers’ movement. Western Marxism has 
been an integral part of that history, and no new generation of revolutionary 
socialists in the imperialist countries can simply ignore or bypass it (ibid: 
94).  
 This dissertation builds on the idea that we have much to gain by bringing 
these two traditions – Western Marxism and Marxist theories of imperialism – into 
engagement with each other through synthesis of the work of two key figures: 
Marcuse and Amin. The rest of this chapter addresses the question: Why these two 
representatives in particular?  
 11  
Marcuse and Amin 
 In the United States, Marcuse’s books, especially Eros and Civilization (1955) 
and One Dimensional Man (1964), resonated with members of the student movement and 
he was frequently asked to give lectures at universities and demonstrations. It was 
through this “sudden popularity” that Marcuse’s work, along with the work of the other 
members of the Frankfurt School, became so significant to the growth of both the 
American and the international New Left (Jay 1973:5, 284; Wheatland 2009). Indeed, the 
work of the first-generation members of the Frankfurt School has been highly influential 
not only to the development of Western Marxism and its analysis of advanced capitalism 
generally but also, especially in the contemporary period, in the more particular areas of 
cultural and media studies and the sociology of consumption and leisure (Walsh 2008). 
Yet, it is for this very reason that the Frankfurt School’s work – especially Marcuse’s – 
has arguably become somewhat ghettoized: on the one hand, they are seen as Eurocentric 
and therefore of only limited relevance for understanding capitalism as a world system. 
On the other hand, while Marcuse has a comprehensive and far-reaching analysis of 
advanced capitalism and the consequences of its development for human experience to 
offer, it is mostly in the particular academic areas listed above that he currently enjoys the 
most popularity.  
 This ghettoization is unfortunate, for the analysis Marcuse undertakes is perhaps 
even more relevant now than it was when first developed. We do ourselves a great 
disservice by relegating his work to specialized disciplinary subfields or writing him off 
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as Eurocentric and biased. On the contrary, his thinking as a whole “must be taken 
seriously” (Amin 1998:104) for he provides an apt and incisive critique of the totalitarian 
tendencies inherent in the advanced capitalist centres (e.g., North America, Western 
Europe). How can this analysis be revitalized in the contemporary context? How can its 
applicability and scope be extended? To answer these questions, I look to the work of 
Amin, arguably “the greatest living Marxist analyst of imperialism” (see Monthly Review 
Vol. 59:No. 7).5  
Amin is widely regarded as having pioneered the centre-periphery distinction that 
is foundational for the World Systems and dependency theories of Wallerstein, Gunder 
Frank, Arrighi, and others. 6 Yet, like Marcuse, Amin has become somewhat ghettoized. 
While he is widely read in Africa and Asia (and to a lesser extent Europe), in North 
America he is either ignored/treated as a Third World Marxist curiosity or lumped in as 
one of many dependency theorists.7 Nonetheless, Amin’s contribution to the development 
of the understanding of capitalism as a world system, and the analysis of imperialism this 
entails, is important for being able to apprehend not only the relation between the 
advanced capitalist centres and the dependent peripheries but these centres and 
                                                 
5 For his part, and despite his criticism of dependency theory, Brewer (1990) also acknowledges the 
significance of Amin’s work, which he asserts is the “most sophisticated” of the dependency theorists (p. 
199), and which he sees, along with Arghiri Emmanuel’s, as “the first serious analysis of international trade 
in the Marxist tradition” (p. 185).  
6 Amin asserts that while he uses the terms “centre” and “periphery”, this conceptualization is in fact 
indebted to Lenin’s work on imperialism (1980: 132).  
7 Brewer (1990) is exemplary of this tendency, as we saw above, and it bears repeating that this is not how 
Amin himself sees his work.  
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peripheries themselves. Though it is clear that Marcuse did little to engage substantively 
with the issue of imperialism and the Third World, Amin himself acknowledges his work 
as important for theorizing the centre (see 2007; 1998; 1980). In my view, using Amin to 
supplement Marcuse (and vice versa) provides for a more complete understanding of 
capitalist imperialism on a world scale. This lends Marcuse an applicability/relevance 
currently denied to him while also allowing for an updating of his theory that accounts 
for changes in the operation of capitalism since his time. It also enhances Amin’s work 
insofar as it can be used to augment his analysis of the capitalist centres and their relation 
to the periphery. 
 Amin and Marcuse share an intellectual background influenced to a large extent 
by the work of both Karl Marx and Georg Lukács; consequently, both share a 
commitment to historical materialism as the correct method for developing an in depth 
understanding of the prevailing social order. Following Lukács (1971 [1923]:xxii), for 
both Amin and Marcuse the Marxian concept of “alienation” is absolutely essential to 
this approach (Amin 1980:viii; Marcuse 1964; 1955). This dissertation takes “alienation” 
as both its starting point and its analytical frame; it is a primary means by which Amin’s 
and Marcuse’s work is brought into contact.  
I begin with an analysis of Marx’s particular engagement with this concept and its 
relation to the development of the notion of “reification” in Lukács’ work before dealing 
with how Amin and Marcuse each address the issue. In Marcuse’s analysis, “alienation” 
is augmented by an engagement with the work of Freud. Marcuse argues that the 
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progression of alienation in the advanced capitalist context has resulted in a situation in 
which people are alienated even on the level of their unconscious drives and desires; as a 
result, they do not experience their alienation (or their fundamental unfreedom) as such. 
This analysis is tied to his engagement with the issue of the transformation of reason into 
positivist, technocratic thinking. Both this technological rationality and the technological 
apparatus that it has produced (and that produces and reproduces it as well) demands 
conformity and compliance from the individuals subjected to it, which Marcuse argues 
can be seen in terms of the dominant “one dimensionality” of thought and experience in 
the advanced capitalist order. Here, Marcuse and Amin have something in common, for 
the latter argues that the capitalist centres are characterized by an increasing “tendency to 
homogenization” (1980:3) that is a direct result of the commodity alienation that 
pervades them. It is at this point that bringing Marcuse and Amin into contact is perhaps 
most useful: while Marcuse for the most part confines his focus to the centre, Amin 
argues that this homogenization is in fact less successful in the peripheries (see 1977b:80; 
1980), due to the organization of the world capitalist imperialist system and its 
consequences for the development of alienation.8 Our engagement with Amin’s 
understanding of alienation therefore focuses specifically on his analysis of the 
imperialistic relationship between the centre and the periphery. 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that Marcuse himself speculates about whether or not, given the situation in the 
advanced capitalist societies, we might find that resistance is most likely to come from the Third World, but 
he does not pursue this line of inquiry very far. We return to this is the final chapter, below.  
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 The dissertation is organized into four chapters. The first chapter provides the 
necessary background for engaging with both Amin’s and Marcuse’s analyses of 
alienation by focusing on the work of Marx, Lukács, and Freud. The Marx section 
focuses on his arguments concerning the development of commodity alienation before 
turning to the question of how he addresses the problem of human emancipation. The 
Lukács section focuses on his arguments concerning reification and its consequences for 
class consciousness. The final section focuses on Freud’s work, particularly in relation to 
the issues of the organization of the “mental apparatus” and how it is affected by the 
demands of civilization as well as to his conceptualization of the pleasure and reality 
principles, repression, and sublimation.  
 Once the stage is set by providing this necessary background, we move to explicit 
discussion of Amin’s understanding of the world capitalist imperialist system and its 
development. We begin Chapter 2 with discussion of the transition from the tributary to 
capitalist social formations and how this transition produced the centre-periphery 
distinction that characterizes the current world system. This analysis includes discussion 
of the differences between tributary and capitalist ideology and the development of 
alienation, which Amin argues has a different character in the tributary mode than it does 
in the capitalist. Special attention is paid to the emergence of what Amin terms “pure 
economics” and short-term rationality as a means of understanding the world. As we shall 
see, this analysis has much in common with that of Marcuse. The chapter concludes with 
discussion of the consequences of Amin’s analysis for our understanding of class and 
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what this means for the possibility of social transformation, both in the centres and the 
peripheries of the world system. 
 Chapter 3 is concerned with Marcuse’s work. I begin with discussion of the 
emergence of “one dimensional thinking” and technological rationality before turning to 
Marcuse’s analysis of alienation, which goes beyond Marx to include not “just” people’s 
relations with one another, with nature, and with the products of their labor, nor their 
consciousness of themselves, their experience, and these relations, but rather their 
unconscious drives and desires as well. It is here that I engage with Marcuse’s 
historicization of several of Freud’s most important concepts, namely work and its 
relation to scarcity, repression, sublimation, and the reality principle and with his 
understanding of the capitalist centres as more or less totalitarian in character. The 
chapter concludes with discussion of the integration of the central proletariat, the 
containment of social change, and the possibilities that may remain – despite this 
containment – for the reactivation of critical thought, the recuperation of human 
experience, and emancipation. 
 The final chapter demonstrates the compatibility of Amin’s and Marcuse’s 
analyses in order to highlight the ways in which a synthesis of these two highly 
influential lines of thought can deepen our understanding of capitalist imperialism as well 
as of alienation as a mode of experience and way of being under the rule of such a 
system. The chapter revisits the discussion of alienation and the consequences of this 
analysis for our understanding of the role of class begun in the previous chapters before 
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turning, once again, to the question of human freedom. The chapter concludes by 
pointing toward some possibilities for future research. 
This project offers a means of both updating and revitalizing Marcuse’s analysis 
of advanced capitalism and of stimulating North American interest in Amin. A synthesis 
of the work of these two important theorists has not been undertaken up to this point; in 
this sense this dissertation is breaking ‘new’ ground and makes an original contribution 
literature concerned with critical theory and imperialism. Beyond this, the dissertation 
recognizes that there is continuity and connection between the struggles we face 
domestically and the struggles of exploited people everywhere. For those committed to 
the emancipatory transformation of society, this means developing a sociological 
imagination that is simultaneously critical in precisely the way that Marcuse describes 
and internationalist in precisely the way that Amin envisions.  
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Chapter 1: Marx, Lukács, & Freud 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to provide necessary background for engaging with 
both Samir Amin’s and Herbert Marcuse’s analyses of alienation. Of particular 
importance to this task is the work of Karl Marx, Georg Lukács, and Sigmund Freud. 
While each of these thinkers produced a great deal of written work on a range of topics, 
for our purposes we focus on those elements of their thought that carry the most 
resonance for Amin and Marcuse. Other figures of importance to Amin and Marcuse’s 
work, such as Mao and Lenin, are raised when relevant and necessary in the chapters 
below. The current chapter is divided into sections dedicated to each of Marx, Lukács, 
and Freud respectively; we begin with a brief discussion of some of Marx’s arguments 
concerning alienation.  
Marx 
 Alienation is a cornerstone of Marx’s analysis of the capitalist system.1 Though in 
his later writings, particularly Capital, he is said to move away from the term “alienation” 
in favour of others such as “commodity fetishism”, its elucidation remains central to the 
understanding of capitalism. This is in part due to the fact that although alienation is 
present in earlier forms of production (e.g. feudalism), Marx argues that it reaches its 
height and is most developed in the capitalist mode of production (see 1998 [1845]; 1963 
                                                 
1 For a more exhaustive discussion of alienation in Marx’s work than is possible here, see Meszaros (1970) 
and Ollman (1976).  
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[1844]:114). For Marx, capitalism is in fact a system of alienation (1963 [1844]:121; 
1973 [1857-1858]:488) and as we shall see in later chapters, this emphasis is carried into 
both Amin’s and especially Marcuse’s work. According to Marx, alienation is 
characterized by an inversion in which the social character of labour appears as a social 
relationship between objects; this has consequences for human experience, in terms both 
of our experience of ourselves and of our relationship to others.  
Before dealing with the concept of alienation in further detail, however, it is first 
necessary to begin with a discussion of its origins, which Marx locates primarily in a 
developed division of labour (1998 [1845]:102; 1983 [1848]:211-212). Further, 
alienation, he argues, appears in its first form in circulation (1973 [1857-1858]:197). 
Circulation of course existed in previous epochs, however, it is in the capitalist mode of 
production that it acquires a particular character in relation to the highly developed 
division of labour. This is due primarily to two things: 1) the emergence of the 
commodity and 2) the fact that the capitalist division of labour is based on exchange 
value (ibid:156). Stated most simply a commodity is anything that is exchanged for 
something else. However, such an understanding is not altogether adequate. Commodities 
contain both use value and exchange value; by “use value” is meant the utility of a given 
product or object and by “exchange value” is meant the “labour time materialized in 
production” (ibid:160) or “definite quantities of congealed labour time” (1977 
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[1867]:130 [original emphasis]).2 To say, then, that commodities are merely things that 
are exchanged for other things obscures the social relations contained in a given product. 
Marx writes,  
As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-
values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom 
of use-value. … With the disappearance of the useful character of the 
products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in 
them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different 
concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all 
together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract. 
…[W]hen commodities are in the relation of exchange, their exchange-
value manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. 
But if we abstract from their use-value, there remains their value, as it has 
just been defined. … A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only 
because abstract human labour is objectified or materialized in it (ibid:128-
129). 
Furthermore,  
To have circulation, what is essential is that exchange appear as a process, 
a fluid whole of purchases and sales. Its first presupposition is the 
circulation of commodities themselves, as a natural, many-sided circulation 
of those commodities. The preconditions of commodity circulation is that 
they be produced as exchange values, not as immediate use values, but as 
mediated through exchange value. Appropriation through and by means of 
divestiture and alienation is the fundamental condition. Circulation as the 
realization of exchange value implies: 1) that my product is a product only 
in so far as it is for others; hence suspended singularity, generality; 2) that 
it is a product for me only in so far as it has been alienated; become for 
                                                 
2 Underlying this understanding of exchange value is Marx’s labour theory of value; in essence, the labour 
theory of value can be summarized by the assertion that “[w]hat exclusively determines the magnitude of 
the value of any article is…the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary 
for its production” (Marx 1977 [1867]:129). Stated differently, “exchange values are explained and 
determined by (labour) values, where the value of a commodity is defined as the socially necessary labour 
time (measured in hours), directly or indirectly required to reproduce it” (Brewer 1990:26-27 [original 
emphasis]). The labour theory of value is one of the more controversial aspects of Marx’s work and has 
been the subject of much debate. For a more detailed discussion, see Saad-Filho 2002, 1997; Brewer 1990; 
Elson 1979; Pilling 1972).  
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others; 3) that it is for the other only in so far as he himself alienates his 
product; which already implies 4) that production is not an end in itself for 
me, but a means. Circulation is the movement in which the general 
alienation appears as general appropriation and general appropriation as 
general alienation (1973 [1857-1858]:196 [original emphasis]).  
 The delineation of the commodity as a mere object exchanged for another object 
obscures social relations in yet another significant way, one implied in the above 
excerpts. The worker sells her labour power as a commodity to the capitalist. She does 
not simply sell an object to the capitalist (although the capitalist owns the product of 
labour as well); rather, she sells her human capacity to labour to him and in return she 
receives a wage. Such wages do not produce wealth either for the capitalist, who would 
prefer to pay nothing at all, nor for the worker, whose wages only provide her the bare 
minimum required in order for her to continue to live (1973 [1857-1858]:294). While the 
worker can only buy a product, can only consume a commodity, the capitalist forever 
continues to consume the productive power of labour. In other words, what the capitalist 
acquires from the exchange of wages for labour power is “a use value: the disposition 
over alien labour” (ibid:281-282); “The use value which the worker has to offer the 
capitalist, which he [sic] has to offer to others in general, is not materialized in any 
product, does not exist apart from him at all, thus exists not really, but only in 
potentiality, as his capacity” (ibid:267). Capital, as accumulated labour, is what the 
capitalist gains from his purchase of labour power. This power belongs to him as his 
property, which he uses to generate more property; in a very real sense the worker sells 
herself and is no longer a “free social individual” (ibid:197; see also pp. 274-275).  
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The peculiar nature of the circulation of commodities in the capitalist mode of 
production is related to the development of a highly differentiated division of labour. The 
focus on the development of the division of labour is present throughout Marx’s work. In 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (1963 [1844])3, as well as in The 
German Ideology (1998 [1845]) and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2004 
[1852]), significant attention is given to the relationship between the division of labour 
and the separation of town and country. While towns existed in medieval times, Marx 
argues that due to the lack of an advanced system of circulation, as well as to restricted 
communication between towns, there was not at that time a concomitant developed 
division of labour (1998 [1845]:74). Nonetheless, Marx asserts that the separation of 
town and country is a precondition of its development. With this separation the stage is 
set; the town signifies the beginnings of the concentration of the population and of 
productive forces and, along with this, the need for more specialized labour. He writes, 
The most important division of material and mental labour is the separation 
of town and country…The advent of the town implies, at the same time, the 
necessity of administration, police, taxes, etc., in short, of the municipality, 
and thus of politics in general. Here first became manifest the division of 
the population into two great classes, which is directly based on the division 
of labour and on the instruments of production. The town is in actual fact 
already the concentration of the population, of the instruments of 
production, of capital, of pleasures, of needs, while the country 
demonstrates just the opposite fact, isolation and separation. The 
contradiction between town and country can only exist within the 
framework of private property. It is the most crass expression of the 
subjection of the individual under the division of labour, under a definite 
activity forced upon him – a subjection which makes one man into a 
                                                 
3 Also referred to as the Paris Manuscripts. 
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restricted town-animal, another into a restricted country-animal, and daily 
creates anew the conflict between their interests. Labour is here again the 
chief thing, power over individuals, and as long as this power exists, private 
property must exist. …The separation of town and country can also be 
understood as the separation of capital and landed property, as the beginning 
of the existence and development of capital independent of landed property 
– the beginning of property having its basis only in labour and exchange 
(ibid:72-73 [original emphasis]; see also 2004 [1852]:47-48; 1983 
[1848]:208-209; 1973 [1857-1858]:276-277). 
 There are, according to Marx, three main phases in the development of the 
division of labour since the Middle Ages. These are first, the separation of town and 
country and all this entails, mentioned above; second, the separation of production and 
intercourse4, characterized by the increased communication between towns, guild-free 
manufacture (1998 [1845]:75), the birth of the bourgeoisie (ibid:78-80), and the 
beginning of the money trade (ibid:80); and finally the emergence of large-scale industry 
which entails the establishment of communication technologies, a modern world market, 
the rapid and extensive circulation of capital on this world market, the centralization of 
capital in a few hands, and the “completed victory of town over country”. This victory is 
signaled by the firm establishment of the two major classes: bourgeoisie and, against it, 
                                                 
4By “intercourse” Marx is referring primarily to the interaction between people in civil society (see 1998 
[1845]:57). Civil society both determines, and is determined by, the character of the “existing productive 
forces” (ibid). Here “separation of production and intercourse” means the development of specialized 
industry within towns. The consequence of this is that labour begins to lose “all the characteristics of 
art…it becomes more and more a purely abstract activity, a purely mechanical activity…a merely formal 
activity, or, what is the same, a merely material activity, activity pure and simple, regardless of its form” 
(1973 [1857-1858]:297 [original emphasis]). No longer does each town produce everything necessary to 
satisfy its needs. Instead, “The towns enter into relations with one another, new tools are brought from one 
town into the other, and the separation between production and intercourse soon calls forth a new division 
of production between the individual towns, each of which is soon exploiting a predominant branch of 
industry. …The immediate consequence of the division of labour between the various towns was the rise of 
manufactures…” (1998 [1845]:75-76 [original emphasis]). 
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proletariat (ibid:81-82, see also p. 72; 1963 [1844]:111-113). It is important to note that 
each phase in the development of the division of labour has a corresponding form of 
property and politics. The conflict between country and town becomes, in many ways, a 
conflict between feudalism and capitalism, between landed property and capital (i.e., 
private property), between monarchy and “democratic” republic. Marx writes, “Upon the 
different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire 
superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought 
and views of life” (2004 [1852]:47). It is clear that the development of the division of 
labour is much more than merely “economic”. It is connected to political change, to the 
above discussion of the appearance of the commodity, circulation, and labour, and to 
alienation generally. It is to explicit discussion of alienation that we now turn.  
 Marx’s treatment of alienation begins, in the early work “On the Jewish 
Question”, with the distinction between political and human emancipation. The latter is 
the goal and ethic of all of Marx’s work and he is clear that “…political emancipation is 
not the final and absolute form of human emancipation” (1963 [1844]:10 [original 
emphasis]). This is because “[t]he limits of political emancipation appear at once in the 
fact that the state can liberate itself from constraint without man himself [sic] being really 
liberated; that the state may be a free state without man himself being a free man” (ibid 
[original emphasis]). Why is this? In some ways, the answer is simple: human beings are 
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alienated. This alienation has several aspects;5 in “On the Jewish Question”, Marx begins 
by addressing the fact that individuals as citizens are alienated from themselves as private 
individuals (ibid). While in the political realm, distinctions of education, religion, 
occupation, etc. are “abolished” in service of the “equality” of citizens, in civil society, 
all of these distinctions remain significant. In other words,  
The perfected political state is, by its nature, the species-life of man [sic] as 
opposed to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life 
continue to exist in civil society outside the political sphere, as qualities of 
civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full development, 
man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life, a 
double existence – celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the political 
community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil 
society where he acts simply as a private individual, treats other men as 
means, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the 
plaything of alien powers. The political state, in relation to civil society, is 
just as spiritual as heaven is to earth. …Man, in his most intimate reality, in 
civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he appears both to himself and 
to others as a real individual he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on 
the contrary, where he is regarded as a species-being, man is the imaginary 
member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual life, 
and infused with unreal universality (ibid:13-14 [original emphasis]; see 
also ibid [1844]:127; 1998 [1845]:100; 1973 [1857-1858]:83-84). 
Human beings are social creatures. For Marx this is fundamental. However, in their 
everyday lives people live as isolated, egoistic individuals; they are alienated from 
themselves as social individuals. They are alienated from their species-being and from 
their species-life (i.e., the community). The irony of this is striking: the political sphere, 
where people interact as social individuals, as part of a community, becomes seen as the 
                                                 
5Some of these were touched upon in the above discussion of labour power as a commodity and are 
discussed more fully below. 
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realm of the “abstract” individual, while the private individual in civil society, on the 
other hand, is “identified with authentic man [sic], man as distinct from citizen…man in 
his true nature” (ibid:30 [original emphasis]; 1973 [1857-1858]:164). Stated differently, 
this alienation is characterized by an inversion in which fundamentally human qualities 
become abstractions and vice versa. Again, the source of this alienation is the 
development of the division of labour; egoistic man and the particular development of the 
state and citizen have their roots in the dissolution of feudal society and the transition to a 
new form of economic and political organization (ibid:28-29; 1998 [1845]:85).  
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (1963 [1844]) alienation 
is fleshed out further and is explicitly tied to the capitalist mode of production and, 
consequently, to the relationship between labour and capital. We see here a situation that 
parallels that of the contradiction between citizen and private individual: the capitalist 
mode of production “perfects the worker and degrades the man [sic]” (1963 [1844]:83). 
Capitalism is a system in which “the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, 
this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-
sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end” (1973 
[1857-1858]:488). Labour is a social activity, performed by social individuals, in a 
community. It is fundamentally human to labour; human beings in fact must do so in 
order to survive. Under capitalism, however, all of this is alienated, and the individual is 
separated from the very things that mark her humanity. She is alienated from the product 
of her labour, which does not belong to her, from the labour process, through which she 
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is forced to sell even her human capacity to labour, from herself as a social being, and 
from those around her. These aspects of alienation are discussed in detail in the section of 
the Paris Manuscripts entitled “Alienated Labour”. Marx terms them: 1) alienation of the 
thing, 2) self-alienation, 3) alienation from nature and human life, and 4) alienation from 
other men (1963 [1844]:125-129).  
In the first case, the product of labour is objectified; “The worker puts his [sic] 
life into the object, and his life then belongs no longer to himself but to the object. The 
greater his activity, therefore, the less he possesses. What is embodied in the product of 
labour is no longer his own” (1963 [1844]:122). This has serious consequences because 
essentially, Marx argues, the worker becomes a slave to the object of her labour. This is 
the case in two ways: 
…first, in that he [sic] receives an object of work, i.e., receives work, and 
secondly, in that he receive means of subsistence. Thus the object enables 
him to exist, first as a worker and secondly, as a physical subject. The 
culmination of this enslavement is that he can only maintain himself as a 
physical subject so far as he is a worker, and that it is only as a physical 
subject that he is a worker (ibid:123 [original emphasis]). 
The worker receives a wage in exchange for the objects of her labour. This is a concrete 
way in which the product of her labour is no longer her own. It does not belong to her at 
all; it belongs to the capitalist. But, again, this is not all. She does not merely receive a 
wage in exchange for the commodity she produces in the form of an actual object. Labour 
itself is a commodity. This brings us to the second aspect of alienation: self-alienation. 
Marx asserts, “if the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active 
alienation – the alienation of activity and the activity of alienation” (ibid:124; see also 
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1998 [1845]:96). Labour itself becomes something separate from the individual; it 
appears as something outside of, and opposed to, her existence. This is clearly connected 
to the above discussion of the inversion of human and abstract qualities. Productive 
activity, which is fundamentally human, is stripped of its human qualities. Marx writes,  
…work is external to the worker…it is not part of his [sic] 
nature…consequently, he does not fulfil [sic] himself in his work but denies 
himself, has a feeling of misery rather than wellbeing, does not develop 
freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and 
mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during 
his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. His work is not 
voluntary but imposed, forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of a need but 
only a means for satisfying other needs. Its alien character is shown by the 
fact that as soon as there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided 
like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a 
labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Finally, the external character of 
work for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own work but 
work for someone else, that in work, he does not belong to himself but to 
another person. …[T]he activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous 
activity. It is another’s activity and a loss of his own spontaneity. We arrive 
at the result that man (the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in 
his animal functions…while in his human functions he is reduced to an 
animal. The animal becomes human and the human becomes animal 
(ibid:125 [original emphasis]). 
 Marx is clear that alienated labour results in the alienation of the individual from 
nature and from human life generally. This is related, again, to the fact that human beings 
are a) fundamentally social and b) that they depend on the external world for their 
sustenance. Human beings must cultivate the land, must exploit nature, in order to live. 
Nature is intimately connected with human life: “To say that man lives from nature 
means that nature is his [sic] body with which he must remain in a continuous 
interchange in order not to die. The statement that the physical and mental life of man, 
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and nature, are interdependent means simply that nature is interdependent with itself, for 
man is a part of nature” (1963 [1844]:127 [original emphasis]). Under conditions in 
which people are not only alienated from the products of their labour, but from the labour 
process itself, however, social and natural relations become obscured and appear 
extraneous (1998 [1845]:88; 1973 [1857-1858]:164). Therefore,  
while…alienated labour takes away the object of production from man, it 
also takes away his [sic] species-life, his real objectivity as a species-being, 
and changes his advantage over animals [i.e. self-consciousness] into a 
disadvantage in so far as his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him. 
…Thus alienated labour turns the species-life of man, and also nature as his 
mental species-property, into an alien being and into a means for his 
individual existence. It alienates man from his own body, external nature, 
his mental life and his human life (1963 [1844]:128-129 [original 
emphasis]). 
Productive activity, which is social, practical, natural, human activity becomes a means to 
an end rather than remaining what it actually is: an end in itself. This is connected to the 
above statement that if given the choice people will avoid work “like the plague”. It is 
merely something that one is forced to do in order to have the means to acquire 
something else. One does not feel a human connection to it just as one feels somehow 
separate from nature and isolated from others (see 1973 [1857-1858]:83-84). We can see 
here the fourth aspect of alienation, alienation from other people, which Marx argues is, 
…[a] direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his 
[sic] labour, from his life activity, and from his species-life…In general, the 
statement that man is alienated from his species-life means that each man is 
alienated from others, that each of the others is likewise alienated from 
human life. Human alienation, and above all the relation of man to himself, 
is first realized and expressed in the relationship between each man and 
other men. Thus in the relationship of alienated labour every man regards 
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other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds 
himself placed as a worker (1963 [1844]:129). 
If in the capitalist mode of production people experience themselves as “naturally” and 
“truly” egoistic, isolated individuals, if they are constantly put into the position of having 
to compete with others for work, then this infects their relationships with one another and 
with the world around them. How can they relate to one another as free, social 
individuals when their work is bondage and toil? And yet, what is toil to the worker is a 
“source of enjoyment and pleasure” to the capitalist (ibid:130) who gains capital from 
this entire process.6 Private property, then, is not only the result of alienated labour but 
also the means by which labour continues to be alienated; it is the “external relation of 
the worker to nature and to himself [sic]” (ibid:131; 1973 [1857-1858]:238, 457). 
 In Marx’s later writings (for example, the Grundrisse and especially Capital) less 
explicit attention is paid to each of these specific aspects of alienation. Instead, the focus 
is placed on alienated labour itself, and the relation of this labour to capital. This is due to 
the fact that these aspects spring forth from alienated labour and are also, of course, 
contained within it. Another difference between the early and later writings is that Marx 
for the most part dispenses with the use of terms such as “species-being” and “species-
life” and opts instead simply for the word “social” (e.g., “social individuals”, “social 
connectedness”, etc.). Yet, it is important to note that despite the change in terminology, 
                                                 
6 It is now easy to understand why, in, for example, the Grundrisse, Marx refers to “capital” as “command 
over alien labour” (1973 [1857-1858]:330, 238). 
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there is no point at which he abandons the analysis of alienation above. That said, the 
analysis of alien labour in the Grundrisse, and most certainly in Capital, is more 
technically proficient than in the earlier work. It is in the Grundrisse (1973 [1857-1858]) 
that the precise way in which labour becomes alien labour is discussed. Marx writes,  
The worker…sells labour as a simple, predetermined exchange value, 
determined by a previous process – he [sic] sells labour itself as objectified 
labour…capital buys it as living labour, as the general productive force of 
wealth; activity which increases wealth. It is clear, therefore, that the worker 
cannot become rich in this exchange, since, in exchange for his labour 
capacity as a fixed, available magnitude, he surrenders its creative 
power…he necessarily impoverishes himself…because the creative power 
of his labour establishes itself as the power of capital, as an alien power 
confronting him. He divests himself of labour as the force productive of 
wealth; capital appropriates it as such. The separation between labour and 
property in the product of labour, between labour and wealth, is thus posited 
in this act of exchange itself. …[T]he productivity of his labour, his labour 
in general, in so far as it is not a capacity but a motion, real labour, comes 
to confront the worker as an alien power; capital, inversely, realizes itself 
through the appropriation of alien labour. …In this process of exchange, 
labour is not productive; it becomes so only for capital; it can take out of 
circulation only what it has thrown into it, a predetermined amount of 
commodities, which is as little its own product as it is its own value (P. 307 
[original emphasis]).  
 The analysis of alienation is further refined in Volume 1 of Capital. Here, Marx 
claims that in order to understand the capitalist mode of production it is necessary to start 
with an examination of the commodity (see also 1973 [1857-1858]:881). In the section 
“The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret” Marx asserts,  
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists…simply in the 
fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s [sic] own 
labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour 
themselves…Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the 
sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which 
exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this substitution, the 
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products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the 
same time suprasensible or social. …[T]he commodity-form, and the value-
relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely 
no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material 
relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation 
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things (1977 [1867]:165; see also 1973 [1857-
1858]:157). 
Marx is here again referring to the “alienation of the thing” as well as to “self-alienation”. 
Within the commodity-form one is able to see the entire relationship between capital and 
labour discussed above. Again there is the same inversion: here the social character of 
labour appears as a social relationship between objects. The labour itself, however, 
retains its appearance as asocial, abstract, and extraneous to the individual. The whole 
relation assumes a backwardness in which use-value appears to exist separately from the 
object while exchange-value seems to inhere within it (ibid:176-177). This fetishism of 
commodities is a product of the “peculiar social character of the labour which produces 
them” (ibid:165); it is indeed a snapshot of the way in which the alienation that permeates 
the whole of capitalist society operates.  
 One of Marx’s greatest concerns is the issue of human emancipation. For Marx, 
political or religious freedom is not human freedom. The possibility for human 
emancipation is inextricably bound to the mode of production. In a system based on 
alienated labour, it is clear that people are not free. How, then, is human emancipation 
won? The answer for Marx is through revolution and the establishment of a communist 
society. One cannot, however, achieve this transformation simply by willing it to happen. 
The proper social conditions have to be present in order for the overthrow of capitalism 
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to be possible. Marx argues that alienation can only be abolished, and human freedom 
won, given two practical premises: 1) most people must be propertyless and 2) they must 
be propertyless despite the fact that the society is both wealthy and culturally developed 
(1998 [1845]:54). Both of these premises require a highly developed division of labour 
because, as mentioned above, with it comes intercourse on a world scale. This “produces 
in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the ‘propertyless’ mass (universal 
competition), making each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally 
puts world-historical, empirically universal individuals in the place of local ones” 
(ibid:57 [original emphasis]). 
Furthermore, according to Marx, capitalism is a system that constantly has to 
withstand crises of overproduction.7 Such crises are “so many mines to explode it” (1973 
[1857-1858]:159; 1983 [1848]:210). In The Communist Manifesto (1983 [1848]) Marx 
writes,  
…the bourgeoisie…is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an 
existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him 
sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. 
Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its 
existence is no longer compatible with society. The essential condition for 
the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and 
augmentation of capital; the condition of capital is wage labour. Wage 
labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance 
of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the 
isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary 
combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, 
therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the 
                                                 
7 Marx’s discussion of specific historical trade crises in France and England can be found in the Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2004 [1852]):108-109. 
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bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie 
therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the 
victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable (P. 217).  
Marx argues that the proletariat is capable of developing a revolutionary class 
consciousness as a result of its unique position in relation to capital; the proletarian 
revolution is “the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the 
interest of the immense majority” (ibid:216). There are several stages in the development 
of the proletariat: first, “individual labourers…in one locality [struggle] against the 
individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the 
bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production 
themselves” (ibid:212); as trade develops, the numbers of the working class increases and 
becomes more concentrated. At this point, the proletariat begins to recognize its own 
strength. This happens in part as a result of the aforementioned crises, which cause 
increasing wage fluctuation, and in part as a result of improvements in machinery, which 
“makes their livelihood more and more precarious” (ibid:213). As a result, workers begin 
to form unions and other worker’s associations. The proletariat is eventually able to 
compel “legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage 
of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself” (ibid:214). The development of the 
proletariat as the revolutionary class is further served by the fact that the bourgeoisie, 
…finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later 
on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have 
become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times with the 
bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled 
to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the 
political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat 
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with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it 
furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie (ibid). 
 The overwhelming condition for human emancipation is the abolition of private 
property (1963 [1844]:152; 1983 [1848]:221), which is the necessary result of the 
abolition of alienated labour. Without wage labour, there is no capital and vice versa. The 
abolition of private property necessitates that individuals “appropriate the existing totality 
of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity [i.e., free, social activity], but, also, 
merely to safeguard their existence” (1998 [1945]:96). Of course, only the proletariat is 
able to appropriate the productive forces in such a way as to be able to completely 
transform social relations: 
Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from 
all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer 
restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of 
productive forces and in the development of a totality of capacities entailed 
by this. …[I]n the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments 
of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. 
Modern universal intercourse cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it 
is controlled by all. This appropriation…can only be effected through a 
union, which by the character of the proletariat itself can again only be a 
universal one, and through a revolution… Only at this stage does self-
activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development 
of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural 
limitation. The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the 
transformation of the previously limited intercourse into the intercourse of 
individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces by 
the united individuals, private property comes to an end (ibid:96-97). 
 
While there have been times when it has appeared that a renewed communist 
revolution was on its way, it has yet to fully materialize. Both Marcuse and Amin have 
witnessed instances where revolutionary conditions seemed to be arising or to have arisen 
 36  
but were instead faced with the problem of fascism and the failure of both various 
workers’ revolutions and national liberation struggles. As a result, the development of 
class consciousness and the possibility of transformative social change are two of the 
main issues addressed in their work. Indeed, as we shall see, this is the case despite the 
fact that they approach the analysis of capitalism and the particular alienation it produces 
from rather different directions. Consequently, the concern with human emancipation, so 
apparent in Marx’s treatment of alienation, is one that we will return to in the following 
chapters. It is to discussion of Lukács’ work on reification and class consciousness that 
we now turn. 
Lukács 
 Like Marx, Lukács argues that in order to understand capitalist society, one must 
start with an analysis of commodities (1971 [1923]:83-84). The analysis of the 
commodity-form generally, and the fetishism of commodities in particular, is 
foundational to Lukács’ theoretical framework because, he argues, the phenomenon of 
reification has its origins in this fetishism. Lukács, like Marx, argues that alienation, in 
the form of reification, becomes more complex and pervasive as capitalism develops. In 
fact, reification is to a large extent resultant when the fetishism first encountered in 
human beings’ relationship to commodities becomes universalized, permeating not only a 
person’s relations with other objective forms in society or her relations with others but 
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also her relationship to herself.8 Again, an understanding of the commodity is crucial to 
understanding the process of reification as they are inextricably linked.9 Furthermore, 
given the fact that under advanced capitalism the commodity “becomes the universal 
category of society as a whole” (ibid:86), it is evident that without such understanding 
any revolutionary project is destined to fail. Lukács alludes to the relationship between 
the commodity-form, reification, and human emancipation when he writes, 
Only in this context does the reification produced by commodity relations 
assume decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and 
for the stance adopted by men [sic] towards it. Only then does the 
commodity become crucial for the subjugation of men’s consciousness to 
the forms in which this reification finds expression and for their attempts to 
comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate 
themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created (ibid).  
 The explication of the relationship between commodity-form and reification 
allows Lukács to illustrate the ways in which their development is tied to increased 
rationalization and specialization, not only of labour itself, but also of the one who 
labours, as well as of society as a whole. Lukács accepts Marx’s assertion that the 
capitalist division of labour is based on exchange-value and he argues that we can see the 
consequences of this in all aspects of capitalist society. Under reification, quantity 
increasingly replaces quality; the “qualitative, human and individual attributes of the 
                                                 
8 Recall the aspects of alienation discussed above. 
9 This is evinced by Lukács’ assertion, “Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its 
needs in terms of commodity exchange” (1971 [1923]:91).  
 38  
worker” are “progressively eliminated” (1971 [1923]:88) in favour of the quantifiable, 
the calculable:  
…[T]ime sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an 
exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ 
(the reified, mechanically objectified ‘performance’ of the worker, wholly 
separated from his total human personality): in short, it becomes space. 
…[T]he objectification of their labour-power into something opposed to 
their total personality (a process already accomplished with the sale of that 
labour-power as commodity) is now made into the permanent ineluctable 
reality of their daily life (ibid:90).   
The significance of the apparent loss of quality in favour of quantity cannot be 
overstated. For Lukács, this rationalization and systematization, this quantification of 
daily life, results in a situation in which various aspects of society (e.g., economics, 
philosophy, law, science) form partial systems, yet appear as though ruled by unified, 
“natural laws” (ibid:101). Yet, in reality, these laws are merely formal; concretely, these 
systems are held together by little more than chance (ibid; see also p. 102). Furthermore, 
in the reduction of quality to quantity, all ability to recognize the whole is lost. Form is 
separated from content and bourgeois thought runs into the problem of the “thing-in-
itself”. Indeed, for Lukács, this very issue is the “fundamental problem of bourgeois 
thought” (ibid:150).  
 Lukács asserts that the attitude toward, and experience of, reality in bourgeois 
society is fundamentally immediate and contemplative in nature. The world is seen as 
divided into “ossified antitheses” (1971 [1923]:141) – into binaries – such as form and 
content, quantity and quality, subject and object, theory and practice/action. As such, and 
as mentioned previously, true understanding of the totality, of reality as a historical 
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process, is impossible. The consequences of this are dire, for it is precisely the unification 
of such antithesis, and the development of true understanding (i.e., imputed 
consciousness)10 that point the way out of the problem of reification. For Lukács, then, 
the concern becomes not only delineation of how understanding of the totality is made 
possible, but also of who is capable of acquiring it. In regard to the former, Lukács makes 
clear that the dialectical method is key: 
The dialectical method is distinguished from bourgeois thought not only by 
the fact that it alone can lead to a knowledge of totality; it is also significant 
that such knowledge is only attainable because the relationship between 
parts and whole has become fundamentally different from what it is in 
thought based on the categories of reflection. …[T]he essence of the 
dialectical method lies in the fact that in every aspect correctly grasped by 
the dialectic, the whole totality is comprehended and that the whole method 
can be unravelled [sic] from every single aspect. …[T]he dialectical process 
is seen to be identical with the course of history (ibid:170 [emphasis 
added]).  
Further, the dialectical method is related to the issue of praxis as the “essence of praxis 
consists in annulling that indifference of form towards content that we found in the 
problem of the thing-in-itself. …In so far as the principle of praxis is the prescription for 
changing reality, it must be tailored to the concrete material substratum of action if it is to 
have any effect” (1971 [1923]:126 [original emphasis]). In other words, praxis is the 
dialectical unity of theory and practice, and can be understood as practical, or 
revolutionary, action. While the dialectical method allows for the development of a true 
                                                 
10 Consciousness is discussed in more detail below. 
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understanding of the totality, it is praxis that is directed toward, and capable of, its 
transformation (ibid:175).  
The question remains as to who is capable of developing both the necessary 
understanding of the totality as a historical process as well as the capacity to change it. 
According to Lukács, “For the individual, reification and hence determinism 
(determinism being the idea that things are necessarily connected) are irremovable” 
(1971 [1923]:193). Indeed, “The individual can never become the measure of all things. 
…Only the class can relate to the whole of reality in a practical revolutionary way” (ibid). 
Immediately, then, it is apparent that the question of escaping reification can also only be 
dealt with on the level of class. The individual actor is not in a position to surpass the 
immediacy of her daily life. Instead, the development of an imputed consciousness is 
necessarily the development of an imputed class consciousness and Lukács, like Marx, 
argues that the proletariat is the only class capable of its attainment. He writes,  
…in capitalist society reality is – immediately – the same for both the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat…this same reality employs the motor of 
class interests to keep the bourgeoisie imprisoned within this immediacy 
while forcing the proletariat to go beyond it. …For the proletariat to become 
aware of the dialectical nature of its existence is a matter of life and death, 
whereas the bourgeoisie uses the abstract categories of reflection, such as 
quantity and infinite progression, to conceal the dialectical structure of the 
historical process in daily life… (ibid:164).  
In other words, “while the bourgeoisie remains enmeshed in its immediacy by virtue of 
its class role, the proletariat is driven by the specific dialectics of its class situation to 
abandon it” (ibid:171). Only the proletariat has the potential of becoming “the identical 
subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality” (ibid:197). 
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 It is important to pause here to discuss more fully what is meant by “imputed” 
class consciousness. This form of consciousness is distinguished from what Lukács calls 
“actual” class consciousness. The difference between actual and imputed consciousness 
can be stated, in very simple terms, as the difference between immediate (or false) 
consciousness and “right” or “true” understanding. Stated differently, for Lukács, this 
distinction signifies the contrast between “immediate interest” and “ultimate goal” (1971 
[1923]:80) in the struggle of the proletariat. The development of such consciousness is 
complicated, however, by the fact that the proletariat “has been reared in capitalist 
society under the influence of the bourgeoisie” (ibid:310). Therefore, like the 
bourgeoisie, the proletariat is trapped in immediacy and though unlike the bourgeoisie the 
proletariat can escape this trap, the process of doing so is both difficult and far from 
guaranteed. Lukács writes,  
[t]he only question at issue is how much it [the proletariat] has to suffer 
before it achieves ideological maturity, before it acquires a true 
understanding of its class situation and a true class consciousness. …[U]ntil 
the proletariat has achieved a true class consciousness, and the ability to 
understand the crisis fully, it cannot go beyond the criticism of reification 
and so it is only negatively superior to its antagonist. …[I]f the proletariat 
finds the economic inhumanity to which it is subjected easier to understand 
than the political, and the political easier to understand than the cultural, 
then all these separations point to the extent of the still unconquered power 
of capitalist forms of life in the proletariat itself (ibid:76).  
In the above excerpt, it is clear that the imputed class consciousness of the 
proletariat entails an accurate understanding of the concrete totality of which the 
proletariat, as a class, is a part. Again, however, due to the fact that in bourgeois society, 
“formal, rational, abstract systems” (1971 [1923]:158) reign, it is characteristic of 
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existing within such a society to view, and indeed experience, “objects of history…as the 
objects of immutable, eternal laws of nature” (ibid:48). The experience of the world as 
highly rationalized, mechanistic, and calculable translates into an understanding of reality 
that is completely immediate in nature. Understanding (and experience) of the world, as 
well as of one’s place in it, is thus reduced to an “unmediated relationship with reality as 
it [is] given”; in other words, as it empirically and immediately appears (ibid:156). This 
not only signifies the character of the actual consciousness of the bourgeoisie, which it 
cannot escape, but of the proletariat as well. Therefore, it is clear that true class 
consciousness can be “identical with neither the psychological consciousness of 
individual members of the proletariat, nor with the (mass-psychological) consciousness 
of the proletariat as a whole, but it is, on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the 
historical role of the class” (ibid:73 [original emphasis]).  
Beginning with the immediacy of the proletariat’s social existence is, however, 
necessary to the development of revolutionary class consciousness. For it is from this 
immediacy that the proletariat becomes capable of seeing its existence as a result of a 
“multiplicity of mediations” (1971 [1923]:168). As Lukács writes, “man, who is the 
foundation and the core of all reified relations, can only be discovered by abolishing the 
immediacy of those relations. It is always necessary, therefore, to begin from this 
immediacy and from these reified laws” (ibid:177 [original emphasis]). Since the 
proletariat must begin from such experience, the dangers of never surpassing its actual 
consciousness are great. Indeed, “in the centre of proletarian class consciousness [is] an 
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antagonism between momentary interest and ultimate goal. The outward victory of the 
proletariat can only be achieved if this antagonism is overcome” (ibid:73). It is for this 
reason that Lukács comes to place so much emphasis on the problem of organisation, as 
well as on the difference between contemplative action and practical, revolutionary 
action, or praxis.  
Lukács argues that due to the fact that “[e]very worker who is born into capitalist 
society and grows up under its influence has to acquire by a more or less arduous process 
of experience a correct understanding of his own class situation” (1971 [1923]:326), the 
consciousness of the proletariat as a class is stratified. Therefore, imputed class 
consciousness “does not develop uniformly throughout the whole class” (ibid:304). As 
such, the role of the Communist Party becomes that of mediator; it is the conscious, 
“revolutionary vanguard” of the proletariat (ibid:329). Its function, then, is to, “hasten the 
process by which these distinctions [i.e. stratifications] are smoothed out. …The 
Communist Party must exist as an independent organisation so that the proletariat may be 
able to see its own class consciousness given historical shape” (ibid:326). It must be able 
to relate the immediate experiences of the proletariat to the totality – in other words, it 
must represent the “highest objective possibility of proletarian action” (ibid:327). In 
mediating between immediacy and ultimate goal, the Communist Party, according to 
Lukács, facilitates the development of imputed class consciousness and, consequently, 
the capacity for praxis in the class as a whole. 
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While Marcuse, along with other members of the Frankfurt School, comes to 
reject Lukács’ turn toward the Communist Party as the central means by which the 
proletariat acquires the “ideological maturity” necessary for the development of imputed 
class consciousness, praxis, and therefore a way out of reification, it remains the case that 
Lukács’ discussion of these issues is highly influential to his work. Furthermore, as we 
shall see, Amin’s understanding of capitalist ideology and its relationship to alienation is 
also indebted to Lukács, despite the fact that the former generally aligns himself most 
strongly with the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist tradition. We turn now to explicit discussion of 
Freud.  
Freud 
 Because of the immensity of Freud’s work, in this section our focus is restricted 
specifically to discussion of some of the concepts most relevant to the following chapters. 
These include delineation of Freud’s conceptualization of the pleasure and reality 
principles, repression, and sublimation. In order to be able to adequately address these 
concepts, however, it is necessary to begin by giving a brief overview of Freud’s 
understanding of the human “mental apparatus” and how it is affected by the demands of 
civilization. 
 Freud describes the mental apparatus in two compatible yet not entirely 
corresponding ways. First, he argues we can understand the human mind 
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topographically.11 Here the mind is divided into three systems: the unconscious system 
(Ucs.), the preconscious system (Pcs.), and the conscious system (Cs.). The Cs. is the 
first part of the mind to receive excitatory stimulus and in The Interpretation of Dreams 
(2001 [1900]), Freud argues that it is little more than a “sense-organ for the perception of 
psychical qualities” whose function is “conscious perception” (p. 615 [original 
emphasis]; see also 2001 [1923]:19). The Cs. receives stimuli both from the external 
world [i.e. through the perceptual system] and from the internal world of the mental 
apparatus as a whole (ibid:616, 574); in other words, “what we call sensations and 
feelings…are Cs. from the start” (2001 [1923]:19). The Ucs., on the other hand, is the 
home of the drives; it is the most “primitive” part of the mind, it knows no time and has 
no direct contact with the external world.12 Left to its own devices, the Ucs. would 
demand the continuous satisfaction of the unconscious wishes and desires residing within 
it. As a result, the Ucs. finds itself subjected to the censorship of the Pcs. (2001 
[1923]:540-541); the Ucs. “has no access to consciousness except via the preconscious, in 
passing through which its excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications” (ibid 
[original emphasis]). This means that the preconscious, for Freud, consists of thoughts 
that are latent, and therefore in a certain sense “unconscious”, however, unlike the Ucs., 
that which is preconscious has the potential to be made conscious (2001 [1923]:15, 21; 
                                                 
11 In his later writings, particularly The Ego and the Id (2001 [1923]), Freud refers to this as the 
“descriptive” understanding of the mental apparatus. 
12 These characteristics of the unconscious are mentioned throughout Freud’s work, particularly in The Ego 
and the Id (2001 [1923]), The Interpretation of Dreams (2001 [1900]), Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis (2001 [1915-1916]), and An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1989 [1949]). 
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2001 [1900]:615). Topographically speaking, then, the Pcs. stands “a great deal closer to 
the Cs. than is the Ucs.” (2001 [1923]:15) in the mental apparatus. Indeed, the Pcs. is the 
gatekeeper between the Cs. and the Ucs. In The Ego and the Id (2001 [1923]), Freud 
argues that unconscious qualities can only become preconscious if we are able to attach a 
“word-presentation” to them (20; see also 2001 [1900]:574):  
…word-presentations are residues of memories; they were at one time 
perceptions, and…they can become conscious again. …[O]nly something 
which has once been a Cs. perception can become conscious…anything 
arising from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious 
must try to transform itself into external perceptions: this becomes possible 
by means of memory-traces. …The part played by word-presentations now 
becomes perfectly clear. By their interposition internal thought-processes 
are made into perceptions…When a hypercathexis of the process of 
thinking takes place, thoughts are actually perceived – as if they came from 
without – and are consequently held to be true (ibid:21-23 [original 
emphasis]).  
In this sense, the aim of psychoanalysis is technically not to make unconscious processes 
conscious, but rather to make these processes preconscious so that they may then be 
granted entry into the Cs. This is done by “supplying Pcs. intermediate links [i.e. word-
presentations] through the work of analysis” (ibid:21).  
 The second model of the mental apparatus articulated by Freud serves as a 
supplement to the first and results from Freud’s recognition, through the process of 
analysis, that the topographical representation of the mind is too limited to be used alone. 
He therefore introduces the “structural”, or “dynamic”, model of the mental apparatus. In 
fact, it is probably most accurate to say that these two models supplement each other; 
while the second model was introduced as a supplement to the topographical one, it came 
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to be the dominant representation of the mental apparatus used by Freud, particularly in 
his later works. Therefore, it can just as easily be said that the topographical model is 
supplementary to the structural model. Indeed, Freud says as much when he argues that 
the former is descriptive while the latter is dynamic (2001 [1923]:13-18); the two models 
emphasize different aspects of the same processes within the human mind. They therefore 
serve as complimentary conceptualizations. In this second, “structural”, model the mind 
is again split into three: the id, ego, and super-ego. The id, according to Freud, “behaves 
as though it were Ucs.” (2001 [1923]:23); indeed, its “home” is in this system and it 
shares its characteristics: it does not have direct contact with the external world and 
instead of being influenced by perceptions stemming from outside of the body, it is 
subject to the vicissitudes of the drives. The id is the “great reservoir” of libido13 and it 
“feels erotic trends as needs” (ibid:29) demanding satisfaction. In this sense, the “power 
of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism’s life. This consists in the 
satisfaction of its innate needs. No such purpose as that of keeping itself alive or of 
protecting itself from dangers…can be attributed to the id” (1989 [1949]:17). 
Furthermore, the id is “totally non-moral” (2001 [1923]:54). It is worth reiterating that 
                                                 
13 In earlier works, such as the Introductory Lectures (2001 [1915-1916]), Freud actually asserts that the 
ego is the “great reservoir” of libido. It seems that by the time he wrote The Ego and the Id, he had revised 
his position on this point. For more information on this, see The Ego and the Id, “Appendix B” (2001 
[1923]:63-66).  
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the id has one aim and one aim only: the satisfaction of instinctual14 needs through the 
discharge of libidinal energy.  
The ego, on the other hand, is the “coherent organization of mental processes” in 
each individual (Freud, 2001 [1923]:17). Consciousness is “attached” to it and the 
motility of the individual is under its control (ibid; p. 25). The ego is a part of the Cs. and, 
like it, “starts out…from the system Pcpt. [perceptual]… and begins by embracing the 
Pcs.” (ibid:23; p. 40). Because of this, Freud asserts that the ego is fundamentally bodily 
(ibid:26 n.1; p. 27). Given that we typically attach so much significance to consciousness, 
it is common to mistakenly assume the ego to be definitive of our personalities as 
individuals. Furthermore, the assumption is often made that ego and id are rigidly 
separated from one another. Freud makes a point of arguing against this misconception 
and asserts that the person is id, not ego; indeed, the ego is but a “specially differentiated 
part of the id” (ibid:38; see also pp. 24, 25, 40; 2001 [1900]:603; 1989 [1949]:36).15 He 
argues that in general, 
…the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct 
influence of the external world through the medium of the Pcpt-Cs. 
…Moreover, the ego seeks to bring the external world to bear upon the id 
and its tendencies. …For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id 
falls to instinct. The ego represents what may be called reason and common 
sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions. …[I]n its relation 
to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior 
strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with 
his [sic] own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. …Often a rider, 
                                                 
14 In both this and the Marcuse chapter below the term “instinct” should be read as connoting “drive”. The 
two terms are used interchangeably.  
15 This is discussed in more detail in relation to repression below. 
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if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants 
to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id’s will 
into action as if it were its own (ibid:25).16 
Finally, the super-ego, according to Freud, arises as a result of two factors: 
biology and history (2001 [1923]:35). In terms of the former, Freud is referring 
specifically to the fact that human children are helpless and therefore dependent on their 
parents for a great length of time. The latter factor refers to the Oedipus complex, which 
is not only a part of the history of each individual but also of the species as a whole (ibid; 
see also 2001 [1929]).17 These factors combine in each person to produce a fear of 
authority; initially this authority is represented in its entirety by the parents. Later, as the 
child matures and is socialized by various societal institutions, the authority that the 
individual submits to is social. The super-ego, then, is this authority internalized (2001 
[1929]:125-128).18 While fear of external authority can be dealt with simply by not doing 
                                                 
16 The means by which the ego attempts to control the id is further clarified in the discussions of the reality 
principle, repression, and sublimation below. 
17 The “simple” Oedipus complex arises out of the “first identifications made in earliest childhood” (2001 
[1923]:31). The male child develops an “object-cathexis” for his mother; she becomes his first love-object 
and the boy finds himself in competition with his father for her affections, which he wants all to himself. 
Initially he “deals with his father by identifying himself with him. For a time these two relationships 
proceed side by side, until the boy’s sexual wishes in regards to his mother become more intense and the 
father is perceived as an obstacle to them…His identification with his father then takes on a hostile 
colouring and changes into a wish to get rid of the father in order to take his place with his mother” 
(ibid:31-32; see also 2001 [1916-1917]:207). In the case of a female child, the situation is reversed: the 
little girl develops an “object-cathexis” for her father, initially identifies herself with her mother, comes to 
view her mother as an obstacle, and wishes for her demise so that she may become her father’s wife 
(ibid:32). As the child matures, the Oedipus complex is “demolished” and the child is forced to give up his 
first love-object. As a result, “its place may be filled by one of two things: either an identification with his 
mother or an intensification of his identification with his father” (ibid:32). This is contrasted with the 
“complete” Oedipus complex, which Freud links with the “bisexuality originally present in children” 
(ibid:33); further discussion of this issue is, for our purposes, unnecessary.  
18 This “fear of authority” is in reality, Freud argues, the fear of the loss of love. Initially the child fears 
losing the love of her parents, on whom she is completely dependent for protection. Later, this becomes a 
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something “bad”, the fear of the super-ego cannot. The super-ego, as the representative of 
the id, sees all (2001 [1923]:36, 34); it knows not just what the individual has done but 
also what she wishes to do, what she wants. Therefore, “bad intentions [i.e. libidinal 
desires] are equated with bad actions, and hence comes a sense of guilt and a need for 
punishment” (2001 [1929]:128). The super-ego dominates the ego and it is a cruel 
master. Like the id, it is never satisfied; “[e]very renunciation of instinct [on the part of 
the ego] …becomes a dynamic source of conscience19 and every fresh renunciation 
increases the latter’s severity and intolerance” (ibid). We can see, then, that the ego finds 
itself in a difficult position. It is torn between the demands of the id and of the super-ego, 
which, for reasons mentioned above, are often anxiety producing. But it is also torn 
between the demands of these internal agencies and those of civilization.20  
In Civilization and its Discontents (2001 [1929]), Freud observes that despite the 
tremendous gains achieved by the acquisition of culture, people are unhappy. This is in 
part due to the fact that the aims of civilization and those of the individual are often in 
conflict. As we saw above, for the individual the aim of life is the satisfaction of inherent 
libidinal needs (2001 [1923]:54). Civilization, on the other hand, serves two main 
purposes: the protection of individuals from nature and the “adjustment” of people’s 
relationships with one another (2001 [1929]:89). Both of these aims require the 
                                                 
fear of losing the love of the community. Finally, once the super-ego is fully developed, the ego comes to 
fear losing the love of the super-ego (2001 [1929]:124-126; p. 136).  
19 Freud often uses the terms “super-ego” and “conscience” interchangeably. 
20 Freud uses the terms “civilization” and “culture” interchangeably and in fact “scorns” distinguishing 
between them (2001 [1927]:6).  
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renunciation of the drives; indeed, civilization “presupposes precisely the non-
satisfaction…of powerful instincts” (ibid:97). This results in “cultural frustration” (ibid) 
and the individual often experiences this as unpleasurable. The preservation of 
civilization therefore depends in part on coercion and this can be seen in the fact that 
people, according to Freud, “are not spontaneously fond of work and…arguments are of 
no avail against their passions” (2001 [1927]:8). In fact, he argues, work is a 
“compulsion”, foisted upon us by civilization in response to scarcity (2001 [1929]:101) 
and in the interest of the domination of nature; people “do not strive after it as they do 
after other possibilities of satisfaction” (ibid:80 n.1). We have developed defenses against 
the suffering that this perpetuation of civilization entails, and these include the subjection 
of the drives to the reality principle, repression, and sublimation.21 It is to discussion of 
these processes that we now turn. 
The id ultimately strives for the discharge of libidinal energy; a build up of the 
“tensions” resulting from libidinal excitation is perceived as unpleasure, while the 
lowering or release of those “tensions” is felt as pleasure (Freud, 1989 [1949]:15).22 
Therefore, the mental apparatus at the very least attempts to keep the levels of excitation 
present within it constant. This is the “principle of constancy” and it is from this that the 
pleasure principle follows (2001 [1920]:9, 56). The pleasure principle is a “tendency 
                                                 
21 Discussion of the full list of defenses can be found in Civilization and its Discontents (2001 [1929]:77-
83). 
22 This is Freud’s “economic view of the mind”. See Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2001 [1920]:8). 
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operating in the service of a function whose business it is to free the mental apparatus 
entirely from excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in it constant or to keep it as 
low as possible” (ibid:62). The pleasure principle, then, “demands a reduction, at bottom 
an extinction perhaps, of the instinctual needs” (ibid:85; see also 2001 [1916-1917]:356). 
However, because it is a part of the primary process, because its home is in the Ucs., 
which has no direct contact with the external reality, “immediate and unheeding 
satisfaction of the instincts, such as the id demands, would often lead to perilous conflicts 
with the external world and to extinction” (ibid:84; see also, 2001 [1920]:10). As such, 
the pleasure principle is hindered or modified by the ego, which operates according to the 
reality principle in the service of the self-preservation of the individual. This principle 
“demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a 
number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure 
as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure” (2001 [1920]:10; see also 2001 [1916-
1917:357).  
The subjection of the drives to the reality principle is able to provide a defense 
against the experience of unhappiness in civilization due to the fact that “non-satisfaction 
is not so painfully felt in the case of instincts kept in dependence as in the case of 
uninhibited ones” (2001 [1929]:79). Even once the ego has “succeeded” in subjugating 
the id to the reality principle, however, the id’s attempt to adhere to the pleasure principle 
persists and the two principles often find themselves in conflict. Indeed, the latter is often 
able to overpower the former and this has potentially dangerous consequences for the 
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individual (ibid). Despite this, however, Freud argues this kind of conflict accounts for 
only a small fraction of the experiences we find unpleasurable (ibid). The inhibition of 
the full expression of the pleasure principle through the repression of the drives is a more 
significant factor.  
Freud distinguishes between two kinds of repression: organic and external. 
Organic repression is phylogenetic; Freud asserts that as human beings began to walk 
upright, the dominance of the sense of smell was replaced by that of sight. The 
development of a taboo against menstruation and the emergence of the feeling of 
repulsion at excretory processes generally was the result; Freud argues that as civilization 
developed, the organic repression of excitatory energy linked to smell is evidenced by the 
extent to which we value hygiene (2001 [1929]:99 n.1; see also ibid:105 n.3). External 
repression, on the other hand, originates both from the ego’s attempt to obey the 
admonitions of the super-ego and from its attempt to uphold the reality principle (2001 
[1923]:52; 2001 [1920]). In both organic and external repression, however, the 
underlying process is fundamentally the same. Impulses, aims, and desires originating in 
the Ucs. are prevented from entering consciousness by the ego; this occurs when 
“individual instincts or parts of instincts turn out to be incompatible in their aims or 
demands with the remaining ones, which are able to combine into the inclusive unity of 
the ego. The former are then split off from this unity…held back at lower levels of 
psychical development and cut off…from the possibility of satisfaction” (2001 
[1920]:11). In other words, repressions are the ego’s “attempts at flight” (1989 [1949]:65) 
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from instinctual impulses that it perceives as distressing or dangerous. In repression, the 
ego takes these distressing impulses or aims and replaces them with something else.23  
In order to fully understand this process of repression, it is important to recall that 
the ego originates from the id and is a “specially differentiated” part of it.24 As a result, a 
portion of the ego always remains in a certain sense unconscious25 and the forces of 
repression stem from this unconscious ego (ibid:18; 2001 [1920]:20). In other words, a 
person is not properly conscious of the fact that repression is taking place; it to some 
extent occurs behind the back of the coherent (i.e., conscious) ego. In analysis, repression 
becomes evident through resistance, on the part of the analysand, to treatment. It must be 
emphasized, however, that these resistances do not come from the dynamic unconscious 
(i.e., id); in fact, “[t]he unconscious – that is to say, the ‘repressed’ – offers no resistance 
whatsoever to the efforts of treatment. Indeed, it itself has no other endeavour than to 
break through the pressure weighing down on it and force its way either to consciousness 
or to a discharge through some real action” (ibid:19). While on the one hand the ego 
engages in repression in an effort to submit the id to the reality principle, it at the same 
time puts up resistance, which seeks to maintain that repression, in accordance with the 
pleasure principle, for the ego perceives the “liberation of the repressed” as unpleasurable 
(ibid:20).  
                                                 
23 For example, the manifest content of dreams disguises the latent dream-wish; in neuroses, repression 
becomes manifest in symptoms. 
24 Page 48 above.  
25 “Unconscious” is meant here in the descriptive, not dynamic, sense. 
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Finally, the displacement of libidinal energy is another means we have developed 
for defending ourselves against the “suffering” entailed by the postponement of 
satisfaction necessitated by civilization. In general, displacement can be understood as 
the “shifting of instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against 
frustration from the external world” (Freud, 2001 [1929]:79). One significant form that 
such displacement takes is sublimation. Sublimation is constituted by aim-inhibited 
libidinal energy; in other words, it requires the desexualization of libido (2001 [1923]:30, 
45). This desexualized libidinal energy becomes culturally productive energy due to the 
fact that it can be displaced, or diverted, into non-sexual socially necessary activities. 
Indeed, “[s]ublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural 
development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic 
or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (2001 [1929]:97; 2001 
[1915-1916]:23). Once again, it is the ego that is responsible for the sublimation of 
libidinal energy in its mediation between the id and the external world (2001 [1923]:30, 
45). Sublimation works in the service of both the reality and pleasure principles; it allows 
individuals to obtain a certain amount of pleasure from activities that would not 
otherwise be instinctually appealing. It is important to note, however, that while 
sublimation is a powerful defense against both cultural frustration and neuroses, it is 
limited by two significant factors: 1) the pleasure obtained from such activities is not 
nearly as intense as “the satisfaction of a wild instinctual impulse untamed by ego” (2001 
[1929]:79); and 2) “There is a limit to the amount of unsatisfied libido that human beings 
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on the average can put up with. …[S]ublimation is never able to deal with more than a 
certain fraction of libido, quite apart from the fact that many people are gifted with only a 
small amount of capacity to sublimate” (2001 [1916-1917]:346).  
This chapter has provided the necessary background for engaging with both 
Amin’s and Marcuse’s analyses of alienation, which share much in common. However, 
while Marcuse’s focus is primarily on analyzing the conditions prevalent within 
advanced capitalist societies, Amin’s discussion of alienation is situated within an 
analysis of capitalist imperialism on a world scale. Amin’s contribution results less from 
offering a “new” understanding of alienation – for the most part he retains the analysis of 
commodity alienation found in Marx’s work – than from his emphasis on this concept in 
specific relation to an “imperialist world view” which, “…in accordance with the 
development of capitalism…by its very nature, has always been uneven and polarizing on 
the world scale” (1998:45).26 In other words, Amin’s concern with the existing and 
continually emergent global order expands not only the utility of alienation as an analytic 
concept but also our understanding of it as a phenomenon. By broadening our perspective 
in the way that Amin requires, we are able to encounter Marcuse’s work as applicable in 
new and important ways. Chapter 2 therefore begins with discussion of Amin’s analysis 
of the development of the imperialist world system before explicitly engaging with his 
conceptualization of both the process and character of alienation.  
                                                 
26 Amin argues that a main failure of “historical Marxism” has been precisely its neglect of these inherent 
qualities of the global dimension (2011; 2010 [1978]). 
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Chapter 2: Samir Amin 
Following both Marx and Lukács (1971 [1923]:xxii), Samir Amin argues 
throughout his work that the concept of “alienation” is essential to acquiring a suitable 
understanding of the capitalist world system (Amin, 2003:59; 1998:46, 54; 1989:118 
1980:viii; 1977:76). Amin asserts that in general all human societies have historically 
moved through three consecutive stages: primitive communism, the tributary form, and 
capitalism (1980:4, 6; 1976:13) and is separated from the one following it by a “period of 
transition” (1980:4, 10-11).1 Primitive communism, according to Amin, delineates the 
historical stage at which the transition from animality to humanity took place (ibid:10). 
Little can be known about this stage because it is “irrevocably lost” to the past (ibid:4). 
Following this stage is the transitionary period characterized by the emergence of 
communal societies. Here neither classes nor states are developed; study of such societies 
is within the purview of anthropology (ibid:10) and is of little concern to Amin’s work. 
For Amin, most important for understanding the contemporary world system is the 
analysis of the tributary and capitalist phases due to the fact that it is with the emergence 
of the former and the transition to the latter that we begin to see concentrated 
development of the productive forces, the emergence of unequal development, and, 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that Amin is not arguing here that the development of a given society can be 
understood as traveling along some sort of irresistible linear trajectory nor that it necessarily and inevitably 
will move from one phase to the next. Rather, he is pointing to what he sees as a general historical tendency 
and his concern here is with drawing attention especially to the periods of transition between phases, for his 
commitment is to understanding not just the development of global capitalism but also the possibility for a 
transition from a capitalist to a communist phase. This possibility is discussed in more detail below. 
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consequently, the centre-periphery distinction that characterizes the contemporary world 
scene. It is therefore necessary to discuss the tributary mode (as understood by Amin) in 
some detail.  
The tributary phase is precapitalist and characterized by what Amin terms a 
“tribute-paying” mode of production (1976:13). There are, in Amin’s formulation, three 
other precapitalist modes of production: primitive-communal, slave owning, and simple 
petty-commodity (ibid; see also Brewer 1990:185), however, it is the tributary mode that 
is by far the most widespread (1989; 1980; 1976). Indeed, Amin argues, “The tribute-
paying mode of production is the form that most normally succeeds the communal mode; 
it is the rule” (1976:15; see also pp. 18-19; 1980:99-100). Whereas communal societies 
were dominated by kinship relations and a consequent lack of state development 
(1980:49), it is in the tributary mode that we see the emergence of the state (1980; 1976). 
State formation is further paralleled by the development of classes (1980:43) and this 
“corresponds to a level of development of the productive forces which makes the growth 
of the state both possible and necessary. That is, it necessitates the end of the dominance 
of kinship (which can continue to exist but only as a vestige dominated by another 
rationality)” (ibid:49). In the tributary mode the fundamental class distinction is between 
the peasantry and the ruling class, the latter of which “monopolizes the functions of the 
given society’s political organization and exacts a tribute (not in commodity form) from 
the rural communities” (1976:15; see also 1980). Furthermore, the “slaveowning and 
simple commodity modes are linked with the dominant tribute-paying mode, and occupy 
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in the given society a place that is of greater or lesser importance depending on the 
relative importance of the surplus2 extracted in the form of tribute” (ibid:19; see also p. 
52). 3 In general, the main characteristics of the tribute-paying mode of production are:  
…first…that the surplus product is extracted by noneconomic [sic] means. 
This characteristic differentiates this first class mode from the communal 
modes preceding it. …The extraction of the surplus product is…like tribute 
to the profit of the exploiting class. …The second characteristic of the 
tributary mode is that the essential organization of production is based on 
use value and not on exchange value. …The essence of this tributary mode 
then is a natural economy, without exchange but not without transfers 
(tribute is one) and redistributions. …The third characteristic of the 
tributary mode is…the dominance of the superstructure. …[T]his 
dominance aids in the extraction of the surplus, while the ideology of 
kinship in the communal mode, where ideology is also dominant, aids in the 
reproduction of relations of cooperation and domination but not of 
exploitation. …[I]n the tributary mode the class struggle takes center stage. 
…In fact, the dominance of the superstructure is the first consequence of 
the dominance of use value in the economic base. The functioning of this 
dominance of class ideology has an impact on the class struggle in the 
tributary mode. The exploited class does not generally struggle for the total 
elimination of exploitation but only for its maintenance within the 
‘reasonable’ limits necessary for the reproduction of economic life at a level 
of development of the productive forces where the surplus product is 
collectively used. …The fourth characteristic of the tributary mode is its 
appearance of stability and even of stagnation, the second consequence of 
                                                 
2 Amin defines “surplus” as “an excess of production over the consumption needed in order to ensure the 
reconstitution of the labor force. This concept of ‘surplus’ assumes different forms in different modes of 
production – noncommodity forms such as tribute, rent in kind, etc., or commodity forms. In the latter case 
the term ‘surplus value’ is employed” (1976:18; for further discussion of surplus in the tributary mode, see 
2011:44-46). 
3 This assertion is in line with Amin’s larger argument that multiple modes can and do exist within 
precapitalist and capitalist social formations (see also Brewer 1990:186). While the dominant precapitalist 
mode is tributary in nature, within this, other modes persist. The same is true today. While the world 
system is both capitalist and imperialist in character, tributary modes are still easily found, particularly in 
the periphery on the national level. As Amin argues, while there is a “variety of immediate reality”, we 
must always emphasize the “unifying principle”, which is to be “sought on the level of the basic mode of 
production” (Amin 1980:50). We return to this point in more detail below.  
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the dominance of use value. …This characteristic…is a false appearance 
deriving from the contrast with capitalism (1980:50-53, 56). 
Amin’s discussion of the nature of the so-called “tributary mode” is particularly 
important given that according to the common Marxist approach feudalism is often 
theorized as the mode of production directly preceding capitalism. Amin does not reject 
the concept or existence of feudalism but rather resituates it within this broader 
discussion of the tributary mode.4 Indeed, Amin argues that feudalism is but an 
incomplete or underdeveloped tributary formation (1980:17, 61-62, 99-101; 1989:8-9; 
1976; see also 2011). Complete tributary formations, such as those found in China, India, 
and Egypt, were characterized by the emergence of state authority as dominant. This had 
several consequences. First, “…the community survived as a community of families, but 
lost the dominium eminens of the land, which passed to a broader and higher community 
that soon developed into a nation” (1976:53). Secondly, despite the common assumption 
in the popular Western imagination that the state authority in these nations was despotic 
particularly in relation to the peasantry, this was not the case. In fact, the “national state-
class…took account of the public interest and organized useful large-scale public 
works…This class, organized in a state, remained comparatively open, and social 
mobility in access to it was considerable” (ibid). Thirdly, “…the power of these 
formations in their developed condition gave the tribute-paying mode a clear dominance 
                                                 
4 Amin’s attempt here is to articulate an understanding of precapitalist societies that does not fall into the 
traps of universalizing the European experience of feudalism on the one hand and of Marx’s “Asiatic mode 
of production” on the other (for more on this line of analysis in Amin’s work see, for example, 1980:46-
70). 
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within them: long-distance trade, craft production (whether carried on by free men or 
slaves), production in those sectors where wage labor existed – all were subject to close 
control by the state, which taxed them” (ibid). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
developed, complete tributary formations are “able to digest the progress achieved by the 
productive forces. The production relations defined by the tribute-paying mode were 
compatible with a wide range of levels of development of the productive forces” (ibid:54) 
and this development favored political centralization (1980:62). Feudal societies, by 
contrast, were characterized by a relatively weak state, whose power was weakly 
integrated into the society as a whole. Despite sharing all of the general characteristics of 
the tributary mode as laid out above, feudal societies were also characterized by the 
“exercise by the lord of political and jurisdictional prerogatives, which implies political 
decentralization” (ibid:61; 1989:8). As a result, towns retained an autonomy not seen in 
complete tributary formations and “feudal landlords, living close to their peasants, were 
free to oppress them without restriction” (1976:53-54). It is crucial to understand Amin’s 
fundamental point that feudalism is but an underdeveloped form of the tributary mode 
because this internal dynamic is one of the primary reasons why the transition to 
capitalism occurred first in feudal Europe and not elsewhere––the other being the 
external and dialectically related dynamic of colonial trade (1976:36, 55; 1989:9; 
1980:63). Before discussing these issues in more detail, however, it is necessary to 
understand the ideological dimension of tributary formations. It is to discussion of this 
that we now turn.  
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 Tributary societies are characterized by the dominance of the superstructure and 
this is typically religious in nature (Amin 1976:25, 52; 1989:7; 1980:100). Indeed, the 
“transparency of the relationships of exploitation in these societies demands that the 
ideological play a predominant role and be regarded as sacred” (1989:22). Given the 
tendency toward a high degree of internal political and economic organization within 
tributary societies, the “passage to the tributary form demands a greater degree of 
coherence and the integration of the elements of abstract knowledge into a global 
metaphysics. It is not until the modern age that the mystification of social relationships, 
peculiar to capitalism, can overthrow the domination of this sacred ideology and replace 
it with the rule of the economic” (ibid). What, then, constitutes this ideology? For Amin, 
the answer lies in discussion of what he calls “medieval scholastic metaphysics” 
(ibid:23); this is “the ideology par excellence of the tributary mode of production” and 
takes four successive forms: Hellenistic, Eastern Christian, Islamic, and Western 
Christian (ibid:23, 30).5 The dominance of metaphysics in the tributary mode is not 
accidental, but rather emerges in order to serve the social reproduction of these societies 
as a whole (1989; 1976). It helps both to reinforce and to perpetuate the integration of 
various social institutions into, and under, the dominance of the centralized state by itself 
providing an integrated worldview in the form of an explanation of the “final principles 
governing the universe” (1989:28). Furthermore, “[t]he cosmogony that it inspires 
                                                 
5 Detailed discussion of each of these forms is beyond the scope of this chapter; for Amin’s discussion of 
this, see Eurocentrism (1989), Chapters 1 and 2.  
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justifies the social order in a world where inequality of wealth and power has transparent 
origins” (ibid:31).  
 Amin argues that the initial development of medieval metaphysics, as 
characterized by Hellenism, is reliant upon the following propositions: 1) the search for 
absolute truth, which is completed “through dialectical reason by means of the practice of 
asceticism” (1989:33-34); 2) the belief in an “individualized and immortal” soul, which is 
both the subject and object of all moral actions and is by its nature universal; and 3) the 
search for, and adherence to, a coherent and complete cosmology (ibid). Indeed, these 
characteristics hold for tributary ideology in general and have significant consequences 
for the character of this ideology in its complete form. The emergence of the belief in the 
soul leads to the development of a “universalist humanism that transcends the 
mythologies and the specifics of peoples” (ibid:35). The preoccupation with the search 
for absolute truth and its relation to asceticism becomes manifest in the predominance of 
deductive reason as the means by which to obtain knowledge (ibid). Finally, and perhaps 
paradoxically, “The Hellenistic expression of this initial formulation of medieval 
scholasticism is secular, in the sense that it is the exclusive product of propositions that 
neither rely on sacred revelations for their support nor seek to confirm such revelations” 
(ibid). It is precisely in this last instance that one of the most important contradictions of 
tributary ideology becomes clear: while on the one hand the propositions of this medieval 
metaphysics – particularly the assertion of the existence of the soul as universal – paved 
the way for “the success of religions with a universalist vocation” (ibid), at the same time 
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these religions’ demands for reliance on sacred texts poses a serious challenge both to the 
secularism of tributary ideology in general and to the “value of tolerance and the 
demands of scientific curiosity” (ibid; pp. 36-37). Nonetheless, Amin argues,  
…in its confrontation with Hellenism, Christianity encountered exactly the 
same problems that Islam would later experience. …[I]t was necessary to 
reconcile beliefs that had become sacred, and the texts upon which these 
beliefs were based, with reason… In order to do so, the way had to be 
opened for a figurative, as opposed to literal, interpretation of the texts. 
…On the other hand, Hellenistic metaphysics lent itself to a religious 
reinterpretation, both in a Christian and, later, Islamic context, particularly 
with respect to the essential matters of immortality of the soul and immanent 
morality. Reflection about individual responsibility and free will, always in 
potential conflict with divine omnipotence, and on the nature of the 
intervention of this power in the world, led…to two solutions that came 
practically to define the new religious belief: unlimited individual moral 
responsibility, combined with the demand that the believer have a deep-
seated conviction going beyond formal submission to religious rites; and a 
recognition that creation does not exclude the regulation of the universe by 
an order of laws which can be discovered by scientific reason and, 
consequently, the granting of exceptional status to the miracle (divine 
intervention outside of these laws) (ibid; see also p. 41). 
According to Amin, it is this “authoritative synthesis of reason and faith” that comes to 
represent the “perfected form of tributary ideology” (ibid:38).  
 Mirroring the aforementioned argument that European feudalism was but an 
incomplete, underdeveloped tributary formation, Amin argues that it is Islamic 
metaphysics in particular that “completed the work of Hellenism and Eastern Christianity 
and perfected the tributary ideology of the region” (1989:54, 58) while “Western 
Christianity’s version of metaphysics…is only a pale, unrefined, and incomplete… 
reflection of this tributary ideology” (ibid). Indeed, 
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…medieval Islamic scholasticism inspired to a great extent the rebirth of 
Christian scholasticism in the West. In the West, semi-barbaric until the 
eleventh century and, for this reason, incapable of assimilating Hellenistic 
and Eastern Christian scholasticism (which disappeared as a result of 
Islamization), the objective conditions that develop from the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries on impose a transition from the primitive stages of the 
tributary mode, marked by feudal fragmentation and a dispersal of power, 
to the advanced form represented by absolute monarchy. During this period, 
the Christian West is thus ready to comprehend the full significance of 
Islamic scholasticism, which it adopts without the slightest uneasiness, 
virtually unchanged.6 …Hellenistic thought was…discovered by the West 
through the mediation of the Islamic metaphysical construct (ibid:53-54). 
Amin’s argument here is significant, not only because it underlines his point that the 
feudal West was an incomplete tributary form on the levels of both base and 
superstructure but also because this poses a fundamental challenge to the Eurocentric 
conception of socio-political, economic, and intellectual development. Indeed, it is not 
the case that science, philosophy, economics, and politics were most developed in the 
West and that this led to the development and advancement of capitalism in these 
societies but rather the very fact that they were underdeveloped. This underdevelopment 
rendered the contradictions prevalent in the tributary mode more visible and therefore 
easier to resolve by transitioning to a new (capitalist) social order whereas in complete 
tributary forms, “these contradictions were better controlled and therefore developed less 
quickly” (1980:63, 100-101; see also 1998:61; 1976:54). At the level of the base,  
[t]he feudal variant remained weak in comparison with the original, fully 
developed tribute-paying mode. This weakness…was to become its 
strength. At the beginning of the feudal order in Europe, it meant a surplus 
of modest size but also an absence of political, administrative, and economic 
                                                 
6 Amin gives examples illustrating this point in Eurocentrism (1989:53-56). 
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centralization, the one going along with the other. This low level of 
centralizing capacity was to allow freedom to the commercial sectors, as yet 
only embryonic. Under their stimulus, agriculture made great progress, and 
the surplus produced by agriculture grew naturally, so that the dialectics of 
increasing trade and breakup of feudal relations could get under way, 
leading in turn to the rise of capitalism (1976:55, 203-204; 1980:64-66, 73).  
It bears repeating that the incomplete nature of the feudal form gives rise to a similarly 
incomplete version of tributary ideology for here again Amin argues that the “…poverty 
of Western scholasticism is precisely what gave Europe its advantage. Necessarily 
leaving a greater sense of dissatisfaction than Islam’s refined version, Western 
scholasticism could offer only slight resistance to the assault of empiricism…which… 
initiates a process of development independent of metaphysical discourse” (1989:57). 
Amin’s focus on underdevelopment as a driving force in the transition from one social 
order to another must be emphasized for two reasons: 1) as mentioned above, these 
factors, along with the advancement of colonial trade, account for the exceptional 
character of European development (i.e., the birth of capitalism); and 2) this is 
foundational to Amin’s argument, discussed in more detail below, that the transition 
beyond capitalism is most likely to begin in the underdeveloped periphery of the 
imperialist world system.  
 While I have engaged in some detail with Amin’s analysis of the consequences of 
the internal dynamic of political and economic decentralization and the ways in which 
this hindered the ability of European feudalism to develop into a complete tributary 
system, I have not yet addressed the external dynamic of long-distance trade; according 
to Amin, this dynamic developed alongside the other and exacerbated the tensions 
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existing within the feudal order. Long-distance trade in general functioned to provide 
societies with “exotic products whose cost of production they [were] unable to calculate” 
(Amin, 1976:155), however, its importance within a given society depends to a large 
extent on how much of a surplus the society in question is itself able to produce (ibid:18). 
In feudal Europe, the amount of tribute it was able to generate internally was 
compromised by the very internal dynamic discussed above. The lack of political and 
economic centralization facilitated the domination of the peasantry by the feudal 
landowners and over time this in turn precipitated peasant uprisings. This had two 
important consequences. These revolts served to further limit “…the surplus that the local 
dominant classes [could] extract from the producers”; consequently, long-distance trade 
became an indispensable source of external surplus in these societies (ibid:17). 
Furthermore, this paved the way for the burgeoning mercantilist system; the emerging 
merchant class was strengthened, as was its influence on the society as a whole. 7 Amin 
writes:  
The peasants who fled from feudal tyranny, and later those whom the lords 
themselves evicted in order to modernize the organization of production, 
formed in the free cities a proletariat that was at the disposal of the 
merchants who controlled these cities. Commodity production by free 
craftsmen and by wage labor developed, both being dominated by 
merchants. The latter were able, therefore, to do more in the field of long 
distance trade… From the sixteenth century onward, the Atlantic trade in 
                                                 
7 Recall Amin’s argument that different formations are composed of several modes of production at a given 
time, though one mode is dominant. Therefore, “every society actually presents a picture of a complex 
group of more than two classes” (1976:23). Feudalism, though tributary in nature, was also characterized 
by the emergence of the mercantilist system, which gained strength as feudal relations began to dissolve 
under the weight of their own internal dynamics. This breakdown was further facilitated by the increasing 
importance of long-distance trade, as we shall see presently. 
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America led to the creation of a periphery for the new mercantilist system. 
The trade no longer consisted merely in collecting the products that the local 
societies could offer; these societies were directly subjugated so that they 
might be organized to produce goods for sale in Europe. …The influx of 
new wealth arising from this trade…had an effect in turn upon the feudal 
sectors of the formation, hastening the breakup of feudal relations. In order 
to obtain new goods, the feudal lords were obliged to modernize their 
methods of exploitation, extracting a larger surplus and converting this into 
money. This modernization led them to drive off the land the excess 
population as happened in the English enclosures. Rent in kind was 
gradually replaced by money rent. Feudal agriculture evolved into capitalist 
agriculture, either by the feudal lords themselves becoming capitalist 
landowners or by the emancipation of the peasantry, enabling a new ‘kulak’ 
class to arise (ibid, p. 34, pp. 63-65; 1980:73, 86-89). 
According to Amin, we must therefore view mercantilism as constituting a 
transitionary period between the tributary and capitalist modes (1976:31, 67; 1980:81).8 
This period is marked by three especially significant developments, alluded to above: the 
proletarianization of the peasantry; the accumulation of money capital (i.e., the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the merchant class); and the emergence of the 
modern centre-periphery distinction. The former two are, Amin argues, necessary to the 
development of modern capitalism (1976:31, 64, 67, 157, 336) while the latter is crucial 
to our ability to understand the contemporary imperialist world system. It is therefore 
necessary to briefly discuss each before moving on to more explicit engagement with the 
imperialist system as we now know it. 
                                                 
8 This issue of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is contentious. Unfortunately, it is beyond the 
scope of this project to engage with this debate in any detail. For discussion of this issue in Amin see 1980: 
82-91. For a detailed analysis of this issue in general see Anderson (1978), Brenner (2003; 1982; 1978), 
Cox (1964), Dobb (1967), Frank (1978), Hilton (1978; 1967), Polanyi (1944), Sweezy (1984), Wallerstein 
(1974), and Wood (2002; 1995). For an overview of the debate as a whole see Mooers (1991).  
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As we have seen, the underdeveloped character of feudal society lent it a greater 
flexibility, which “…made for its more rapid transcendence through the early growth 
within it of embryonic forms of the capitalist mode. The class groups present during the 
mercantilist period were therefore three: the peasants, the feudal lords, and the [early, 
merchant] bourgeois. The tripartite class struggle involved shifting blocs of two against 
one” (Amin 1980:87, 103). The movement of the peasantry into the cities – a 
consequence of the breakdown of feudal relations – had the effect of separating 
“…producers from their means of production so that the way to a free labor market was 
opened” (1976:33, 203). This meant the creation, in the cities, of a fresh supply of “free 
and available labor power” (ibid:31, 64), which could be exploited by the rising 
bourgeois class. It is precisely this tendency that Amin terms “proletarianization”. Amin 
argues that while abstractly speaking we could account for the development of capitalism 
by looking at the internal dynamic of the breakdown of feudal relations alone, this would 
be a mistake. Rather, it is necessary to examine the “transition as it really took place” 
(1980:184) if we are to understand the actually existing capitalist order. This requires 
acknowledgement of, and engagement with, the interrelationship between internal and 
external factors.9 He writes, “In the concrete, historical formation of capitalism, Europe 
created and subjected a periphery as early as the mercantilist period, the exploitation of 
                                                 
9 Amin’s insistence on this point is indicative of the influence of Mao, who argues, “…materialist 
dialectics…holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of 
change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg 
changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different 
basis” (1971 [1937]:89).  
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which both quickened the pace of its own development and arrested and then distorted 
that of the subject regions” (ibid). In other words, the proletarianization of the peasantry 
occurred alongside the accumulation of money-wealth in the hands of the merchant class 
and this was facilitated by colonial trade. 
Insofar as the external dynamic of long-distance trade is concerned, it is not 
merely the fact that it operated as a source of external surplus per se that strengthened the 
position of the merchant class in Europe but also the particular way in which this trade 
was organized. In fact, the ability of merchants to accumulate wealth can be traced in 
large part to the organization of monopolies that began at this time. While, on the one 
hand, merchants were able to increasingly accumulate internal surplus as a result of the 
proletarianization of the peasantry, at the same time, 
The precapitalist merchant drew his [sic] profit from his possession of a 
monopoly. In long-distance trade this monopoly made it possible to transfer 
a surplus from one society to another. …This monopoly was the completer 
in proportion to the distance over which the trade was carried on and to the 
rarity of the goods involved. If there were commodity exchanges within the 
formation that were effected through specialized traders, the latter also 
tended to organize themselves in monopolies, but these were precarious, 
and failed to bring in the enormous profits obtainable through long-distance 
trade. This trade always brought about a concentration of wealth in money 
form (Amin 1976:32-33 [original emphasis], 67). 
The existence of monopolies in this period must be acknowledged not only because doing 
so enhances our understanding of how the concentration of money-wealth took place but 
also because their emergence in the mercantilist period is a precursor to the development 
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of monopoly capitalism.10 Most crucial for our purposes at this point, however, is 
understanding how these factors, taken together, result in the centre-periphery distinction 
that characterizes the modern world system (1976:155). 
 At the most basic level, the distinction between the centre and the periphery 
emergent in the mercantilist era is a result of the subjugation of Africa and the Americas 
by Western Europe. As we have seen, this subjugation came to play an increasingly 
important role as a consequence of the reliance on colonial trade not only in order to 
maintain, but also to promote, European wealth and power. Furthermore, the “trade 
relations between the center in process of formation (Western Europe) and the new 
periphery that it was forming for itself in the mercantilist era constituted a fundamental 
element in the capitalist system that was taking shape” (Amin 1976:155). Amin argues, 
however, that the primary distinction necessary for understanding the difference between 
centre and periphery in the world system is whether a particular society is “autocentred” 
or “extraverted”. The former is, in Amin’s view, a fundamental characteristic of the 
centres of the world system (of whatever type), while the latter characterizes the 
periphery. In general, in autocentric societies the economy is relatively “closed”, or self-
sustaining (1978:598-599). This is not to say that external relations with other societies 
are not important; indeed, as has been emphasized, these relations played an important 
role in the establishment of the mercantilist system and, by extension, capitalism. Rather, 
                                                 
10 This is discussed in more detail below. 
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what Amin is pointing to is the ability of central societies to satisfy their own needs both 
internally and, when necessary, through the subjugation of societies external to them. He 
writes:  
…the division of the capitalist world took place during the mercantilist 
period. The industrial centers (through the growth of their manufactures and 
the flourishing of petty rural and craft capitalism) satisfied their own needs 
(and in that were autocentric) and thus acquired a decisive capacity for 
external aggression. The peripheries, created as incomplete, extraverted 
economies complementary to those of the centers, furnished wheat, sugar, 
and precious metals. The wheat, sugar, and metals were produced within 
modes that were precapitalist in form (serfdom or slavery) but were new in 
the sense of having been established directly by or for the metropoles 
because this made possible the superexploitation of labor power (1980:90-
91).  
In other words, “…the subjection of external (economic and political) relations to the 
needs of internal accumulation…gradually created the world capitalist system. This 
system emerged as a group of autocentered and interdependent (although unequally 
advanced) central formations and of peripheral formations subject to the logic of 
accumulation in the centers that dominated them” (ibid:133). Incomplete, peripheral 
formations can be described as “extraverted” due to the fact that rather than being able to 
accumulate surplus in order to satisfy their own needs, they are, instead, tasked with 
performing specific functions that meet the accumulation requirements of the centres of 
the world system; the latter “…impose a type of unequal international specialization for 
their own benefit” (1976:191, 193; 1980:99). It bears repeating that while, abstractly-
speaking, autocentric formations can be described as self-reliant, in the reality of the 
actually-existing transition to capitalism, the internal dynamics of the breakdown of 
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feudal relations and the subsequent emergence of the mercantilist system led to a 
situation in which the external dynamic of colonial trade services the demands of the 
autocentred capitalist development of Western Europe.  
It is important to recall Amin’s arguments concerning the importance of unequal 
development for this further enhances our understanding of the centre-periphery 
dynamic. Not only is the periphery of the system underdeveloped in relation to the centre 
but unequal development also occurs within the centre and the periphery respectively. In 
other words, central nations compete with one another and are more or less successful 
depending primarily upon their own internal dynamics. Insofar as the periphery is 
concerned, some countries are more peripheralized than others as a result both of “their 
own inner dynamism” and the extent to which their development is blocked or distorted 
by their relationship with the central formations (Amin 1976:58, 133). Although by the 
end of the mercantilist period, large portions of the world were still not wholly integrated 
into the centre-periphery system taking shape, after the Industrial Revolution, as 
capitalism became firmly entrenched, this changed (1980:91).11 In order to understand 
why this is the case, it is necessary to discuss, briefly, how autocentric accumulation 
functions in the specifically capitalist context.  
                                                 
11 This emphasis on the interrelationships between the countries of the centre and the periphery of the world 
system is indebted to Mao, who argues, “In the era of capitalism, and especially in the era of imperialism 
and proletarian revolution, the interaction and mutual impact of different countries in the political, 
economic and cultural spheres are extremely great” (1971 [1937]:89). These relations are discussed in more 
detail below. 
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Amin argues that autocentric accumulation in its fully capitalist form operates in 
three primary ways: first, in autocentric formations, external expansion of the system is 
theoretically unnecessary in order to compensate for real wages not increasing at a given, 
calculable rate (1976:76). Amin asserts, “…the immanent tendency of the system is to 
maintain constant the level of real wages” which do not increase except as a consequence 
of the struggle of exploited classes through, for example, the organization of trade unions 
(ibid); in such cases, accumulation requires “a steady external expansion of the market. 
This is what underlies the necessary expansionism of the capitalist mode” (ibid [original 
emphasis]). As has been mentioned, this expansionism confers particular functions on the 
periphery in order to maintain the accumulation requirements of the centre (ibid; p. 292). 
Second, “…autocentric accumulation gives the capitalist mode at the center of the system 
a tendency to become exclusive, that is, to destroy all the precapitalist modes. …[T]he 
central capitalist social formation tends to become identical with the mode of production 
that dominates it, whereas all previous formations were stable combinations of different 
modes” (ibid:77). Finally, “autocentric accumulation is the condition necessary for 
manifestation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Monopolies and imperialism are 
the system’s response to this tendency, putting an end to the equalization of profit. …The 
way in which the system overcomes [the problem of how to absorb excess capital] is 
through state monopoly capitalism, which organizes the absorption of the surplus” (ibid). 
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For our purposes, detailed exposition of the economic principles underlying each 
of these factors is unnecessary.12 Most important is to grasp the fundamental point that 
autocentric accumulation as it actually exists forms the basis for: 1) the development of 
monopoly capitalism and imperialism; 2) the unceasing expansionism of capitalist 
imperialism; and 3) the homogenizing tendency inherent in the capitalist mode. Each of 
these tendencies can be seen, in their embryonic form, within the mercantilist system. 
Furthermore, taken together, these factors function as a means of perpetuating both 
autocentric accumulation itself and the capitalist system as a whole. It is therefore 
necessary to discuss these issues in more detail. 
 Amin argues that until approximately 1900 capitalism could still be understood as 
competitive, despite the fact that “relations with the periphery were frequently 
monopolistic” (Brewer 1990:187).13 He writes: 
Between the Industrial Revolution and the complete conquest of the world 
(1880-1900), a century elapsed that was in the nature of a pause: the old 
forms (slave trade, plundering of the New World) gradually faded away; the 
new forms (the économie de traite and the exploitation of mineral wealth) 
took shape only slowly. We get the impression that Europe and the United 
States withdrew into themselves in this period, in order to accomplish the 
transition from the prehistoric forms of capitalism to its finished industrial 
form. During this period, products were exchanged at their…price of 
production; the rewards of labor at the center were very low, tending to be 
kept down to subsistence level; the terms of trade…evolved in the direction 
conforming to the rule of equal exchange. …Imperialism…made its 
appearance when the possibilities of capitalist development on the old basis 
had been exhausted, through the completion of the first Industrial 
                                                 
12 For this discussion see especially Chapters 3 and 4 in Amin’s Unequal Development (1976) and Amin 
2011; 2010 [1978]. 
13 This tendency has its origins in the mercantilist period; recall pages 69-70.  
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Revolution in Europe and North America. A fresh geographical extension 
of capitalism’s domain then became necessary. The periphery as we know 
it today was created by way of colonial conquest (Amin 1976:186-187; 
1998:20-21; see also Lenin (1987 [1939]):203-204, 214). 
Again, the role of autocentric accumulation here is central, for Amin argues, 
This conquest brought different social formations again into mutual contact, 
but in new forms; those of central capitalism and those of peripheral 
capitalism in process of constitution. The mechanism of primitive 
accumulation for the benefit of the center reappeared in new form. The 
characteristic feature of primitive accumulation…is unequal exchange, that 
is, the exchange of products whose prices of production…are unequal. This 
new international specialization was to provide the basis for both the 
exchange of commodities…and the movement of capital, since exhaustion 
of the possibilities of the first Industrial Revolution coincided with the 
formation of monopolies, which made this export of capital possible. At 
every stage in the development of the world capitalist system the 
commercial and financial relations between the center and periphery thus 
serve the same twofold function: on the one hand, to facilitate, by extending 
the capitalist market at the expense of the precapitalist systems, the 
absorption of the surplus, and, on the other, to increase the average rate of 
profit (ibid:187-188). 
Following Lenin, Amin sees this “imperialist break” as fundamental (1980:187; 1977:8) 
not only because at this stage monopoly (in the form of the transnational firm) becomes a 
central feature of the world system (1976:174-175, 189; 2003:8; Lenin 1987 [1939]:181-
182) but also because here unequal development is apparent in the extreme: namely, the 
ever-increasing polarization characteristic of the imperialist world system (1998:45, 24, 
63; see also Mao 1971 [1937]:102-103). Indeed, according to Amin, this “polarization on 
a world scale is the most violent permanent manifestation of the capital-labor 
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contradiction in the history of the expansion of capitalism…” (2003:25-26; 1989:75; 
1980:6, 199).14  
 These two tendencies – toward monopoly and polarization – have been present 
since before capitalism became fully entrenched. Indeed, “…polarization is inherent in 
capitalism as it has developed historically and cannot be overcome within a capitalist 
framework” (Amin 1998:24, 127; 2003:57-59; 1989:75). This polarization, as we have 
seen, has its roots in the unequal development of the tributary phase and the development 
of the centre-periphery division in the mercantilist transition to capitalism resulted in this 
unequal development becoming increasingly extreme. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
monopolies were important in the transitionary period as a means both of centralizing 
money-wealth and of extracting surplus via long-distance trade. It is in the imperialist 
phase, however, that these tendencies reach their height. Indeed, Amin, like Lenin, asserts 
that at the moment “Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of economic 
life” capitalism “has been transformed into imperialism” (Lenin 1987 [1939]:183, 180-
190; Amin 1998:20-26). In other words, imperialism is monopoly capitalism. Monopoly 
                                                 
14 It is important to point out, once again, the influence of Mao’s On Contradiction (1971 [1937]:109-117 
especially) here for, following Mao, Amin argues that one must keep in mind the distinction between 
principal and basic contradictions when analyzing the capitalist system. Amin argues, “…the contradiction 
between centres and peripheries is the principal contradiction in the actually existing world capitalist 
system. I say ‘the principal contradiction’, as the fundamental contradiction is the one between capital and 
labour, whose relationship defines the capitalist mode of production dominating the system as a whole. But 
every fundamental contradiction manifests itself only through principal contradictions; these are the 
concrete forms of its manifestation” (2003:25 [original emphasis]).  
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and polarization, the two fundamental components of capitalism as we now know it, 
reinforce and sustain one another.15  
 Amin argues that in the contemporary period, we can identify five monopolies as 
dominant. Furthermore, Amin asserts that there is a triad of countries in particular that 
control these monopolies: the United States, Germany, and Japan (see 2011; 2003); these 
countries constitute the “center of the center” of the imperialist world system.16 The 
monopolies over which the Triad maintains control are: 1) technologies, 2) financial 
systems, 3) worldwide access to natural resources, 4) media and information systems, and 
5) weapons of mass destruction (2011:60, 62; 2004:23; 2003:13, 63-65; 1998:26). It is 
through the Triad’s control of these monopolies in order both to expand the capitalist 
market and, relatedly, to service autocentred accumulation, that the polarization of the 
world system is maintained and intensified (1998:127; 2003:62). Indeed, Amin argues,  
These five monopolies together define the framework within which the 
global law of value operates. Far from being the expression of a ‘pure’ 
economic rationality detached from its social and political setting, the law 
of value is the condensed expression of all these monopolistic determinants, 
which restrict industrialization in the peripheries, devalue the productive 
labour incorporated in their products, and overstate the value supposedly 
added through activities corresponding to the new central monopolies. The 
monopolies therefore produce a new global hierarchy of income 
distribution, more unequal than ever, and reduce the industries of the 
                                                 
15 As we shall see, however, it is precisely this relationship – and the inter-imperialist rivalries it has 
historically entailed – that constitutes the crisis of capitalism, a crisis which becomes manifest particularly 
in the periphery of the world system.  
16 It is important to note that the Triad, more properly speaking, is composed of the United States, Japan 
and the European Union (see, for example, 2003:7, 19, 80), however, Amin asserts that Germany has been 
– and continues to be – most representative of EU power/wealth.  
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peripheries to the status of subcontractors. This is the new basis of 
polarization that is destined to shape its future forms (2003:64).  
Amin is clear that the Triad’s control over these monopolies is “sustained by the political 
and military hegemonism of the United States” (ibid:65). This hegemonism has important 
consequences insofar as the prevailing ideology of the capitalist form is concerned, 
however, it also serves to keep inter-imperialist rivalries within the Triad in particular -- 
and the centre more generally -- in check, at least for the time being.  
 This polarization, along with the hegemony of the United States, is linked with 
the tendency toward homogenization that further characterizes the capitalist world 
system. One consequence of autocentred accumulation is the tendency for the capitalist 
mode to become exclusive, particularly in the centre (Amin 1980:7). Nonetheless, the 
homogenizing tendency extends beyond the centres – though it is strongest there – 
throughout the system as a whole. Indeed, abstractly speaking, “…if the process of 
capital accumulation could be indefinitely extended, it would lead to the imposition of 
capitalist relations of production on all the world’s societies through the suppression of 
all other forms of productive relations and thus to the homogenization of the whole of the 
planet” (ibid:240). The fact that the centre-periphery contradiction is fundamental, 
however, means that this total homogenization cannot occur; this would require a 
completely different form of actually existing capitalism, one not reared on the division 
of the world as it currently stands. In other words, though the necessity of capitalist 
markets to continually expand forms the “material basis” for capitalism’s homogenizing 
tendency – a tendency that, he argues, also envelopes “all aspects” of social life and 
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culture – it is at the same time “held in check by the effects of unequal accumulation”, 
i.e., by the very polarization inherent in the world capitalist imperialist system (ibid:30-
32).17 In fact,  
The…unfolding of the history of the capitalist conquest of the world 
showed that this conquest was not going to bring about a homogenization 
of the societies of the planet on the basis of the European model. On the 
contrary, this conquest progressively created a growing polarization at the 
heart of the system, crystallizing the capitalist world into fully developed 
centers and peripheries incapable of closing the ever widening gap, making 
this contradiction within “actually existing” capitalism – a contradiction 
insurmountable within the framework of the capitalist system – the major 
and most explosive contradiction of our time (1989:75, 122). 
 
In other words, “In its polarizing worldwide expansion, capitalism has proposed a 
homogenization of the world that it cannot achieve” (ibid:77). Nevertheless, the fact that 
capitalism has this inherent tendency itself “has powerful ideological effects” (1980:3). 
Indeed, within the centre, where such homogenization does in fact occur, where all pre-
capitalist modes are destroyed, where homogenization is in fact accelerated as a result of 
the dynamics of “imperialist development” (ibid:32), we see the emergence of “social-
democratic ideological hegemony over the working class” (1977:8). This ideology is then 
put in service of the continued autocentric accumulation of the centre and is, at the same 
                                                 
17 It is worth taking note of the fact that in his discussion of homogenization, Amin explicitly references 
Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1964). He writes, “In a totally homogenized world where capitalism 
would already have suppressed nations and national inequalities, the class struggle would finally acquire 
that purity dreamed of by certain people – unless in this science-fiction world it was too late, unless the 
regime of ‘one-dimensional man’ had nullified the laws discovered by historical materialism” (1980:199, 
217). We return to this connection presently in our discussion of ideology in the capitalist mode as well as 
in Chapter 4.  
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time, exported to the periphery.18 It is crucial that we are able to acquire a more thorough 
understanding of the ideology of the capitalist mode, not only because it is central to our 
understanding of imperialism on a world scale but also because it is fundamental to the 
understanding of alienation in this system. Furthermore, it is, as we shall see in Chapter 
4, a main site of continuity between the work of Amin and Marcuse. It is to explicit 
discussion of this ideology that we now turn.  
 As we saw above, the tributary mode is characterized by the dominance of 
ideology. This is manifest in the fact that politics occupies a superordinate role in 
societies of this type while economics is subordinated to political interests. According to 
Amin, with the transition to capitalism, this relationship becomes inverted; we are faced 
with a situation in which “politics becomes subordinate to economics” (1998:31; 
2011:70, 159, 186; 1989:71-72). In other words, it is only in the capitalist context that the 
economic emerges as an “autonomous factor” (1998:51); the ideology of the capitalist 
formation is that of economic determinism (ibid:30; 1989:71-72; see also 2011, 2004, 
1980). Nonetheless, it is important not to view the ideology of capitalism as completely 
discrete from that which preceded it. Indeed, Amin argues that the ideology of the 
capitalist mode is reliant upon rationality and universalism, both of which emerged with 
the metaphysics of the (complete) tributary formations, as we have seen. Despite this, 
however, “…universalism had remained only a potential before the development of 
                                                 
18 One of the key means by which this exportation occurs is through the spread of what Amin terms 
“homogenizing American mass culture” (1989:93).  
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European capitalism, because no society had succeeded in imposing itself and its values 
on a worldwide scale” (1989:72, 73, 103; 1980:x). Furthermore, the rationality invoked in 
the capitalist era is one that “attributes to the capitalist system…a transhistorical 
legitimacy, making it the ‘end of history’” (2004:15). The consequences of this become 
apparent in more detailed engagement with the ideological development and character of 
capitalist formations.  
The ideology accompanying the capitalist mode of production has developed, 
broadly speaking, over the course of the following historical periods.19 The first phase, 
which Amin terms the reign of “monopolistic nationalist liberalism” characterized the 
period from 1880-1945 (1998:37). He argues that this particular form of liberalism served 
both to support “the predominant role of markets (oligopolistic markets, to be sure) in a 
self-regulating economy within the structure of appropriate public policies applied during 
this period, and…of bourgeois democratic political practices” (ibid). Furthermore,  
Nationalism was a regulating fact within this liberal model able to legitimize 
the public policies underlying competition within the global system. Those 
policies hinged on local hegemonic coalitions (alliances with middle-class 
and aristocratic strata) that backed up the dominant power of capitalist 
monopolies and kept the industrial working class in political isolation. 
…[T]hese alliances were generally rounded out and reinforced through 
colonial privileges. Electoral democracy, based on these alliances, allowed 
ongoing flexible adjustment of the terms for their maintenance. …The state 
was needed for management of the hegemonic coalition by organizing and 
regulating markets appropriately (for example, by subsidizing agriculture) 
and for directing its international competitive strategy (through protective 
tariffs and monetary regulation). Its active intervention in this sense was 
                                                 
19 Amin also refers to these periods as “waves” (see, for example, 2011:51-77). Amin argues that a long 
transition to socialism would likewise also occur in waves; this is discussed further below. 
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considered perfectly legitimate, even necessary. …During this 
period…freedom was supposed to need laws and a law-based state in order 
to flourish properly. Nevertheless, the notion of democracy remained 
limited: the rights of the individual were those guaranteeing formal juridical 
equality, freedom of expression, and, up to a certain point, freedom of 
association (ibid:37-38). 
In the era of monopolistic nationalist liberalism, markets were believed to be self-
regulating and were purported to “maintain a harmoniously working society” (ibid:38, 
39; 2004:13-15). This particular manifestation of bourgeois thought enters its crisis with 
the First World War; the promises of societal harmony were unfulfilled (ibid) and this 
could be seen most clearly in the fact that political-economic competition devolved into 
out-and-out war. Nonetheless, this form of liberalism persisted for another thirty years, 
due in part, Amin argues, to the weakness and isolation of the working class at this time 
(1998:39).20  
 With the advent of the Second World War, this changed, for this was a period 
“which upset the balance of social forces in favor of the working classes and oppressed 
peoples” (Amin 1998:39, 40), in part due to the defeat of fascism in Europe. The 
ideology of the period 1945-1980 was built partly upon the critique of liberalism, seen 
most clearly in the Keynesianism (or neo-Keynesianism) of the period. According to 
Amin, this ideology operated “within the framework of a controlled globalization”21 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed analysis of this period, see especially Polanyi (1944), whom Amin asserts is the first 
to “understand the nature and bearing of the crystallization of this…thought” (1998:40).  
21 Amin cites “the Marshall Plan, the expansion of multinational corporations, UNCTAD, GATT, and the 
organization of collective North-South discussions within the UN framework” as illustrations of this 
(1998:41). We could perhaps think of the World Bank and the IMF, both established at the end of World 
War II, as further examples.  
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(ibid:40, 41) and though it stemmed from the critique of liberalism, rather than leave 
liberal tenets behind, it instead “rearranged them incompletely” (ibid:41). Consequently, 
it was fundamentally reformist. Indeed,  
Labor was still treated as a commodity, but the severity of its treatment was 
mitigated through the three principles of collective bargaining, social 
insurance, and wage increases proportional to productivity increases. 
Contrariwise, natural resources remained the object of systematic and 
aggravated wastage, which is the inescapable consequence of the absurd 
“discounting of the future” characteristic of “rational” short-run economic 
calculation…22 Money, on the other hand, was…subject to political control 
at both governmental and global levels. (The purpose of Bretton Woods was 
to maintain stable exchange rates). …The essential political objectives 
operative during this period, and consequently, the methods employed for 
those purposes…held that solidarity – which was expressed in a remarkable 
stability of income distribution, in full employment, and in continual 
increases in social expenditures – needed to be maintained on the national 
level through policies of systematic state intervention… The basic aims of 
these welfare state practices were analogous to those of modernization and 
industrialization for the newly independent countries of the third world… 
We can thus characterize this single thought as dominant on a global scale, 
excluding only the zone of Sovietism. …Thus, the single thought of the 
1945-1980 phase was not merely an “economic theory” (that of 
Keynesianism and the macroeconomic management flowing from it) but 
was likewise the expression of a true corporate project which, though 
capitalist, was also “social” (ibid:41-42; 1976:70-72).  
In other words, the focus on social and economic welfare, as well as on “controlled 
globalization” still operates in the service of capitalist interests, particularly the continued 
autocentric accumulation of the centres of the world system. The increasing role of 
multinational organizations serves to protect the interests of monopoly, though this aim 
                                                 
22 We return to this issue of short-term rationality as a particularly destructive characteristic of capitalist 
ideology below. 
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continues to be hidden behind “rhetoric about the virtue of competition” (ibid:44). 
Nonetheless, though this phase lasted for approximately 35 years, it too fell into a crisis 
resultant from the inability to deliver on the promise of continual market growth; by 
1990, this culminated in the “generalized collapse” of 1) the welfare state, 2) the project 
of modernization and industrialization for the Third World, and 3) the Soviet system 
(ibid:42-43; see also 2011).  
Amin argues that the contemporary period is marked by an intensification of the 
reliance on so-called “pure economics” as a means of understanding the world. It is a 
time of “crisis management” borne of the attempt to manage the collapse of the former 
period through a return to the dogma of self-regulating markets, privatization, free-trade, 
international competition, and the like (1998:43, 46; 2003:16-17). For this reason, Amin 
describes it as a “globalized” or “social” neoliberalism” (ibid).23 Yet, despite this 
rhetoric, in the current period American hegemonism is central and is maintained by a 
U.S. global strategy based on three main principles: 1) “the rapid substitution of NATO 
for the UN as the means of running the international order”; 2) “the alignment of Europe 
with Washington’s strategic objectives, through a return to the traditional principle prior 
to the creation of the UN…(that is, war as a means of solving political disputes)”; and 3) 
“a choice of military methods that strengthen American hegemony (risk-free bombing 
and use of European troops as possible auxiliaries on the ground)” (2003:81; see also 
                                                 
23 Indeed, Amin also refers to this period as one characterized by “globalization gone wild” (see, for 
example, 2004:43; 1998:43). 
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2004:75-99). Indeed, underlying the current neoliberal global order is this American 
hegemony, which can be seen as the manifestation par excellence of the militarization of 
“liberal economic governance”;24 this in turn facilitates “Triad hegemony over the world 
system” provided that the other Triad members fall into step with the United States 
(ibid:101, 112).25 Furthermore, the turn toward a “globalized neoliberalism” both results 
from, and in turn perpetuates, the decreasing strength of the working and oppressed 
classes that characterized the preceding period. Indeed, the policies and practices 
dominant in the contemporary period are 
…applied in a way that at times flagrantly contradicts the dogmas from 
which they stem. The vaunted globalization remains curtailed to the 
detriment of labor markets and, to an ever-increasing extent, by 
strengthened restrictions against immigration; rhetoric about the virtue of 
competition barely hides how in practice monopolies are systematically 
defended (as is visible in the dealings of the…World Trade 
Organization…); and insistence on discounting the future reduces to zero 
the significance of environmentalist discourse. Finally, belying their 
affirmation of internationalist principles, the Great Powers (conspicuously 
the United States) continually apply raw power in all domains, whether 
military…or economic. …The new single thought and the policies 
following from it are directed at systematically dismantling the specific 
rights that had been achieved by the workers and lower classes. Given this, 
all its discourse about democracy is exposed as empty rhetoric, unrelated to 
reality” (1998:44-45; see also 2004:25; 2003:1, 99-100). 
                                                 
24 For more on militarization and the tendency toward “permanent war” characterizing the current world 
system see Amin 2011:1-18, 72, 138, 155, 159, 185; this discussion will be relevant to the arguments 
presented in Chapter 4. 
25 It is important to note, however, that this American hegemony is never secure due to the fact that it is 1) 
“always under threat from the evolving relationship of forces among the partners in the world system” 
(Amin 2003:78) and 2) based on the “parasitic character of the U.S. economy and society – a parasitism 
that makes it highly vulnerable” (ibid:80; 2004:105).  
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I raise the above not in an attempt to provide a thorough or exhaustive discussion 
of the domestic and transnational circumstances prevalent in each of these periods but, 
rather, in order to present the general context in which to situate our understanding of the 
dominant ideological perspective of the capitalist epoch as a whole. Indeed, the periods 
that Amin identifies are not discrete; he argues that taken together they are a 
manifestation of an  
…imperialist world view, in accord with the development of capitalism 
which, by its very nature, has always been uneven and polarizing on a world 
scale. During the monopolistic nationalist liberal phase…imperialism was 
(or rather imperialisms were) synonymous with conflict among imperialist 
powers… In contrast, the social and national postwar phase…was 
characterized on the one hand by the strategic convergence of national 
imperialisms under the discipline of a hegemonic United States, and on the 
other by a retreat of imperialism, which was forced to withdraw from the 
regions of “real socialism” (the U.S.S.R, Eastern Europe, China) and to 
bargain with national liberation movements over the terms under which it 
would maintain its position in its Asian, African, and Latin American 
peripheries. Now that “really existing socialism” and third world radical 
populism have met their ruin, imperialism is once again on the offensive. 
The “globalization” thesis proclaimed so arrogantly by the current ideology 
is nothing but a new way in which the inherently imperialist nature of the 
system asserts itself. In this sense, it can be said that “globalization” is a 
euphemism for that forbidden word, imperialism (1998:45-46; 2011).  
Stated differently, these periods are all characterized by the same fundamental rationality, 
a rationality that is both economistic and shortsighted in nature and the imperialist project 
is itself reliant upon this rationality. As we have seen, this has an effect on policy and 
practice, both military and economic. But the consequences of this can be seen on the 
“purely” superstructural level as well, in two apparently contradictory trends: 1) the 
aforementioned reliance on “pure economics” – and one of its manifestations, positivism 
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– as the means by which to understand the world and 2) the increasing popularity of post-
modernism. Indeed, the latter, Amin argues, has emerged as the dominant form of liberal 
discourse today. In order to engage with these issues in more detail, however, it is first 
necessary to discuss briefly Amin’s arguments concerning Enlightenment thought.  
As we will see, like Marcuse, Amin argues that in order to understand the 
emergence of capitalist ideology, instrumental rationality, and the particular character of 
alienation in this period, we must look specifically at the changes brought about by the 
Enlightenment (1989:80).26 These changes did not develop in a vacuum, however. 
Rather,  
…society, transformed by the nascent capitalist relationships of production, 
was forced to call the tributary ideological construct, the construct of 
medieval scholasticism, into question. It was therefore real social change 
that brought about transformation in the field of ideas… It took two or three 
centuries before the new dominant ideology crystallized, the period of 
transition from mercantilism to fully developed capitalism, extending from 
the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The decisive step is the development 
of English political economy, at the moment when the Industrial Revolution 
and the French Revolution brought about the triumph of bourgeois power 
and the beginnings of the generalization of wage labor. The center of gravity 
shifts from metaphysics to economics, and economism becomes the content 
of the dominant ideology (ibid:87).  
According to Amin, the thought emerging from these conditions “…is founded on a 
tradition of mechanistic materialism that posits chains of causal determinations. Principal 
among these is that science and technology determine by their autonomous progress the 
                                                 
26 Marcuse’s arguments on this issue are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 while the connection between 
Amin and Marcuse on this subject is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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advance of all spheres of life. Class struggle is removed from history and replaced by a 
mechanistic determination that imposes itself as an external force, a law of nature” 
(ibid:80). In other words, with the emergence of this philosophy, the metaphysics that 
dominated tributary formations gives way to the preoccupation with the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge through empirical experimentation and the belief that the whole of 
social and political life can be explained by the discovery of the “laws” governing 
them.27 Indeed, “…entire areas of social life are henceforth conceivable independently of 
one another. The need to satisfy metaphysical yearnings is left to individual conscience” 
(ibid:82). Rather than seeing the prevailing order as made up of, and resultant from, 
complex interrelationships between, for example, history, the struggle of oppressed 
classes, the state, and so on, this thought treats each – insofar as it recognizes them at all 
– as an autonomous factor, an independent object of analysis. Even the relation between 
various fields of human knowledge is destroyed by the turn away from a metaphysical 
concern with cosmogony toward positivistic science; as a result, so-called “natural 
science” henceforth exists independently from “social science” and the disciplines they 
contain subsist as autonomous, as partial systems (2004:54, 72). Furthermore, at a more 
basic level, Enlightenment thought affirms “a separation – in fact, opposition – between 
humankind and nature” and “opens the way to treating nature as a thing, even to 
                                                 
27 Here the influence of Lukács’ arguments concerning reification (recall Chapter 1) is especially evident.  
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destroying it, thereby threatening the very survival of humanity” (ibid:81; 2003:64).28 
According to Amin, all of this is indicative of the “generalization of market relationships” 
which “penetrate all aspects of social life and subject them to their logic” (1989:81; 
1997:136). Stated differently, while on the one hand each aspect of society acquires 
autonomy, they are at the same time held together by an overarching, chiefly ideological, 
project: the ostensible “understanding” and therefore management of the new capitalist 
order (1989:82, 86).29  
In the contemporary context, the outcome of this is a situation in which the 
rhetoric and practices employed in order to apprehend the dominant order in fact serve 
capitalist ideology by obscuring the understanding of the operation and character of 
actually-existing capitalism, thus perpetuating it. For example, appeals to the importance 
of “deregulation” in fact hide “…a reality that dare not speak its name: one-sided 
regulation of markets by capital” (Amin 2003:16), specifically and especially through the 
strengthening and spread of monopoly. This concept, like others propagated by neo-
liberal discourse (e.g., competition, free trade, privatization) in fact has no basis in reality 
(2004:13). Economism, which asserts the primacy of so-called “pure economics” as the 
means by which to comprehend the prevailing system, is problematic due to the fact that 
                                                 
28 Indeed, in Amin’s most recent writings (for example, 2011:33-35), he argues that this threat has become 
a real possibility and is only heightened by the short-term rationality that prevails in contemporary 
oligopolistic capitalism. 
29 As is perhaps apparent, Amin’s arguments here are intimately related to his conceptualization of 
alienation, which he argues takes a different form in capitalist, as opposed to tributary, formations. This is 
discussed in more detail below.  
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rather than enhance our comprehension of the actually-existing capitalist imperialist order 
it instead offers only “the theory of an imaginary world” (ibid:15, 16; 1998:30-31); it 
takes the individual, specifically constructed as Homo oeconomicus, not only as its 
starting point but as its basis (1998:133-134) and from this foundation, claims to discover 
– through the use of complex formulas and models, which it terms “scientific” and hence 
“objective, neutral and unavoidable” (2004:15) – the rational “laws” governing individual 
behaviour and by extension the social order as a whole. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, pure economics is borne out of and in turn perpetuates a rationality that, in its 
characteristic shortsightedness, not only facilitates the belief in capitalism as the “end of 
history” but in fact discounts historical memory entirely. As Amin argues,  
…pure economics is conceived as totally ahistorical, blind to every past or 
present dimension of social reality, blind to all possibilities of future 
evolution. It recognizes only “the individual” … Its preferred fable is of 
Crusoe on his island – the timeless, placeless individual human. It is 
separated from the scientific spirit by a full 180 degrees. …[B]ourgeois 
economics…and, a fortiori, its distillation “pure economics”…is 
exclusively based on a single preoccupation, a preoccupation with showing 
that “the market” rules with the force of natural law, producing not merely 
a “general equilibrium” but the best of all possible equilibria, guaranteeing 
full employment in freedom, the “social optimum”. And this preoccupation 
is nothing but the expression of a fundamental ideological need, the need to 
legitimize capitalism by making it synonymous with rationality – which, in 
conformity with bourgeois ideology, is seen as nothing more than the use 
of technically rational means for the individual pursuit of mercantile profit. 
…The discourse of pure economics has no real aim other than to legitimize 
the unrestricted predations of capital (1998:143, 135-136; 1989:76-77; 
1980:23; 1977:79).30  
                                                 
30 Amin emphasizes this point in The Liberal Virus (2004). Here, taking the United States as emblematic of 
this way of orienting to the world, he argues, “…one of the major weaknesses of American thought, 
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Enlightenment thought, in its turn away from metaphysics, represents the secularization 
of the world (1989:81-82; 1998:95; 1980:34-35). Yet, in its attempt to liquidate myth it 
has instead, over time, replaced the old myths with that of pure economics. Amin writes, 
“…there is no realism at all about pure economics, which abstracts from reality (classes, 
states, the global system) so that its discourse, emptied of reality, is left a mythical fable” 
(1998:144).31 This fable, however, is accompanied and enhanced by another story, one 
that further serves as an “ideological accessory to liberalism” (2004:19): postmodernism.  
 For Amin, the emergence of postmodernism as the dominant means of orienting 
toward and theorizing the social and political world does not contain transformative or 
emancipatory potential, nor is it benign. This approach is dangerous precisely because it 
serves to bolster liberalism more generally, regardless of any claims to the contrary. But 
how does it do this? Stated simply, as liberalism’s dominant ideological manifestation, it 
exacerbates a culturalist approach to history; the story that it tells is one of histories 
(individual, cultural, etc.) that are fundamentally unrelated to one another. Indeed, in this 
view, human history appears  
                                                 
resulting from its history and its ideology, is that it has no long-term vision. This thought is embedded in 
the immediate about which it collects an alarmingly large quantity of data… The future, in these 
conditions, is always conceived as the simple projection of the immediate. …This is why American 
imperialism will be infinitely more barbaric than were earlier forms of European imperialism” (p. 80). 
31 Indeed, Amin argues that so-called pure economics is the “witchcraft of the contemporary world” 
(2011:156). His analysis of Enlightenment in general, and “pure economics” in particular, has much in 
common with both Marcuse’s thought as well as that of Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (2002 [1944]). This connection is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
 93  
as if it were composed of a succession of particular trajectories and 
evolutions, without any connections with each other, except by chance. 
Each of these successions can only be explained by particular causalities 
and sequences of events. This method reinforces the tendency towards 
“culturalisms”, that is, the idea that each people is identified by the specifics 
of its culture, which are mostly “transhistoric”, in the sense that they persist 
in spite of change (Amin, 2011:40). 
Furthermore, according to postmodernist discourse, “nations and classes have already left 
the scene and ceded political space to the individual, who is now the active subject of 
social transformation” (ibid:14; 2004:57-58; 1998:33-35). While it is true that 
postmodern analysis has succeeded in providing some important insights into the nature 
of, for example, oppression and power, for Amin, the approach as a whole is 
irredeemable insofar as it actually  
…methodically lays out, without concern for overall coherence, one 
argument after another encouraging suspicion towards the concepts of 
progress and universalism. But far from deepening the serious critique of 
these expressions of Enlightenment culture and bourgeois history, far from 
analyzing their actual contradictions…this discourse is satisfied with 
substituting the impoverished propositions of liberal American ideology for 
a true critique…[It] abstain[s] from reflecting on the nature of the system, 
and particularly from calling into question its choices of the moment. The 
praise for inherited diversities proposed in place of the necessary effort to 
transcend the limits of bourgeois universalism thus functions in perfect 
accord with the requirements of contemporary imperialism’s project of 
globalization, a project that can produce only an organized system of 
apartheid on a world scale, sustained as it is by reactionary 
“communitarian” ideologies in the North American tradition (2004:20; 
2011:192).  
Postmodern discourse is unable to account for the realities of the imperialist world 
system. It offers little insight into the way in which contemporary capitalism is 
characterized by globalized “accumulation through dispossession” (i.e., by the 
 94  
autocentred accumulation of the centres at the expense of the vast majority of the world’s 
population) (Amin 2011:19, 112; 2004; 1980:225-230). In this sense, the analysis of 
capitalist social, political, and economic relations is “outside of history” (2004:23) and is 
blind to the reality of uneven, polarizing imperialist expansion. Furthermore, the new 
“Empire” that much postmodern analysis takes as its focus (or at the very least takes for 
granted) is “defined naively as a ‘network of powers’ whose centre is everywhere and 
nowhere, which thus dilutes the importance of the national state…[which is] simply 
evaded by the gratuitous affirmation that the state has almost ceased to exist” (ibid:25). 
The reality, however, is that the Triad states do in fact impose “collective domination 
over the whole of the planet’s peripheries by means of institutions put into place and 
under its management for that purpose” (ibid). As a consequence, rather than illuminating 
the current conjuncture, postmodernism obscures it, and in much the same way as 
economism it functions to reinforce a fundamentally alienated orientation to the world.32  
The culturalist tendency that postmodernism intentionally or unintentionally 
promotes has serious consequences for the actual struggles on the ground in both the 
periphery of the world system and the centre. In the peripheries, the culturalist turn often 
becomes manifest in religious or ethnic fundamentalisms (Amin 2004:21; 2011:78-99; 
1980:177-178). In the centres, demonstrations for change often centre on identity issues 
                                                 
32 Because of this, Amin also refers to postmodernism as a “negative utopia”, arguing that it “expresses 
capitulation to the demands of capitalist political economy in its current phase, in the hope – the utopian 
hope – of ‘humanely’ managing the system. This position is untenable. …What the postmodernists refuse 
to see is that modernity can progress further only by going beyond capitalism” (1998:101-103; 1997:137; 
2003:151).  
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or, particularly after the financial crisis of 2008, “anti-corporatism”. Neither perspective 
is able to actually get at the root cause of oppression and exploitation. Further, with the 
“abandonment of Marxism” and the rise of postmodern discourse “…after the waning of 
the first wave of struggles for the emancipation of workers and of peoples in the 20th 
century” we saw not “an increased consciousness of the need of the dominated and 
exploited for internationalism, but a retreat to positions of charity and humanitarianism” 
(2011:130). But the “catching up” of the dominated peripheries through international 
“aid” and “development” schemes is an impossibility; it is abrogated by the very nature 
of the system itself, a system that is, again, inherently polarizing and uneven on a world 
scale and operates according to a logic that “…is no longer able to ensure the simple 
survival of humanity” (2011:106).33 
 For Amin the current ideological orientation has consequences not just for foreign 
policy (military, economic, and “humanitarian”), but for domestic civil society as well. 
                                                 
33 Here Amin is referring both to climate change and general environmental destruction as well as to the 
expansionist requirements of the system. The latter cannot “resolve the peasant question: the only prospects 
it can offer are a planet full of slums and billions of ‘too many’ human beings” (2011:105-106; see also 
2003:92-100). The capitalist modernization of agriculture in the Third World is impossible. As Amin 
writes, “…if some 50 million more modern farms were given access to the large areas of land which would 
be necessary (taking it from the peasant economy and of course choosing the best soils) and if they had 
access to the capital markets, enabling them to equip themselves, they could produce the essential of what 
the creditworthy urban consumers still currently obtain from peasant agriculture. But what would happen to 
the billions of non-competitive peasant producers? They would be inexorably eliminated in a short period 
of time, a few decades. What would happen to these billions of human beings, most of them already the 
poorest of the poor, but who feed themselves, for better and for worse (and for a third of them, it is for the 
worse)? Within 50 years, no industrial development, more or less competitive, even in a far-fetched 
hypothesis of a continual yearly growth of 7 percent for three-quarters of humanity, could absorb even a 
third of this labor reserve” (ibid: 105). In other words, “Capitalism has reached the stage where the pursuit 
of profit requires ‘enclosure’ policies at the world level, like the enclosures that took place in England in 
the first stage of its (modern) development. Now, however, the destruction of the peasant reserves of cheap 
labour at the world level will result in nothing less than the genocide of half of humanity” (ibid:124).  
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According to the dominant ideological discourse, the state is seen as less significant than 
the more abstract “network of powers” and as an outmoded enemy of freedom 
(2011:134), particularly insofar as it is framed as simply beholden to, for example, “big 
business”. Amin argues that the consequence of this is a focus on corporate interest as the 
locus of power and through its critique of this state of affairs, the ideology in fact 
“legitimize[s] the ‘jungle of business’, as is illustrated by the ongoing financial crisis” 
(ibid). Again, rather than illuminating the social, political, and economic relations that 
define the capitalist imperialist reality, they remain opaque and civil society, too, 
becomes  
…the collection of neighbourhood assemblies, of communities (the concept 
cannot be separated from the communitarian ideology), of local interests 
(school, hospital, green spaces) which are themselves inseparable from 
ideologies that are split up, separated from one another (gender understood 
in its narrow sense, respect for nature, which is also made into an object that 
is separable from the others). Even if the defence of the demands of these 
assemblies that constitute the so-called civil society is often legitimate…in 
these conditions, this civil society does not offer an adequate framework for 
overall alternative projects, by definition consistent and political to take 
form. …All together, civil society, good governance, social justice and the 
war on poverty constitute a perfectly functional ideology; what is essential 
– the real power of the capitalist oligarchy – is eliminated from the debate 
(ibid:134-135). 
Importantly, the organizations that comprise contemporary civil society (neighborhood 
assemblies, social justice groups, non-governmental organizations), while still important 
and necessary at least in the immediate, are insufficient insofar as they miss the real (i.e., 
fundamental) target, which has been and remains the exploitation of labour by capital, 
both domestically and on a global scale. These organizations are “interclass organizations 
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by nature, able to mobilize the middle classes, but they are much less successful with the 
popular classes [i.e., working/under classes]” (ibid:134).  
 The inability of central civil society to address more than the symptoms of 
capitalist and imperialist exploitation is, again, the direct result of the economic 
alienation that characterizes the system as a whole. For Amin, like Marcuse, the 
understanding of capitalism cannot be reduced to the understanding of its economic 
dimension nor to its specific productive relations. Rather, “[i]ts ideological dimensions – 
the uniqueness of economic alienation and, with it, the affirmation of economic activity 
as both autonomous and dominant over other social determinants…stand as integral 
elements in the concept of a capitalistic mode of production” (1998:58-59, 46; 2003:1, 
22). Further, no emancipatory transformation of society is possible unless this form of 
alienation is overcome. It is therefore crucial that we understand just what Amin means 
when he refers to economic alienation in his writings.34 This form of alienation is, he 
argues, unique to capitalism and did not exist is pre-capitalist social formations. Indeed, 
though Amin’s conceptualization of economic alienation is for the most part the same as 
that of Marx (and of Marcuse as well, as we shall see), his particular contribution comes 
from his emphasis on the world capitalist system and its historical development.  
                                                 
34 The content and consequences of this form of alienation have already been discussed in the preceding 
analysis of the ideology dominant in both the tributary and capitalist modes, however, the attempt here is to 
provide a concise rearticulation of what characterizes this concept so that we can be sure that its overall 
meaning is clear.  
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 Amin argues that in general there are two levels of alienation: one that is the 
outcome of the “permanence of the humanity-nature relation” (1980:ix; 2011:182), which 
Amin terms “anthropological alienation” and another which Amin describes as “social 
alienation” (ibid). In the former case, alienation results from the fact that the relation 
between human beings and nature “transcends social modes, defines human nature in its 
permanent dimension but does not have a direct role in the evolution of social history” 
(ibid). It is an alienation that stems from our experience of ourselves as separate from the 
natural world and is present simply by virtue of our being human; it is therefore “supra-
historical” (ibid). For this reason, this form of alienation is of little concern to Amin’s 
analysis; his focus remains the social alienation that characterizes the capitalist 
imperialist system.  
 For Amin, though the “economic instance is the determining one in the last 
analysis, if we accept the fact that material life conditions all other aspects of social life” 
it is “[n]evertheless…important to distinguish between this determination in the last 
analysis and the question of whether the economic or the politico-ideological instance is 
the dominant one in a given case” (1976:24-25 [original emphasis]). As we saw in our 
earlier discussion, in the tributary mode the political is superordinate to the economic and 
the ideology is constructed along these lines. Furthermore, the economic relationships in 
the precapitalist modes are, for the most, part transparent. It is only logical then that the 
social alienation in operation in precapitalist, tributary formations is not the same as that 
of capitalism. Indeed, its “characteristics derive, on the one hand from the transparency of 
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the economic relations of exploitations and, on the other hand, from the limited degree of 
mastery over nature at the corresponding levels of development of the productive forces.” 
(1980:ix; 1976:70). Therefore, “[t]he producers can…agree to levy from themselves this 
surplus that they produce, and know that they produce, only if they are ‘alienated,’ and 
believe such a levy to be necessary for the survival of the social and ‘natural’ order. The 
politico-ideological instance thus necessarily assumes religious form and dominates 
social life” (1976:25; 1989:5, 22). It is for this reason that Amin terms the alienation of 
the tributary form “religious” or “metaphysical” alienation (2011:180, 182; 1998:54-55; 
1980:ix; 1977:76-77, 84; 1976:70-71).35  
In the capitalist mode, as we have seen, this relationship is inverted and the 
political becomes subordinated to the economic. Indeed, Amin argues that capitalism is 
defined by this inversion (2011:70, 74, 186; 2004:46-47, 54, 72; 2003:1, 59, 149; 
1998:13-14, 31; 1989:71-72; 1976:69) so that under this system wealth is the source of 
power whereas in the tributary formations, power was the source of wealth (2011:186-
187; 1998:14). He writes, “…the economic base does not become dominant, or directly 
dominant, except under capitalism. In the previous systems, it was the political power 
that constituted the directly dominant authority. …The dominant political power needed 
an ideology that suited its reproduction – the state religion; that of capital was economism 
– commodity alienation” (ibid). Again, Amin’s understanding of economic alienation 
                                                 
35 For more on the ideological content and development of this form of alienation, see the discussion of the 
tributary form, above. 
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closely follows that of Marx, particularly as formulated in Capital.36 It is worth quoting 
the following passage at some length, for it offers a relatively concise encapsulation of 
his position: 
Economistic alienation is necessary to the functioning of the system. 
…Social life is…compartmentalized, economic activity being distinct from 
other activities. But at the same time, the unity of this social life is 
reestablished by the dominance of its economic sector; all aspects of life are 
subject to the fundamental requirement that labor power be reproduced as a 
commodity. This is the condition of the dominance of exchange-value of 
commodities over the use of things. Commodities and noncommodities [sic] 
appear as two distinct categories. But the noncommodity exists only 
through its opposite, the commodity, and the former is dominated by the 
latter. Social time is split into non-working time and working time. But here 
too the former exists only to serve the latter. It is not leisure time, as it is 
called in the false consciousness of alienation, but recuperation time. It is 
functional recuperation that is socially organized and not left up to the 
individual, despite certain appearances. Here again the image reverses the 
reality: the closed and secret world of the free individual belongs to the 
heaven of ideas; here on earth, in the realm of realities, it is invaded by the 
demands of society. …At the same time, social life loses the notion of the 
durability of time. Exchange-value, command by profit, is embodied only 
in objects that are useful in the most functional sense of the term. The 
replacement of things is not only, or even chiefly, the result of real progress 
in the productive forces; it is also, and above all, necessary to the system of 
extracting surplus value. It is therefore, in the true sense of the word, waste. 
This waste has a profound effect on the relationship between people and 
things. Things come to have only one dimension: the dimension of 
immediate use. Individuals, too, no longer fearing nature, no longer believe 
in eternity. They have gotten rid of eternity, but only to deliver themselves 
up to the demands of the short term (1977:78-79; 1976:25-26, 72; see also 
1980:217-218).37 
                                                 
36 Recall Chapter 1. 
37 It is worth bearing this passage in mind as we engage with Marcuse in the following chapter, for on this 
point the two thinkers’ positions overlap. Furthermore, like Marcuse, Amin asserts that this economic 
alienation results in “the internalized totalitarianism of advanced Western society” (1980:217), which 
“…empties democracy of its emancipatory potential. When democracy exists at all under these conditions –
which means, in practice, in the centres of the system, the only areas to benefit from the development of the 
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We have already discussed the particular ways in which this form of alienation becomes 
manifest in capitalist ideology: economism and its expression in liberalism and 
postmodernism together serve to obscure the real source of surplus (1980:ix; 1977:78; 
1976:25) – and therefore of exploitation – in the capitalist mode, hiding instead behind 
the rhetoric of the autonomous and self-regulating market, various culturalisms, and the 
like. Under this system, “…the hell of reality is compensated for by the heaven of ideas” 
(1977:78) and these ideas are truly heavenly insofar as they do not have grounding in the 
concrete, historical, and material conditions. 
  Amin’s conceptualization of alienation, however, goes beyond Marx insofar as he 
situates it within a global context that takes its imperialistic character into account. In 
doing so, Amin is further able to assert that a “pyramid of alienations” (2011:189) 
operates within the world system, due to the fact that as we have seen in our previous 
discussion, multiple modes of production can and do exist concurrently: though the 
dominant mode of production today is capitalist, tributary modes can also still be found, 
particularly in the periphery. Therefore, while the centres are dominated by economic 
alienation, in the peripheries there is a conflict between the economic alienation that 
results from the capitalist nature of the system as a whole and the religious alienation that 
still persists as a result of its retention of tributary features. In other words, “the 
                                                 
productive forces – it suffers degradation and loss of meaning. Genuine politics, expressing the capacity of 
the inventive imagination, is replaced by the hollow consensus of low-intensity democracy, a media 
spectacle constructed and manipulated by the capital dominant within the economic system” (2003:149). In 
fact, Amin raises Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1964) in connection with these discussions; we return 
to this in Chapter 4. 
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development of capitalism in the periphery remains the development of a dependent and 
incomplete capitalism” (1980:188). It is for this reason that Amin argues that the 
emancipatory transformation of the world (i.e., the “long transition” to socialism) is more 
likely to begin in the periphery of the world system (2011; 1980:188, 200-203, 244, 253, 
256; 1977:14, 83; 1976:360, 383). Indeed, this is the logical conclusion of the analysis of 
the historical dynamics and tendencies of the world system Amin has developed thus far: 
as we recall, capitalism as we now know it developed first in Europe as a result of the 
fact that it was an incomplete (i.e., underdeveloped) tributary formation. So too Amin 
argues that the transition to socialism is most likely to occur in the incomplete capitalist 
formations, and for similar reasons. Here, unlike in the centres, the homogenizing 
tendency of capitalism has not won out and it is the very underdevelopment of the 
peripheral societies that makes the contradictions of capitalism (at least potentially) more 
visible (1977:80, 83). As Amin argues, “It is while capitalism is still young that it shows 
its true face. Later it may be too late: people have forgotten the very existence of use-
values, they do not ask themselves any more questions about the meaning of alienated 
work, they are conditioned, they have become one-dimensional” (ibid).38  
 Furthermore, though it is still the case that the fundamental contradiction of 
capitalism remains that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, unlike in Marx’s 
                                                 
38 For more on the development and character of this one-dimensionality, see Chapter 3. 
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time, “the main nucleus” of the latter is no longer in the centre (Amin 1976:360; 2011: 
191) due to the fact that  
…capitalism has become a world system. The contradiction is not between 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of each country considered in isolation, 
but between the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat. But this world 
bourgeoisie and this world proletariat do not fit into the framework of the 
capitalist mode of production – they belong to a system of capitalist 
formations, central and peripheral. …The main increasing contradiction of 
the system is expressed in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. There is 
only one way to combat this on the world scale: raise the level of the rate of 
surplus value. The nature of the formations at the periphery makes it 
possible to raise this rate to a much higher degree there than at the center. 
Consequently the proletariat at the periphery is being more severely 
exploited than the proletariat at the center (ibid:360, 196-197; see also 
1998:77). 
Therefore, in the contemporary context the bourgeoisie and the proletariat must be further 
subdivided into 1) the imperialist bourgeoisie, “which dominates the system as a whole 
and concentrates to its own advantage a substantial proportion of the surplus labor 
generated on the world scale”; 2) the central proletariat, “which enjoys increases in real 
wages…parallel to increases in the productivity of labor, and, on the whole, accepts the 
hegemony of social democracy (these two phenomena are interlinked, resulting from the 
historically completed structure of capitalism with self-centered accumulation, and are 
bound up with imperialism)”; 3) the peripheral bourgeoisie, which is dependent on that of 
the centre and “whose place is defined by the international division of labor and whose 
anti-imperialist activity modifies this division”; and 4) the peripheral proletariat, 
“subjected to super-exploitation by virtue of the incomplete character of the capitalist 
structure, its historical subordination…and the disconnection derived from this between 
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the price of its labor-power and the productivity of its labor – and which, consequently, is 
the spearhead of the revolutionary forces on a world scale” (2010 [1978]:92). For Amin, 
this peripheral proletariat includes, or potentially includes, the peasant population, who is 
also super-exploited not just by capital but also by the remaining precapitalist forms 
(ibid; 1976:361; 2011:120). 
 We are therefore faced with a situation in which the working class within the 
centre of capitalism is integrated into the imperialist system in such a way so as to benefit 
from autocentred accumulation and the super-profits and access to natural resources that 
this entails; these benefits are all derived from the super-exploitation of the proletariat of 
the periphery.39 This super-exploitation is further manifested in the “social imperialism” 
that characterizes the centre of the world system. By this Amin means that the many 
strides forward that the working class has been able to make in its national contexts (for 
example, unionization and the implementation of the welfare state, itself a result of a 
compromise between capital and labour after World War II) have only been possible as a 
result of imperialist rent (2011:168, 163). Stated differently, it is the privileged position 
that the central proletariat occupies in the world system that makes possible these 
advances (ibid:91), advances which are impossible in the peripheries due to the 
polarization inherent in the capitalist system, a polarization that enables the continued 
                                                 
39 Amin terms this dynamic “imperialist rent” (see, for example, 2010 [1978]:11, 13, 110-111; 2011:1-3, 
35, 163) and argues that this is inseparable from the monopolies the centre also enjoys over technology, 
communications, and the military (2010 [1978]:110). In this argument Amin is indebted to Lenin and his 
theorization of the labour aristocracy (see, for example, Lenin 1987 [1939]; 1964 [1916]).  
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autocentred accumulation of the centres. The assimilation of the working class is then 
further exacerbated by the hegemonic economic alienation to which they are subjected. 
Taken together, the central proletariat, again, “no longer appears to be the living 
contradiction to the established society”, to borrow a line from Marcuse (1964:32; see 
also Amin 1976:378-379).40 
 Given all of this, Amin argues we must look to the periphery as the main locus of 
the potential for revolutionary change. Though Amin is somewhat ambivalent about 
whether this change will take place or whether capitalism will instead continue to 
develop into something increasingly barbaric and destructive, not only of human lives but 
of the planet (2011; 1977), he does provide concrete indications of what is required.41 
Most important, he argues, is for the periphery to “delink” from the centre due to the fact 
that “[e]xtrication from capitalist/imperialist globalization and extrication from capitalism 
cannot be dissociated” (2011:72). In other words, the periphery must become autocentred 
(2003:160; 2011:37, 58). Amin writes:  
The strategy of a long transition to world socialism…implies delinking the 
system of criteria of economic rationality from the system of criteria derived 
from submission to the globalized law of value. …[This involves] the 
construction of a national-popular society and the associated construction 
of a self-reliant national economy. Every aspect of this is contradictory: it 
combines criteria, institutions and procedures of a capitalist nature with 
social aspirations and reforms that conflict with the logic of world 
capitalism; it combines a certain openness to the outside (as controlled as 
                                                 
40 We return to discussion of the integration of the working class in Chapters 3 and 4. 
41 Amin shares this ambivalence with Marcuse, however, it can be argued that he is more optimistic than 
the latter as a result of his understanding of the world system. This understanding is something that 
Marcuse, and the Frankfurt school more generally, lacks. We return to this connection between the two 
thinkers in Chapter 4.  
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possible) with demands for progressive social changes that conflict with the 
dominant capitalist interests. The ruling classes, by their historical nature, 
fit their visions and aspirations into the perspective of actually existing 
capitalism, and willy-nilly keep their strategies within the constraints of the 
global expansion of capitalism. This is why they cannot really imagine 
delinking. For the popular classes, however, delinking becomes a necessity 
as soon as they try to use political power to transform their conditions and 
to free themselves from the inhuman consequences of the polarizing global 
expansion of capitalism (2003:159-160).  
Delinking requires that peripheral societies are able to have national control over their 
own labour power and its reproduction, surplus, monetary and financial markets, natural 
resources, and technologies (ibid:160-161; 2011:36). It also means a development 
strategy that does not aim at “catching up” to the centre but rather “a national and popular 
alternative that associates the democratization of society with social progress, that is, with 
a perspective of development that integrates – and does not exclude – the popular classes, 
[and] requires a political strategy of rural development based on the guarantee of access 
to land for all peasants” (2011:37, 117-125). Clearly, and for reasons discussed above, 
increased or better humanitarian aid from the centre will not do the job. What is required 
is a new wave of national liberation movements, which are by their nature anti-imperialist 
(2011:162; 1980:252-253; 1976:382-383) and the strategies for delinking from the 
imperialist system that these movements develop and employ must come from the 
peripheries themselves as a result of their specific historical and material circumstances 
(2011:58).  
In the more immediate term, the move toward delinking further requires that the 
nations of the periphery form alliances with each other with the aim of developing these 
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strategies and against their continued domination by the centre. Such a project should 
begin, Amin argues, with an emphasis on food sovereignty:  
At the national and regional levels…regulations, specific and adapted to 
local conditions, must protect national production, thus ensuring the 
indispensable food sovereignty of nations – in other words, the regulations 
must delink the internal prices from those of the so-called world market. A 
gradual increase in the productivity of peasant agriculture, which will 
doubtless be slow but continuous, would make it possible to control the 
exodus of rural populations to the towns. At the level of what is called the 
world market, the desirable regulations can probably be applied through 
inter-regional agreements that meet the requirements of a development that 
integrates them rather than excludes them (2011:106, 124, 141).  
There is no alternative to the fight for food sovereignty according to Amin and the 
current emphasis on food security only serves to perpetuate the domination of the 
peripheries (ibid:107-108) by, ironically, keeping these nations food insecure insofar as it 
requires that they “rely on international trade to cover the deficit – however large – in 
their food requirements” (ibid:107). In addition to this, structural adjustment and other 
foreign policies dictate what food can be produced, under what conditions, and for whom, 
which further exacerbates the problem (ibid). The move toward food sovereignty requires 
significant and wide-reaching land tenure (i.e., agrarian) reforms in the peripheries. This 
means “putting in place a land tenure system that is not based on private ownership (at 
least not dominated by it)” and reforming the state in such a way so as to “actively 
involve it in setting up a management system for access to land that is modernised, 
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efficient (economically) and democratic (to avoid, or at least to reduce, inequalities)” 
(ibid:120).42 
 For Amin, human emancipation, and the “de-alienation” that this requires, is only 
possible if we are able to overcome capitalism, though in his view this project requires a 
long view and will not be resolved in the immediate. This why he places such an 
emphasis on alliance-building in the Third World, as well as on reforming state policies 
to begin the long process of delinking. In the centres of capitalism, it remains important 
to fight for progress in the national context, however, this fight cannot remain oriented to 
the national context only. Social movements must acquire a truly internationalist 
perspective; they must be solidarity movements in a real sense. In other words, these 
movements must work to fully understand the imperialist nature of the world system and 
the benefits they themselves enjoy as a result of imperialist rent; they must therefore be 
fundamentally anti-imperialist in orientation. There is no alternative to this fight, except a 
capitalist and imperialist reality that grows increasingly barbaric and genocidal.   
The analyses of alienation undertaken by Amin and Marcuse have much in 
common, though they arrive at this common understanding along different paths. While 
Amin, as we have seen, situates his discussion of alienation in the context of the 
development and character of the imperialist world system, Marcuse’s focus is on 
alienation as it exists specifically in the advanced capitalist centres, where, he argues, 
                                                 
42 It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this project to engage with these reforms in more detail. For more 
on this issue see especially Amin 2011. 
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“the reality…constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation” (1964:11) and we have 
reached a point where “the alienation of labor is almost complete” (1955:102). Our 
engagement with Amin’s work ended with discussion of the ideological perspective 
dominant in the capitalist epoch, the very point at which our discussion of Marcuse must 
start. As Amin himself asserts, the analysis of the “ideological absolutism” of the centres 
of advanced capitalism (specifically as manifested in its one-dimensionality) began with 
the work of the Frankfurt School (1980:217) and with that of Marcuse and Adorno in 
particular. By engaging with Marcuse’s work in detail, we are able to further the 
understanding of economic alienation we have acquired thus far, and this will shed 
further light on the challenges posed by the imperialist nature of the world system for 
those committed to an emancipatory project of social change.
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Chapter 3: Herbert Marcuse1 
 
 Like Amin, and following Lukács and Marx, Marcuse argues that the concept of 
alienation is essential for understanding the prevailing order. Marcuse has little concern 
with engaging in the transition debate or discussing the importance of long-distance 
trade. Instead, Marcuse is concerned with the consequences of the transformation of 
reason (and the concomitant progress of alienation) for both the nature of advanced 
capitalist society as well as the experience of individuals existing within such societies. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the emergence of what Marcuse terms 
“technological rationality” and its relationship to alienation. 
 Throughout his work, though especially in One Dimensional Man (1964), “Some 
Social Implications of Modern Technology” (1998 [1941]), and Reason and Revolution 
(1960), Marcuse argues that in the course of the development of the prevailing social 
order a “new” form of rationality has emerged. This rationality can be distinguished from 
“traditional”, “pre-technological” rationality in several ways; most importantly, it is 
characterized by the transformation of negative, two-dimensional into positive, one-
dimensional thought.2 The reason that had informed the Western tradition was, for 
                                                 
1 Elements of the following chapter were first published in Hornstein, Sarah, "On Totalitarianism: The 
Continuing Relevance of Herbert Marcuse" Pp. 87-99 in 1968 in Retrospect: History, Theory, Alterity, 
edited by G.K. Bhambra and I. Demir, 2009, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced here with 
permission of Palgrave Macmillan.  
2 It is important to understand, however, that these modes of thought “…developed within the historical 
continuum of domination to which they pay tribute” (Marcuse, 1964:168; see also pp. 123, 128, 138). In 
other words, Marcuse argues that thought and social history cannot be separated; the two must be 
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Marcuse, characterized by its fundamentally dialectical nature. Its logic was “the mode of 
thought appropriate for comprehending the real as rational” (1964:123) and its primary 
concern was the discovery of truth (ibid:125). Crucially, however, the delineation of the 
true versus the false reflected “the experience of a world antagonistic in itself” (ibid) due 
to the fact that philosophy, and thinking more generally, was traditionally concerned with 
the difference between “appearance and reality” (ibid). Things cannot be taken as they 
immediately appear, and pre-technological, negative rationality understood this fact. 
Indeed, characteristic of two-dimensional thought is its ability to think through the 
difference between “essential” and “apparent” truths (ibid:135); its “[l]ogic centers on 
judgments which are, as demonstrative propositions, imperatives – the predicative ‘is’ 
implies an ‘ought’” (ibid:132 [original emphasis]; see also pp. 133 n. 3, 140-142, 167). 
The importance of this cannot be overstated, for to understand that despite how things are 
they perhaps ought to be different involves “critical judgment” and this judgment is 
inherent in two-dimensional thinking itself. Indeed “is” and “ought” are the two 
dimensions of this mode of thought. In being able to think alternatives, in recognizing 
that what appears to be true could be the manifestation of a deeper truth (if not something 
else entirely), dialectical thinking is intrinsically subversive; this is its negative quality 
(see ibid:123-143, 171). As Marcuse argues,  
                                                 
considered together. This is important if we are to avoid romanticizing “pre-technological” rationality. 
Nonetheless, as we will see, Marcuse argues that it is the recuperation of negative, critical thought that 
points the way toward real freedom.  
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The laws of thought are laws of reality, or rather become the laws of reality 
if thought understands the truth of immediate experience as the appearance 
of another truth… Thus there is the contradiction rather than 
correspondence between dialectical thought and the given reality; the true 
judgment judges this reality not in its own terms, but in terms which 
envisage its subversion. And in this subversion, reality comes into its own 
truth. …The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms 
of the given reality, “mere” Idea, “mere” essence – potentiality. But the 
essential potentiality is not like the many possibilities which are contained 
in the given universe of discourse and action; the essential potentiality is of 
a very different order. Its realization involves subversion of the established 
order, for thinking in accordance with truth is the commitment to exist in 
accordance with truth (ibid:131-132). 
 The dialectical character of two-dimensional thinking, its ability to (at least 
attempt to) think through both the immediate and the potential reality, requires a certain 
degree of abstraction. Marcuse argues that abstraction in and of itself is not a “bad” thing; 
indeed “[a]bstractness is the very life of thought” (1964:134). However, there are “false 
and true abstractions” due to the fact that abstraction “is a historical event in a historical 
continuum. It proceeds on historical grounds, and it remains related to the very basis from 
which it moves away: the established societal universe” (ibid). As negative rationality 
emerged in the socio-historical context of a widespread separation between intellectual 
and manual labor (ibid), its philosophy was not concerned with those “who bore the brunt 
of the untrue reality and who, therefore, seemed to be most in need of attaining its 
subversion… It abstracted from them and continued to abstract from them. In this sense 
‘idealism’ was germane to philosophic thought” (ibid:135, 139). This constitutes the 
socio-historical “paradox” of negative thinking, for in abstracting from the concrete 
social conditions in this way, in attempting to critically re-imagine existence, “the 
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philosophic critique finds itself blocked by the reality from which it dissociates itself, and 
proceeds to construct a realm of Reason purged from empirical contingency. The two 
dimensions of thought – that of the essential and that of the apparent truths – no longer 
interfere with each other and the concrete dialectical relation becomes an abstract 
epistemological or ontological relation” (ibid). We have here the beginning of the 
transition from negative to positive, one-dimensional thinking. With the idealist turn in 
philosophy the stage was set for the emergence of formal logic.  
 Formal logic is, for Marcuse, connected to the desire to “understand”, order, and 
control the world in an entirely “reasonable” way. What is false about the abstraction 
required by formal logic and positive, technological thinking more generally, is that in it 
“…the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable if not meaningless; the 
material content is neutralized; the principle of identity is separated from the principle of 
contradiction… Well defined in their scope and function, concepts become instruments of 
prediction and control” (1964:137). What is crucial here is that these modes of thought 
“share the radical opposition to dialectical logic” (ibid). If what sets truly dialectical 
thought apart is the fact that it critically judges, and therefore subverts, the prevailing 
order, and that it understands this order as fundamentally antagonistic, then opposition to 
this comes to mean conformity with and justification for the world as immediately given, 
for the “is” (ibid:140-141; see also 1998 [1941]:49-50). Two-dimensional thought is 
opposed both to an idealism that fails to grasp the material reality and to a science or way 
of thinking that fails to see beyond that reality, for the latter finds its “truth” in the 
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“concreteness of immediate experience” and fails to free itself “from the deceptive 
objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts” (ibid:141, 182). This is indeed the 
defining characteristic of one-dimensional thinking and is a major contributor to what 
Marcuse comes to argue is its “totalitarian” quality.3 It is to explicit discussion of this 
quality of essentially affirmative thought that we now turn. 
 Positive, one-dimensional thinking is characterized by the “radical acceptance of 
the empirical” and, according to Marcuse, this in fact “violates the empirical, for in it 
speaks the mutilated, ‘abstract’ individual who experiences (and expresses) only that 
which is given to him (given in a literal sense), who has only the facts and not the factors, 
whose behavior is one-dimensional and manipulated. …[T]he positivist cleaning of the 
mind brings the mind in line with the restricted experience” (1964:182). We see here that 
one-dimensional thinking is reflective of one-dimensional existence and vice versa. What 
makes this rationality and this existence not only dangerous but actually totalitarian is the 
fact that in both cases, “Subjection to the established facts is total” (ibid:178; see also 
2001 [1961]:55); positive thinking, and its manifestation in positivism proper, 
mathematization, standardization, and scientific method, seeks exactness and 
calculability (ibid:184). Indeed, positive thinking is in fact always concerned with 
liquidating anything it views as “unscientific”, “incalculable”, qualitative, which it views 
                                                 
3 The totalitarian character of advanced capitalist centres is discussed in detail below. 
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as mere mystification. Yet, as Marcuse argues, it is this rationality itself that is truly and 
completely mystifying. He writes:  
…in this society, the rational rather than the irrational becomes the most 
effective vehicle of mystification. It was the total mobilization of the 
material and mental machinery which did the job and installed its 
mystifying power over the society. It served to make individuals incapable 
of seeing “behind” the machinery those who used it, those who profited 
from it, and those who paid for it. Today the mystifying elements are 
mastered and employed in productive publicity, propaganda, and politics. 
Magic, witchcraft, and ecstatic surrender are practiced in the daily routine 
of the home, the shop, and the office, and the rational accomplishments 
conceal the irrationality of the whole. For example, the scientific approach 
to the vexing problem of mutual annihilation – the mathematics and 
calculations of kill and over-kill …–is mystifying to the extent to which it 
promotes (and even demands) behavior which accepts the insanity. It thus 
counteracts a truly rational behavior – namely, the refusal to go along, and 
the effort to do away with the conditions which produce the insanity. …The 
trouble is that the statistics, measurements, and field studies of empirical 
sociology and political science are not rational enough (ibid:189-190, see 
also 1960).  
For Marcuse, as well as for Amin,4 the emergence of one-dimensional rationality is 
clearly related to the mode of production according to which society is organized. The 
two inform, perpetuate, and solidify each other. In Marcuse’s work, the focus in 
articulating this connection is centred, to a large extent, on the understanding of our 
social order as a “technological society”. In other words, while the “totalitarian universe 
of technological rationality is the latest transmutation of Reason” (ibid:123), it is not just 
that. Indeed, positive, technological thinking arose “in the course of the technological 
                                                 
4 Recall the discussion of capitalist ideology in Chapter 2, above. This connection is further elaborated in 
Chapter 4.  
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process” (1998 [1941]):42) and with it new forms of individuality and experience also 
emerged. 5 
 Marcuse differentiates between “technics” and “technology” arguing that while 
the former refers to the “technical apparatus of industry, communication, transportation” 
the latter is the social process in which “technics is but a partial factor” (1998 [1941]:41; 
see also 2001 [1961]:45). The mode of production operating in advanced capitalist 
society is a technological mode of production (ibid), requiring efficiency, 
standardization, and mechanization on a mass scale (ibid:63; 1998:73-77). While the 
technological achievements of the prevailing social order could be used to combat both 
toil and scarcity (i.e., to fundamentally change the prevailing social relationships), in the 
contemporary period, for the most part, technology instead is “a manifestation of 
prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination” 
(ibid:41, see also pp. 47-49).6 As the prevailing form of thinking in the technological 
society of the capitalist centres is one-dimensional and therefore essentially affirmative in 
nature, the technology itself manifests this both in its organization and in its use. For 
                                                 
5 The issue of individual experience in advanced capitalist centres as well as further aspects of the 
relationship between the transformation of reason and the organization of labor in advanced capitalism – 
specifically what Marcuse refers to as the “assimilation of the proletariat” – are discussed in more detail 
below.  
6 It is important to note, however, that Marcuse nonetheless argues that technological progress, and the 
increasing automation this entails, still has emancipatory potential. For more on the liberatory potential of 
technology see 2001 [1965]:84-85, 88; 1964; 2001 [1961]:37, 42-43, 46-47, 50, 56; 1998 [1941]:63-64. 
This possibility is explored more fully in the discussion of freedom at the end of this chapter.  
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Marcuse, the notion of “compliant efficiency…perfectly illustrates the structure of 
technological rationality” due to the fact that,  
Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the thoughts, 
feelings and actions of men [sic] are shaped by the technical requirements 
of the apparatus which they have themselves created. Reason has found its 
resting place in the system of standardized control, production and 
consumption. There it reigns through the laws and mechanisms which 
insure the efficiency, expediency and coherence of this system. As the laws 
and mechanisms of technological rationality spread over the whole society, 
they develop a set of truth values of their own which hold good for the 
functioning of the apparatus – and for that alone. …Rationality here calls 
for unconditional compliance and coordination, and consequently, the truth 
values related to this rationality imply the subordination of thought to 
pregiven external standards. We may call this set of truth values the 
technological truth, technological in the twofold sense that it is an 
instrument of expediency rather than an end in itself, and that it follows the 
pattern of technological behavior (ibid:49-50). 
It is not only technological rationality that demands conformity and compliance from 
individuals but the technological apparatus that it has produced (and that produces and 
reproduces it) as well. Indeed, in Marcuse’s view, this is due to the fact that technological 
rationality itself has a specific political character and “operates as political rationality” 
(2001 [1961]:47). The three major factors that contribute to this political character in 
general are: 1) the fact that advanced capitalist society maintains and reproduces itself 
through mass production (2001 [1961]:47); 2) the fact that its technical apparatus 
“consists not only of the machinery employed in material production but also of that 
which fills the offices and stores and streets and, not least, the private homes and 
apartments” (ibid: 48); and 3) the fact that “in the functioning of the productive and 
distributive apparatus, technical and political operations, technical and political controls 
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are inexorably intertwined” (ibid:49). The mass production of goods requires a 
concomitant system of mass distribution and consumption and this demands the extensive 
coordination of all realms of social life:  
Under these circumstances, mass production takes place through an 
omnipresent, huge technical apparatus which integrates all spheres of the 
private and public existence, and integrates them in accordance with the 
interests which control the apparatus. But the decisive fact is that this 
integration does not appear as political act – it asserts itself as, and indeed 
it is technological integration, spreading the rationality of convenience and 
efficiency, the terrifying comforts and the terrifying power of the “affluent 
society”. Producing and consuming its benefits, the individuals to whom 
these benefits are administered behave perfectly rationally… And in acting 
rationally, in conforming to the technical conquest of nature which they 
have achieved, they support the quantitative growth and the oppressive 
weight of the apparatus over them. …The technological division of labor: 
scientific management and scientific rationalization intensify rather than 
alleviate the subjection of free labor and free relaxation to those who 
determine the use of labor and relaxation: intensify subjection precisely 
because the technological form of the organization and its ability to “deliver 
the goods” lets the masters disappear behind the objective technical 
structure (ibid:48-49 [original emphasis], 53; 1998:77-78).  
 The discussion of the transformation of reason and of its relationship to the 
development of the technical apparatus is, to a large extent, a continuation of the analysis 
of alienation laid out by Marx and further elaborated by Lukács.7 The two-fold 
integration of the technical apparatus and technological rationality into every realm of 
social life – including individual experience – serves to obscure the actual relations of 
domination and exploitation upon which advanced capitalist society is based and is one 
of the main insights leading Marcuse to conclude that “the reality [of advanced 
                                                 
7 Recall Chapter 1. 
 119  
capitalism] constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation” (1964:11) in which “the 
alienation of labor is almost complete” (1955:102). Yet, it must be emphasized that the 
form that this alienation takes can no longer be explained solely in terms of its four main 
aspects as laid out by Marx. It is no longer “just” people’s relations with one another, 
with nature, and with the products of their labor that are characterized by alienation, nor 
can it be said to characterize “only” people’s consciousness8 of themselves, their 
experience, and these relations. Instead, Marcuse argues, alienation has reached a stage 
where people are affected even on the level of their unconscious drives and desires as 
well (1964:6, 32, 72; 1955:46, 89, 102-103, 129); “Mass production and mass 
distribution claim the entire individual… [alienation] has become entirely objective; the 
subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence” (1964:10-11 
[original emphasis], see also pp. 23-24, 27, 32-33). Because in the centres of capitalism 
alienation has become almost total, Marcuse has to explain how the individual psyche is 
affected by capitalist culture and he therefore must begin by reconceptualizing some of 
Freud’s most basic terms. 
 There are four main places where Marcuse’s attempt to rework Freudian concepts 
in an effort to better understand the effects of alienation on individuals (particularly those 
in the advanced capitalist centres) becomes most clear: first, the issue of scarcity and its 
relation to work; second, repression; third, the reality principle; and fourth, sublimation. 
                                                 
8 This issue, particularly the distinction between “true” and “false” consciousness, and its relation to the 
possibility of freedom is discussed further below.  
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In each of these cases, Marcuse argues that Freud’s terminology does not “adequately 
differentiate between the biological and the socio-historical vicissitudes of the instincts” 
and must therefore “be paired with corresponding terms denoting the specific socio-
historical component” (1955:35 [original emphasis]).9 Freud, unlike Marx, asserts that 
humans have a “natural aversion” to work; it is “normally without satisfaction in 
itself…it is unpleasurable, painful” (ibid:81; Freud 2001 [1929]:80 n. 1). Furthermore, 
work is necessary because scarcity is a “brute fact” and therefore unavoidable. People 
have to work because people have to procure scarce resources in order to live (ibid:35; 
Freud 2001 [1929]:101). Work therefore becomes labour (ibid:82); it is toil and misery, 
and this is naturally and unavoidably the case. Furthermore, labour, as unpleasurable 
activity, requires that “energy…be ‘withdrawn’ from the primary instincts…the work 
impulses are thus fed by aim-inhibited sexuality” (ibid; Freud 2001 [1929]:104). Marcuse 
points out that there are moments where it appears that Freud recognizes that satisfaction 
in work may be possible (for example, ibid:85, 212), however, Freud just as quickly turns 
away from this possibility due to the fact that he views it as the exception rather than the 
rule.10 Freud cannot or does not see that his perspective is located in a particular 
historical moment. While it may be the case that labour is based upon “aim-inhibited 
sexuality” and that it is unpleasurable, Marcuse argues that this is not a quality inhering 
                                                 
9 For an overview of the Frankfurt School’s arguments on this issue see, for example, Zizek (2005 [1994]), 
Jacoby (1975), and Jay (1973). 
10 For an example of this see Freud 2001 [1929]:80 n.1. 
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in work itself nor is the aversion to work “natural” (ibid:85). Rather, both scarcity and 
labour are organized in specific ways and acquire their particular character depending 
upon the historical development of a given society. Freud, according to Marcuse, does 
not distinguish between alienated and non-alienated work (ibid); this distinction is 
important because when Freud discusses work, he is in reality discussing the former 
(alienated labour). Furthermore, in calling for this distinction, Marcuse opens up the 
possibility for an organization of work and scarcity that is satisfying, free, and no longer 
based on domination. He calls this the “transformation of work into play” (see ibid:213-
218) and this becomes an important part of his argument concerning freedom.11  
 Marcuse argues that it is also necessary to introduce a socio-historical distinction 
into Freud’s conceptualization of repression.12 While basic repression is universal and 
necessary for the survival and “perpetuation of the human race in civilization” (1955:35), 
surplus-repression is used by Marcuse to designate the repressive “restrictions 
necessitated by social domination” (ibid). Unlike basic repression, surplus-repression is 
reflective of the “historical sources of human suffering” (ibid:88); it is repression above 
and beyond what is absolutely necessary to ensure the survival of society (ibid:37) and is 
the result of “specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interest of domination” 
(ibid:88). The extent of surplus-repression will vary according to the relations of 
                                                 
11 We return to this discussion in more detail below. 
12 For a detailed discussion specifically focused on the issue of repression in Marcuse’s work, see Horowitz 
(1977). 
 122  
production and the “specific historical institutions” dominating a given society (ibid:37). 
Marcuse argues that as society develops, the actual need for labour13 is reduced due to 
technological and intellectual progress (ibid:88); the advanced capitalist centres “could 
actually afford a considerable release of instinctual energy expended for domination and 
toil” (ibid). Despite this, however, the degree of surplus-repression actually appears to 
increase as society matures and develops. This is the dialectic of civilization: as the 
potential for human emancipation increases, so too does the degree of surplus-
repression.14 In other words, surplus-repression operates in service of the status quo: 
…the closer the real possibility of liberating the individual from the 
constraints once justified by scarcity and immaturity, the greater the need 
for maintaining and streamlining these constraints lest the established order 
of domination dissolve… The rationality of domination has progressed to 
the point where it threatens to invalidate its foundations; therefore it must 
be reaffirmed more effectively than ever before (ibid:93, 88). 
One of the primary ways in which surplus-repression is able to serve domination stems 
from its relation to the reality principle prevalent in advanced capitalist society. It is to 
discussion of this that we now turn. 
 For Freud the reality principle is always based on the “repressive organization of 
the instincts” (Marcuse 1955:34); repression is the price we pay for civilization regardless 
                                                 
13 From this point on, we follow Marcuse’s distinction and use the term “labour” to refer to alienated labour 
specifically.  
14 Marcuse argues that ultimately this dialectic becomes “fatal”: “…the perpetual restrictions on Eros 
ultimately weaken the life instincts and thus strengthen the release of the very forces against which they 
were ‘called up’ – those of destruction” (1955:44; see also p. 54). This argument is in many ways similar to 
Marx’s claim that capitalist relations ultimately produce the conditions of their own end; we return to this 
issue in the discussion of freedom below.  
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of its type. Therefore, for Freud, the reality principle operating in human societies always 
takes fundamentally the same form and as such is ahistorical. Just as with the issues of 
work and repression, however, Marcuse argues that the development of the reality 
principle is deeply historical and its content is dependent on the form of social 
organization in which it is developed (ibid:37). A particular reality principle comes to 
dominate a particular civilization as a result of the particular social and historical 
development of said civilization. The reality principle dominating advanced capitalist 
society, then, is necessarily reflective of the alienation that pervades the relation of 
human beings to themselves, each other, and their work. Furthermore, it both relies upon 
and perpetuates social institutions and practices that are characterized by a high degree of 
surplus-repression (ibid:44). Marcuse gives the name “performance principle” to the 
reality he sees governing advanced capitalist society and argues,  
…under its rule society is stratified according to the competitive 
performances of its members. It is clearly not the only historical reality 
principle: other modes of societal organization not merely prevailed in 
primitive [sic] cultures but also survived into the modern period.15 The 
performance principle…presupposes a long development during which 
domination has been increasingly rationalized: control over social labor 
now reproduces society on an enlarged scale and under improving 
conditions. …For the vast majority of the population…their labor is work 
for an apparatus which they do not control, which operates as an 
independent power to which individuals must submit if they want to live. 
And it becomes the more alien the more specialized the division of labor 
becomes. Men [sic] do not live their own lives but perform pre-established 
functions. While they work, they do not fulfill their own needs and faculties 
but work in alienation. Work has now become general, and so have the 
                                                 
15 While Marcuse does not pursue this particular point in any detail, it is central to Amin’s understanding of 
the imperialist world system, as we have seen (Chapter 2).  
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restrictions placed upon the libido: labor time, which is the largest part of 
the individual’s life time, is painful time, for alienated labor is absence of 
gratification, negation of the pleasure principle. …Under the rule of the 
performance principle, body and mind are made into instruments of 
alienated labor; they can function as such instruments only if they renounce 
the freedom of the libidinal subject-object which the human organism 
primarily is and desires (ibid:44-46 [original emphasis]). 
 
Again, Marcuse points out that there are moments in Freud’s work where he appears to 
recognize the importance of history in the development of the reality principle (for 
example, ibid:40), but he dismisses this in favour of the argument that the nature of this 
principle is for all intents and purposes universal, unavoidable, and fixed.16 For Marcuse, 
this is problematic due to the fact that such an argument precludes any discussion that 
human life could be fundamentally different and that freedom from labour, the 
performance principle, and surplus-repression may be possible. Marcuse’s claim that the 
development of the reality principle is determined by the historical and material social 
conditions under which people live opens up the possibility for the development of a new 
reality principle, one that is no longer based on, or perpetuating of, alienated existence.  
 For Marcuse, the development of labour, surplus-repression, and the performance 
principle is tied to what he terms the “repressive organization of sexuality.” According to 
Freud, the transformation of polymorphous sexuality into that characterized by the 
                                                 
16 Some examples of places where Freud appears to acknowledge the importance of social history can be 
found in Civilization and its Discontents (2001 [1929]:86, 89, 96, 144) and The Ego and the Id (2001 
[1923]:35).  
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primacy of the genitals is part of natural human sexual development; the libido and the 
reproductive function become paired in part out of the need to perpetuate the species and 
in part in order to “…divert their [people’s] energies from sexual activity to work” (Freud 
2001 [1916]:312). People cannot run around obtaining pleasure from everything; they 
must have the discipline to complete unpleasant tasks and this requires the postponement 
of satisfaction. As we saw above, for Freud work is unpleasurable but it is the necessary 
solution to the problem of scarcity. The id must submit to the demands of the ego and its 
reality principle. The libido must be tamed. That said, gratification is of course still 
possible; libidinal desires find satisfaction in socially acceptable forms (e.g., sexual 
intercourse, sublimation). Marcuse does not disagree with this element of Freud’s 
argument and in fact argues that, “The ‘containment’ of the partial sexual impulses, the 
progress to genitality belong to [the] basic layer of repression which makes possible 
intensified pleasure: the maturation of the organism involves normal and natural 
maturation of pleasure” (1955:38). However, we are again faced with the fact that thanks 
to the intellectual and material progress of human civilization, real scarcity,17 and the 
actual need for toil and the delayed satisfaction this entails, has decreased. As a result, 
Marcuse argues that it is also possible that 
…the mastery of the instinctual drives may…be used against gratification; 
in the history of civilization, basic repression and surplus-repression have 
been inextricably intertwined, and the normal progress to genitality has 
been organized in such a way that the partial impulses and their “zones” 
                                                 
17 As opposed to the scarcity of advanced capitalist society, which is manufactured in the interest of 
domination and exploitation and perpetuates the status quo. 
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were all but desexualized in order to conform to the requirements of a 
specific social organization of the human existence (ibid [original 
emphasis]; see also 1964:73). 
Therefore, 
The organization of sexuality reflects the basic features of the performance 
principle and its organization of society. …It is especially operative in the 
“unification” of the various objects of the partial instincts into one libidinal 
object of the opposite sex, and in the establishment of genital supremacy. In 
both cases, the unifying process is repressive – that is to say, the partial 
instincts do not develop freely into a “higher” stage of gratification which 
preserves their objectives, but are cut off and reduced to subservient 
functions. This process achieves the socially necessary desexualization of 
the body: the libido becomes concentrated in one part of the body, leaving 
most of the rest free for use as the instrument of labor. The temporal 
reduction of the libido is thus supplemented by its spatial reduction (ibid:48; 
1964:72-73). 
Again, Marcuse is not arguing that the delay of satisfaction and the basic repression that 
this sometimes requires is harmful in and of itself. What he argues is that in advanced 
capitalist society, we are repressed far more than is necessary and we do not even realize 
it. Our bodies are desexualized in accordance with the performance principle in order to 
perpetuate our alienated existence and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, people’s 
compliance with this system does not exist “merely” on the level of consciousness; at this 
point, even their unconscious has been subjugated: 
The restrictions imposed upon the libido appear as the more rational, the 
more universal they become, the more they permeate the whole of society. 
They operate on the individual as external objective laws and as internalized 
force: the societal authority is absorbed into the “conscience” and into the 
unconscious of the individual and works as his [sic] own desire, morality, 
and fulfillment. In the “normal” development, the individual lives his 
repression “freely” as his own life: he desires what he is supposed to desire; 
his gratifications are profitable to him and to others; he is reasonably and 
often exuberantly happy. This happiness…enables him to continue his 
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performance, which in turn perpetuates his labor and that of the others. His 
erotic performance is brought in line with his societal performance. 
Repression disappears in the grand objective order of things which rewards 
more or less adequately the complying individuals and, in doing so, 
reproduces more or less adequately the society as a whole (ibid:46). 
 This process of desexualization in the repressive organization of the drives is tied 
to sublimation; the latter requires the former. Here again, however, we run into another 
situation in which Freud does not sufficiently distinguish between the “natural” and the 
socio-historical aspects of his terminology. For Freud, sublimation in general occurs 
when libidinal energy is diverted from its overtly sexual aim to a related, but non-sexual 
(what he terms “social” or “higher”) one instead (2001 [1916-1917]:345; see also page 
55, above). Freud argues that sublimation operates as a protective measure against the 
neurosis that can result from the frustration of desire and is a necessary factor in the 
development of the ego (ibid; Marcuse, 1955:75). Now, while it may be the case that 
“[c]ulture demands continuous sublimation” (Marcuse 1955:83), it is important to 
understand that the sublimation advanced capitalist culture requires takes a particular 
form and cannot be separated from the socio-historical context in which it arises.18 This 
is indeed what Marcuse argues; sublimation refers to, and is fundamentally affected by, 
“…the fate of sexuality under a repressive reality principle” (ibid:206). As a result,  
                                                 
18 This stands in opposition to Freud’s conceptualization insofar as he tends to take the development of this 
form of human civilization for granted and therefore also the content of his concepts as well when, as we 
have emphasized previously, it is contingent on the particular social and historical development of this 
culture. That said, it is important to note that there are moments where Freud seems to imply the possibility 
of a very different form of civilization, one “evolving from and satisfied by free libidinal relations” 
(Marcuse 1955:207) but in general, as in the cases of his conceptualization of work, repression, and the 
reality principle, he does not follow this line of thought very far.  
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This mode of sublimation is to a high degree dictated by specific societal 
requirements and cannot be automatically extended to other and less 
repressive forms of civilization with different “social values”. Under the 
performance principle, the diversion of libido into useful cultural activities 
takes place after the period of early childhood. Sublimation then operates 
on a preconditioned instinctual structure, which includes the functional and 
temporal restraints of sexuality, its channeling into monogamic 
reproduction, and the desexualization of most of the body. Sublimation 
works with the thus preconditioned libido and its possessive, exploitative, 
aggressive force. The repressive “modification” of the pleasure principle 
precedes the actual sublimation, and the latter carries the repressive 
elements over into the socially useful activities (ibid). 
In other words, Freud’s conceptualization actually refers to what Marcuse calls 
“repressive sublimation” and must therefore be distinguished from the possibility of a 
sublimation that is non-repressive19 in character. For Marcuse, non-repressive 
sublimation can only exist in its full form in non-repressive civilization (ibid:208). For 
this reason, he raises it as part of a larger discussion of the possibility for human freedom 
and the concomitant “transformation of work into play”. We will therefore encounter this 
concept again below. At this point, however, it is sufficient to briefly mention its defining 
characteristic. According to Marcuse, in non-repressive sublimation “…sexuality is 
neither deflected from nor blocked in its objective; rather, in attaining its objective, it 
transcends it to others, searching for a fuller gratification” (ibid:211); in other words, it is 
“sublimation without desexualization” (ibid:208; 1964:73). 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that when Marcuse uses the term “non-repressive” he is referring not to the 
absence of basic repression but rather to the absence of surplus-repression. “Non-repressive” should 
therefore be read as “non-surplus-repressive”.  
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 Just as the distinction between repressive and non-repressive sublimation is 
necessary, so too is there a need to distinguish between non-repressive and repressive 
desublimation. “Desublimation” is characterized by the replacement of “…mediated by 
immediate gratification” (Marcuse 1955:72). In its non-repressive form, the libido is free 
to find this gratification and the object it chooses for said gratification is freely chosen. In 
contrast, the immediate gratification experienced through repressive desublimation is 
“…‘practiced from a position of strength’ on the part of society…[S]exuality is liberated 
(or rather liberalized) in socially constructive forms. …[I]t operates as the by-product of 
the social controls of technological reality, which extend liberty while intensifying 
domination” (ibid). Repressive desublimation bears the mark of the repressive society in 
which it operates. It is institutionalized, adjusted, and controlled desublimation20 and it 
works in the service of “social cohesion and contentment” (ibid). While people may feel 
as though they are freely choosing the objects which satisfy their desires, as we saw in 
the above discussion of sublimation, the reality is that these desires have been 
preconditioned; individuals have been trained to seek their gratification in particular 
objects (i.e., commodities) at particular times in particular ways. Furthermore, sexuality 
itself has been commodified,  
…thereby eliminating and subduing most of those forces and features 
which, according to Freud, made sexuality and Eros a really liberating and 
socially dangerous force. In the affluent society [i.e., centres] sex is used as 
a salable commodity, as a publicity stunt, as even a status symbol; this 
                                                 
20 Marcuse in fact uses the terms “institutionalized desublimation” (1955:74), “adjusted desublimation” 
(ibid:75), and “controlled desublimation” (ibid:77) as synonyms for “repressive desublimation”.  
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liberalization of sex is practiced by individuals who remain alienated. 
Sexual liberalization remains defined by alienation. Moreover, and perhaps 
even more important, socially facilitated sexual satisfaction becomes a 
vehicle of adjustment. …[D]esublimation, liberalization of sexual morality, 
is accompanied by a release of destructive and aggressive energy on a scale 
hitherto unknown. This means that sexuality is confined to sexuality as a 
partial drive, satisfied in a local zone of the organism, and that the erotic 
transcendence, the cathexis of the entire organism, and the drive to form its 
own peaceful and pleasurable environment, is cut off. Desublimated 
satisfaction remains a temporary outlet which leaves social repression 
unchanged (2001 [1965]:90-91; 1998 [1941]:47). 
In other words, advanced capitalism provides many opportunities for desublimation, 
however, it is always desublimation on its own terms, in service of its own aims. This is 
what makes the desublimation repressive. Furthermore, repressive desublimation 
militates against qualitative social change; this is discussed in more detail below. 
 According to Marcuse, repressive desublimation is one of the clearest symptoms 
of what he terms the “matter-of-fact” or “technological” attitude.21 Furthermore, this 
attitude is part and parcel of what Marcuse calls an overall “psychological neutrality”. 
With the emergence and development of technological rationality, the individual has 
found herself in a situation in which unquestioning, obedient adjustment to the prevailing 
social order is not only required but almost a matter of reflex. The technological attitude, 
as the outcome of the totalizing force of technological rationality, is characterized by 
(sometimes extreme) rationalization on the part of the individual. Wars, scarcity, toil – 
injustices of all kinds – are seen as reasonable and/or pragmatic and this leads to a 
                                                 
21 Marcuse uses these terms synonymously (see, for example, 1998 [1941]: 48). 
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standpoint of detachment and resignation (see 2001 [1961]:49; 1998a:187-188; 1998 
[1941]:44-48). Marcuse argues, “The pragmatic matter-of-factness of everyday life which 
characterizes the behavior of men [sic] in the technological era tends to interpret the 
concrete issues, the fate of every single individual which is actually at stake, in terms of 
objective forces, machines, and institutions” (1998a:187) and this tendency itself 
becomes an integral part of the “mechanics of conformity” in technological society (1998 
[1941]:48). The result is not only that the attitude serves the self-preservation of the 
whole but, perhaps even more troubling, it becomes perceived by the individuals 
themselves as necessary to their own survival (ibid:44-48):  
Business, technics, human needs and nature are welded together into one 
rational and expedient mechanism. He [sic] will fare best who follows its 
directions, subordinating his spontaneity to the anonymous wisdom which 
ordered everything for him. The decisive point is that this attitude – which 
dissolves all actions into a sequence of semi-spontaneous reactions to 
prescribed mechanical norms – is not only perfectly rational but also 
perfectly reasonable. All protest is senseless, and the individual who would 
insist on his freedom of action would become a crank. There is no personal 
escape from the apparatus which has mechanized and standardized the 
world. It is a rational apparatus, combining utmost expediency with utmost 
convenience, saving time and energy, removing waste, adapting all means 
to the end, anticipating consequences, sustaining calculability and security. 
In manipulating the machine, man learns that obedience to the directions is 
the only way to obtain desired results. Getting along is identical with 
adjustment to the apparatus. There is no room for autonomy. Individualistic 
rationality has developed into efficient compliance with the pregiven 
continuum of means and ends. The latter absorbs the liberating effort of 
thought, and the various functions of reason converge upon the 
unconditional maintenance of the apparatus. …Everything cooperates to 
turn human instincts, desires and thoughts into channels that feed the 
apparatus (ibid:46-47).  
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Marcuse is constructing an analysis of the capitalist centres that understands them 
as more or less totalitarian in character. Indeed, as we have mentioned previously, the 
totalitarian character of advanced capitalist societies is in fact seen in the two-fold 
integration of the technical apparatus and technological rationality into not just all of 
social, political, and economic life but also into the actual psyches of each individual as 
well. In order to make this point, Marcuse’s analysis turns toward an examination of 
fascism, for in his view this serves to further enhance our understanding of the 
totalitarianism of the ostensibly democratic centres. It is therefore important to discuss 
this issue further.  
 In contradistinction to commonsense understanding – and worth repeating for this 
reason – Marcuse argues that what separates the overtly fascist from the democratic 
society is not so much that the former is totalitarian while the latter is not. In fact, 
Marcuse is clear that in any case,  
By virtue of the way in which it has organized its technological base, 
contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For totalitarian is 
not only a terroristic political co-ordination of society, but also a non-
terroristic economic-technical co-ordination which operates through the 
manipulation of needs by vested interests and thus precludes the emergence 
of an effective opposition against the whole organized by these interests. 
Not only a specific form of government or party rule makes for 
totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and distribution 
which may well be compatible with “pluralism” of parties, newspapers, 
“countervailing” forces, etc. In the contemporary period, political power 
asserts itself through the power of the machine process, which moves the 
technical ensemble of the productive apparatus. The government of 
advanced and advancing industrial societies can maintain and secure itself 
only when it succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the 
technical, scientific, and mechanical productivity available to industrial 
civilization – and this productivity tends to involve society as a whole, 
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above and beyond any particular individual or group interests (2001 
[1961]:50-51). 
In a certain sense, then, what separates the “democratic” from the fascist regime is that 
the former is a non-terroristic technocracy while the latter is a terroristic one (1998 
[1941]:42) and that consequently in the one case a non-terroristic “unfreedom” prevails 
while in the other this unfreedom has taken an openly terroristic form (2001 [1965]:88-
89; 2001 [1961]:37, 43, 52; 1998; 1998a). In other words, the advanced industrial 
organization of both fascist and democratic systems is ruled by the same technological 
rationality; under fascism, however, the totalitarian element finds its extreme 
manifestation. The crucial distinction is whether the totalitarianism of a given social 
order is terroristic or not as this obviously has consequences for the ways in which 
technocratic organization manifests itself.  
 Under National Socialism (the terroristic technocracy par excellence) the focus on 
efficiency, calculability, standardization, and the like is taken to its most extreme point; 
technological rationality, with its governing “principle of efficiency” (1998:73-77), is 
here “in the total service of imperialist expansion” (ibid:77; see also pp. 72-73, 78-80, 92) 
and this desire for expansion is absolutely uncompromising. Everything, all of the horror, 
is committed in its name. As a consequence of this, the terror that holds this society 
together is “not only that of the concentration camps, prisons and pogroms; it is not only 
the terror of lawlessness, but also the less conspicuous though no less efficient legalized 
terror of bureaucratization” (ibid) which aims to assist in the abolishment of the 
separation between state and society and between society and individual (ibid:70, 75-76, 
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78).22 Insofar as the latter is concerned, this is achieved in two ways: 1) “The regime 
releases all those forces of brutal self-interest which the democratic countries have tried 
to curb and combine with the interest of freedom” (ibid:80) and 2) through the “abolition 
of highly sanctioned taboos” (ibid: 84 [original emphasis]). The consequences of the 
release of competitive self-interest is that it facilitates the organization of individuals into 
a mass (ibid:80):  
These masses…are not united by a common interest and common 
“consciousness”. They are rather made up of individuals each of whom 
follows only his most primitive self-interest, and their unification is brought 
about by the fact that this self-interest is reduced to the bare instinct of self-
preservation which is identical in all of them. The coordination of 
individuals into a crowd has intensified rather than abolished their 
atomization and isolation from each other… They are susceptible to 
manipulation and unification from above because they are stripped of 
everything that might transcend their self-interest and establish a real 
community. They are led to entertainment, they rest and holiday as masses. 
…Reduced to that brute and abstract instinct of self-preservation which is 
equal in all of them, they are easily forced into masses which, by their mere 
weight, prevent any articulation of common interest. This atomization and 
isolation provides the safe ground on which the individual’s forces and 
faculties can issue into the service of the regime (ibid:80-81; see also p. 70). 
At the same time, the National Socialist regime relaxed and in some cases completely 
removed prevalent taboos, such as those on chastity, monogamy, and the sanctity of the 
                                                 
22 While more detailed discussion of the abolition of the distinction between state and society under 
National Socialism is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note the following as it sheds light 
on the extent to which social and political institutions and interests became coordinated under this system. 
This coordination was assisted by extensive and unrelenting bureaucratization (1998:78). Marcuse asserts, 
“The National Socialist state emerges as the threefold sovereignty of industry, party, and army which have 
divided up among themselves the former monopoly of coercive power. The whole system is by no means a 
homogenous one. The three ruling hierarchies frequently clash with each other and each is divided within 
itself. …Despite the diverging claims and tendencies, however, the conflicts do not break out in the open 
because of the deeper pre-existing harmony between the interests of industry, the party and the army. This 
harmony is symbolized in the Leader” (ibid:76 [original emphasis], 78).  
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family (ibid:83-86, 90). The abolition of the taboo on privacy, under which these other 
taboos fall, was most disastrous insofar as the status of the individual’s relationship to the 
social order is concerned due to the fact that in one’s private, leisure time one “may come 
to think, [one’s] impulses, feelings and thoughts may be driven into regions which are 
foreign and inimical to the prevailing order” (ibid:89 [original emphasis]). Furthermore, 
these taboos “tended…to aggravate the antagonism between individual satisfaction and 
social frustration; the former was kept apart from society and, by this very fact, retained 
elements of a freedom and happiness which were alien to the social reality” (ibid:83). 
The removal of these taboos therefore has a repressive rather than truly liberatory 
function (ibid:90) despite appearance to the contrary. Indeed, the abolition of taboos and 
the emergence of the mass, particularly when connected with “the drives and impulses 
directed against the chosen enemies of the Third Reich” (ibid:86) result in the (almost) 
total identification23 of the individual with her society (ibid:87). The terror of the 
National Socialist order is tolerated because individuals come to see themselves as 
compensated for it; the identification is so strong that they, as the privileged members of 
the “German race”, see themselves as the new masters instead of as the ones who are 
mastered by the National Socialist constellation of industry, party, and army (ibid:86-87). 
 Now, while it is certainly the case that many contemporary “democratic” societies 
are also rabidly imperialistic, highly bureaucratized, and also to a certain extent organize 
                                                 
23 Used here in the Freudian sense. 
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individuals into a “mass”, Marcuse argues that these societies have not (d)evolved into an 
openly terroristic technocracy due in large part to the fact that in this case liberal values 
(such as liberty, self-determination, civil rights, and rule of law) are at least formally and 
ideologically upheld (see 1998:71-72; 1964:51) and in many cases were an integral part 
of the history of their state-formation.24 Nonetheless, Marcuse asserts that “[d]emocracy 
would appear to be the most efficient system of domination” (1964:52) due to the very 
fact that its unfreedom is non-terroristic in nature. Under these circumstances unfreedom 
in fact appears, and is indeed experienced, as freedom (2001 [1965]:86; 2001 [1961]:37) 
and this makes freedom itself “a powerful instrument of domination” (1964:7). 
 “Democratic” advanced capitalist societies are particularly good at liquidating, 
containing, and/or integrating threats to the self-preservation of the status quo; indeed, the 
“irrational in this society appears as rational because people indeed have more comforts, 
and more fun. Domination appears as freedom because people indeed have the choice of 
                                                 
24 The argument can of course be made that especially in the current climate these values are at the very 
least under threat if not protected in name only. Yet even if this is the case, this only underlines Marcuse’s 
point that democracy (as we know it) is not fundamentally incompatible with the development of an openly 
fascist order. Again, given that technological rationality dominates both systems the question is not whether 
it is possible for a democratic nation like the United States or Canada to become fascist but rather what 
provides for the most effective resistance against such a possibility. Put differently, the question is how to 
keep countries like these from becoming so. As Marcuse argues, “Certain groups among the population of 
the democratic countries are all too readily inclined to marvel at the efficiency of the Nazi machine in 
dealing with internal problems (labor trouble, rationalization, overall control of production, distribution and 
consumption, elimination of waste and subversive activities, etc.). They may be tempted to seize upon any 
opportunity to contrast these German ‘achievements’ with the conditions of their own country, and to draw 
the conclusion that, after all, Nazism did some useful things” (1998a:190). It may not be ridiculous to argue 
that these words are perhaps as true today as they were when Marcuse first wrote them and Marx’s famous 
dictum that history repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce” seems an especially 
prescient caution.  
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prefabricated goods and prefabricated candidates. Behind the technological veil 
domination of man by man continues as it did before and operates within the conception 
and context of free individuals” (Marcuse 2001 [1965]:86; 2001 [1961]:38, 40, 49-50; 
1964).25 The efficacy of this domination-through-integration is especially clear if we look 
in two directions: 1) its manifestation in the very psyches of the individuals living in 
these societies and 2) at the assimilation of the proletariat. These issues are not unrelated; 
in fact, the latter is made possible not only by the increased mechanization of labour and 
the higher standard of living in the capitalist centres, but also by the ramifications of the 
issues discussed up to this point for individuals’ psychic lives.  
As we have seen in our discussion of repressive desublimation above, non-
terroristic technocracies, like terroristic ones, relax taboos around sexuality and do so 
toward a repressive end. In both terroristic and non-terroristic industrial societies 
repressive desublimation operates as a means of promoting “satisfaction” and this 
satisfaction, be it the “privilege” of belonging to the “master race” or that of being able to 
watch “Sex and the City” or “Desperate Housewives”, to sit behind the wheel of a Honda 
or a Cadillac, only serves the self-preservation of the entire order which produces and 
                                                 
25 Marcuse makes this especially clear in his assertion that, “Free election of masters does not abolish the 
masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if 
these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear – that is, if they sustain 
alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish 
autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls” (1964:7-8; Marcuse also uses these exact words 
in 2001 [1961]:52).  
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assimilates such “freedom”. This makes the desublimation not only repressive, but 
dangerous. As Marcuse argues, 
…with the release of the death and destruction instinct, we have a dangerous 
paradoxical situation; the liberalization of the destruction instinct is not a 
satisfaction of the destruction instinct by virtue of which the instinct would 
be alleviated. The opposite is the case…because in the technological society 
the relaxation of controls over the death instinct decreases rather than 
increases individual instinctual satisfaction and therefore involves 
frustration, which in turn necessitates the repetition of the destruction 
instinct on an ever larger scale (2001 [1965]:91).  
Repressive desublimation is a powerful tool of domination: it can be used to bolster not 
only the “democratic” capitalist order but also the more openly terroristic brand of socio-
political organization and psychological compliance discussed in relation to National 
Socialism above. Furthermore, it’s operation both facilitates and is facilitated by the 
integration of the proletariat within the capitalist centres. It is to discussion of this that we 
now turn.  
 Marcuse argues that in conjunction with increasing surplus-repression, the rule of 
the performance principle, and repressive desublimation there have also been several 
developments in the process of production since Marx’s time that contribute to the 
“transformation” and resultant assimilation of the proletariat. First, increased 
mechanization has changed the nature of labour in the capitalist centres (1964:24). 
According to Marcuse,  
Now the ever-more-complete mechanization of labor in advanced 
capitalism, while sustaining exploitation, modifies the attitude and status of 
the exploited. …Standardization and routine assimilate productive and non-
productive jobs. The proletarian of the previous stages of capitalism was 
indeed a beast of burden, by the labor of his [sic] body procuring the 
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necessities and luxuries of life while living in filth and poverty. Thus he was 
the living denial of his society. In contrast, the organized worker in the 
advanced areas of technological society lives this denial less conspicuously 
and, like other human objects of the social division of labor, he is being 
incorporated into the technological community of the administered 
population (ibid:25-26). 
Furthermore, “[t]he same technological organization which makes for a mechanical 
community at work also generates a larger interdependence which integrates the worker 
with the plant” (ibid:30); this actually promotes feelings of gratification amongst the 
workers, who often come to view themselves as members of a team (ibid:26) and feel an 
attachment and loyalty to their place of work itself (ibid:30, see also pp. 19-20). This is 
an additional means by which the proletariat no longer experiences itself or its work as 
contradictory to capitalism. Furthermore, 
To the extent to which the machine becomes itself a system of mechanical 
tools and relations and thus extends far beyond individual work process, it 
asserts its larger domination by reducing “professional autonomy” of the 
laborer and integrating him [sic] with other professions which suffer and 
direct the technical ensemble. To be sure, the former “professional” 
autonomy of the laborer was rather his professional enslavement. But this 
specific mode of enslavement was at the same time the source of his 
specific, professional power of negation – the power to stop a process which 
threatened him with annihilation as a human being. Now the laborer is 
losing the professional autonomy which made him a member of a class set 
off from the other occupational groups because it embodied the refutation 
of established society (ibid:28 [original emphasis]). 
In other words, the proletariat can no longer be distinguished based on the fact that its 
labour is manual and directly productive in nature. As mechanization increases, so too 
does standardization; both spread into all sectors of society and the labour performed in 
the factory and the office become more and more alike. This is the assimilation of jobs; in 
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addition, the overall trend is such that “…the ‘blue-collar’ work force declines in relation 
to the ‘white-collar’ element; the number of non-production workers increases” (ibid:27). 
As mechanization, standardization, and the assimilation of labour increases in degree and 
scope, the proletariat finds itself incorporated into the system to an ever-greater extent. 
They do not experience their labour or their lives as oppositional; in fact, they often find 
themselves “satisfied”.26 
 The result of all of this is a “weakening of the negative position of the working 
class: the latter no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society” 
(1964:32, see also p. 19; 2001 [1961]:38). This is further exacerbated by the fact that 
many proletarians in the capitalist centres are able, through their labour, to participate in 
the consumptive practices of the society as a whole. They can dress and eat well, buy 
homes and cars, take vacations, go to the theatre, have access to and enjoy stock options, 
and so on. This is another important part of what makes their position as the “living 
denial” of the social order less “conspicuous”. But this is not all. Again, the proletariat is 
not only integrated into this system physically but mentally as well; its members develop 
a “Happy Consciousness”, a belief that “the system delivers the goods” (1964:79, 84; 
1955:103-104). Furthermore, as we have seen, on an unconscious level they learn to 
desire what they have been (pre)conditioned to desire and to experience satisfaction 
                                                 
26 Again, this feeling of “satisfaction” is itself a “token of repression” (Marcuse 1955:220) and signals the 
psychological component of the domination-through-integration mentioned previously.  
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through the repressive sublimation required for their labour;27 “The machine process in 
the technological universe breaks the innermost privacy of freedom and joins sexuality 
and labor in one unconscious, rhythmic automatism…” (ibid:27). The extent to which 
both surplus-repression and repressive desublimation operate in contemporary capitalism 
works to ensure the inability for the proletariat to feel their oppression as such.28 This is 
further bolstered by “…the effect of the technological organization of production…on 
management and direction. Domination is transfigured into administration. The capitalist 
bosses and owners are losing their identity as responsible agents; they are assuming the 
function of bureaucrats in a corporate machine” (ibid:32). The consequences of this are 
dire, for,  
Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards extending far 
beyond the individual establishment into the scientific laboratory and 
research institute, the national government and national purpose, the 
tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the façade of objective 
rationality. Hatred and frustration are deprived of their specific target, and 
the technological veil conceals the reproduction of inequality and 
enslavement. With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom – in the 
sense of man’s [sic] subjection to his productive apparatus – is perpetuated 
and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts. The novel feature 
is the overwhelming rationality of this irrational enterprise, and the depth of 
the preconditioning which shapes the instinctual drives and aspirations of 
the individuals and obscures the difference between false and true 
consciousness. For in reality, neither the utilization of administrative rather 
                                                 
27 A prime example of this is the integration of the worker with the plant mentioned above. 
28 Lukács’ assertion that “…[I]n capitalist society reality is – immediately – the same for both the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat” (1971 [1923]:164) takes on a particularly ominous connotation in this 
context due to the fact that the possibility of freedom is no longer merely a question of the development of 
a “true class consciousness” but rather of the abolition of alienation on the instinctual level as well. People 
have come to literally identify themselves with this society (Marcuse 1964:10; 1955:90); they “…recognize 
themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen 
equipment” (ibid:9). 
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than physical controls…nor the change in the character of heavy work, nor 
the assimilation of occupational classes, nor the equalization in the sphere 
of consumption compensate for the fact that the decisions over life and 
death, over personal and national security are made at places over which the 
individuals have no control. The slaves of developed industrial society are 
sublimated slaves, but they are slaves. …This is the pure form of servitude: 
to exist as an instrument, as a thing. And this mode of existence is not 
abrogated if the thing is animated and chooses its material and intellectual 
food, if it does not feel its being-a-thing, if it is a pretty, clean, mobile thing. 
Conversely, as reification tends to become totalitarian by virtue of its 
technological form, the organizers and administrators themselves become 
increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and 
administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the dialectical 
relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the 
struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encloses 
both the Master and the Servant (ibid:32-33).29 
Each of the two major classes appears to lose its particular identity in the face of the 
technological, bureaucratic administration of society. Instead of clearly standing on 
opposite sides of the labour relation, they appear almost as though standing together, on 
the same side, the differences between them a matter of degree rather than fundamental 
(see also 2001 [1961]:38). The proletariat is no longer driven to view its liberation as a 
matter of life and death; in fact, the question of liberation now appears to have no 
relevance at all. The conditions outlined above “…promote a false consciousness which 
is immune against its falsehood” (ibid:12). The most significant implication here is not 
that the transformation of society appears impossible but rather that its transformation 
and by extension real freedom have become undesirable.30 
                                                 
29 Here Marcuse refers to Hegel’s argument in the “Lordship and Bondage” section of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit (1979 [1807]). 
30 For discussion of this in relation to Critical Theory more broadly, see Jacoby (1975:81-82). 
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 Advanced capitalism is a system of social relations that is perhaps uniquely able 
to “contain” the potentially liberatory forces of society; change from within the system 
seems more and more unlikely as the “use-value of freedom” (Marcuse 1964:49) is 
reduced. The changes in the labour process and the resultant transformation of both the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist centres help to produce a situation in 
which the contradictions of capitalism appear to be smoothed out. Any potential site of 
resistance is absorbed into the system and used to further “social cohesion”. Marcuse 
argues,  
Today’s novel feature is the flattening out of antagonism between culture 
and social reality through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and 
transcendent elements in the higher culture by virtue of which it constituted 
another dimension of reality. This liquidation of two-dimensional culture 
takes place not through the denial and rejection of the “cultural values,” but 
through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through 
their reproduction and display on a massive scale. …If mass 
communications blend together harmoniously, and often unnoticeably, art, 
politics, religion, and philosophy with commercials, they bring these realms 
of culture to their common denominator – the commodity form. The music 
of the soul is also the music of salesmanship. Exchange value, not truth 
value counts. On it centers the rationality of the status quo, and all alien 
rationality is bent to it (1964:57 [original emphasis]). 
Everyone and everything in the society is mobilized, consciously and unconsciously, 
against “the Enemy”, the “real spectre [sic] of liberation” (ibid:52). Under these 
circumstances the possibilities for resistance and emancipation may appear particularly 
bleak. Yet the tension running throughout Marcuse’s work is actually that of the 
simultaneous impossibility and possibility of freedom (1964:xlvii). For Marcuse genuine 
freedom would, in the current context, be better described as negative freedom for 
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…economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy, that is, man’s 
[sic] freedom from being determined by economic forces and relationships: 
freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a living. 
Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from politics 
over which they have no effective control – the disappearance of politics as 
a separate branch and function in the social division of labor. Similarly, 
intellectual freedom would mean the restoration of individual thought after 
its absorption by mass communication and indoctrination – abolition of 
‘public opinion’ together with its makers. The unrealistic sound of these 
propositions is indicative, not of their utopian character, but of the 
predominance of forces which prevent their realization by preconditioning 
the material and intellectual needs which perpetuate obsolete forms of the 
struggle for existence (2001 [1961]:51 [original emphasis]).  
So, then, where does the possibility for this freedom lie? The answer is twofold. First – 
and strikingly – Marcuse, like Marx, argues that it is still to be found in the process of 
production itself (and in the culture that it produces). At the same time, however, 
Marcuse asserts that perhaps the greatest hope for liberation in the capitalist centres is 
actually to be found in the reactivation of critique and of critical thinking more generally. 
We begin, then, with some discussion of the former possibility before closing this chapter 
by engaging with Marcuse’s analysis of the recuperation of two-dimensional thought. 
 The increased mechanization of labour, though highly repressive, also contains 
revolutionary potential. Marcuse is clear that this possibility is not assured; automation is 
either “an explosive or non-explosive catalyst in the material base of qualitative change” 
(1964:36). Its potentially “explosive” element can be found in two, apparently 
contradictory, places: 1) its increase to the point where it becomes “the process of 
material production” (ibid:37 [original emphasis]) and 2) in the resistance of labour to it. 
In Marcuse’s view, the former appears to hold more potential than the latter due to the 
 145  
fact that “…the declining proportion of human labor power in the productive process 
means a decline in the political power of the opposition” (ibid:38). Furthermore, in the 
capitalist centres white-collar labour becomes increasingly important. In order, then, for 
the resistance to automation to become a real challenge to the system, the political 
radicalization of white-collar workers becomes necessary and this radicalization 
“…would have to be accompanied by the emergence of an independent political 
consciousness and action among the white-collar groups – a rather unlikely development 
in advanced industrial society” (ibid). What then of the revolutionary potential of 
increased automation? Marcuse follows Marx here,31 arguing that were automation to 
become total, the relation of labour to the process of production would change in such a 
way that the individual labourer would be excluded from it. The production of 
commodities and of surplus value would no longer depend upon direct human labour 
power. Therefore, 
…the social process of automation expresses the…transubstantiation of 
labor power, in which the latter, separated from the individual, becomes an 
independent producing object and thus a subject itself. Automation, once it 
became the process of material production, would revolutionize the whole 
society. The reification of human labor power, driven to perfection, would 
shatter the reified form by cutting the chain that ties the individual to the 
machinery – the mechanism through which his [sic] own labor enslaves 
him. Complete automation in the realm of necessity would open the 
dimension of free time as the one in which man’s private and societal 
existence would constitute itself. This would be the historical transcendence 
toward a new civilization (ibid:36-37 [original emphasis]; 1955:129).  
                                                 
31 See the Grundrisse (Marx 1973 [1857-1858]).  
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With the possibility of this “transcendence” toward a new, non-repressive civilization 
comes the potential for the “transformation of work into play”; the end of alienated 
labour would mean that the individual would be free to sublimate her desires in her work 
and as such she would exist “…not as an instrument of alienated labor but as a subject of 
self-realization – in other words…socially useful work [would become] at the same time 
the transparent satisfaction of an individual need” (1955:210, see also p. 218). Here, then, 
is an instance in which the progression of alienation in the relations of production 
becomes (at least potentially) “positive”. Alongside this are the potentially positive 
aspects of alienation in the realm of capitalist culture and it is to discussion of this that we 
now turn. 
 We have seen that advanced capitalism is able to contain emancipatory forces in 
part through the absorption of the antagonistic elements of its culture (Marcuse 1964:57). 
Art, for Marcuse, has historically been able to express the contradictions of the society in 
which it is created; it represented and communicated the “…unhappy consciousness of 
the divided world, the defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises 
betrayed. [It was] a rational, cognitive force, revealing a dimension of man and nature 
which was repressed and repelled in reality” (ibid:61). Even elements within bourgeois 
art performed this function and art in general presented and represented the tension 
between actual and ideal reality, between the world as it is and the world as it could be 
(ibid, see also pp. 58, 60). While the proletariat was the negation of the “established 
order” in flesh, art was its negation in culture. As this negative, contradictory force, it 
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constituted a propitious form of alienation and as such it was “the Great Refusal – the 
protest against that which is” (ibid:63, 256-257; 1955:149f). Marcuse argues that this 
“artistic alienation” stands “in contrast to the Marxian concept” (ibid:60) and is 
subversive insofar as it is “the conscious transcendence of the alienated existence – a 
‘higher level’ or mediated alienation. …The traditional images of artistic 
alienation…recall and preserve in memory…images of a gratification that would dissolve 
the society which suppresses it” (1964:60). However, even this alienation is absorbed by 
the process of one-dimensional, technological rationality (ibid:65): 
Now this essential gap between the arts and the order of the day, kept open 
in artistic alienation, is progressively closed by the advancing technological 
society. And with its closing, the Great Refusal is in turn refused; the “other 
dimension” is absorbed into the prevailing state of affairs. The works of 
alienation are themselves incorporated into this society and circulate as part 
and parcel of the equipment which adorns and psychoanalyzes the 
prevailing state of affairs. Thus they become commercials – they sell, 
comfort, or excite (ibid:64). 
While on the one hand, great works of art are now accessible to more and more people, in 
their mass reproduction and availability they have lost their oppositional element; 
through the process of repressive desublimation, and their reduction to mere 
commodities, their power of negation has, to a large extent, been divested from them 
(ibid:72). Art is therefore rendered largely harmless and “…the joys which it grants 
promote social cohesion and contentment” (ibid). The possibility for resistance in this 
realm still exists, however. What is required is the conscious effort to communicate art’s 
truth without allowing it to become absorbed by, and integrated into, the prevailing order 
(ibid:66). If we have come to completely identify with our society, then the trick becomes 
 148  
breaking that identification in order to produce a “dissociation in which the world can be 
recognized as what it is” (ibid:67). Marcuse, like other members of the Frankfurt School, 
points to the avant-garde as a site where attempts to do so are being made but the 
reactivation of the negative power of art, like the revolutionary potential of automation, is 
far from assured. 32  
 The reactivation of art’s negativity is connected to the recuperation of critical 
thinking more generally. Indeed, each depends upon and strengthens the other. The 
reactivation of two-dimensional thought as well as of its ability to recognize history as a 
“hidden dimension of meaning” in the dominant discourses of society is necessary, for 
“unless the recognition of what is being done and what is being prevented subverts the 
consciousness and the behavior of man, not even a catastrophe will bring about…change” 
(1964:xlvii).33 According to Marcuse, such recognition “shatters the natural and reified 
form in which the given universe of discourse first appears” (ibid:181). Furthermore, the 
reactivation of two-dimensional, negative thinking would also be the reemergence of the 
critical judgment, which would at least challenge, if not destroy, the technological 
attitude due to the fact that this form of judgment not only imagines and articulates how 
things ought to be but is also, therefore, explicitly political (ibid:123f). Marcuse sees the 
                                                 
32 Marcuse cites Brecht’s “estrangement effect” as an example of the conscious attempt to reassert the 
revolutionary potential of alienation in art (1964:66). Further discussion of this, and Marcuse’s arguments 
concerning aesthetics more generally, are beyond the scope of this chapter. For more on this issue, see 
Marcuse 1998:91-92; 1998 [1993]; 1979; 1978; 1964.  
33 Indeed, we can see that this is the case by looking to history. There have arguably already been many 
“catastrophes” and rather than exploding the prevailing order, they have instead appeared, to a great extent, 
to strengthen it.  
 149  
development of a philosophy that is immanently critical (e.g., the Frankfurt School’s own 
“Critical Theory”) as one of the main means, alongside art, of reviving critical thought. 
Marcuse argues, 
The unscientific, speculative character of critical theory derives from the 
specific character of its concepts, which designate and define the irrational 
in the rational, the mystification in the reality. Their mythological quality 
reflects the mystifying quality of the given facts – the deceptive 
harmonization of the societal conditions (ibid:189, see also pp. 140-141). 
Therefore, 
In the totalitarian era, the therapeutic task of philosophy would be a political 
task, since the established universe of ordinary language tends to coagulate 
into a totally manipulated and indoctrinated universe. The politics would 
appear in philosophy, not as a special discipline or object of analysis, nor as 
a special political philosophy, but as the intent of its concepts to 
comprehend the unmutilated reality (ibid:199).34  
Of course, as we have seen in the discussion of the transformation of negative into 
positive thinking above, critical thought is capable of being contained and absorbed by 
the prevailing social order. Indeed, this form of thought has become increasingly 
“socially impotent” as a result both of the “growth of the industrial apparatus” and the 
resulting coordination of “all spheres of life” and as an outcome of the assimilation of 
historically oppositional elements, such as labour and art, into the apparatus itself (1998 
                                                 
34 For more on the importance of Critical Theory to social transformation, see Jacoby (1975:73-100) where 
he argues that the “…overpowering by a brutal reality which has left the individual numb and dumb is to be 
overcome, at least in thought and theory, before subjectivity can be realized: insight into the very material 
and social conditions that mutilate it. Before the individual can exist, before it can become an individual, it 
must recognize to what extent it does not yet exist. It must shed the illusion of the individual before 
becoming one. Subjectivity must be brought to objectivity so it can be realized” (ibid:81; see also pp. 80, 
90-91, 99). This is the negative (and negating) power of Critical Theory.  
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[1941]:51-52). Nonetheless, Marcuse argues that we must continue to develop this 
critique in an effort to find ways of keeping it from losing its “edge” and becoming 
“merge[d] with the old and familiar” (ibid:51). Otherwise, we run the risk of becoming 
completely incapable of escaping a truly pervasive and destructive totalitarianism, one 
that covers not only all of society but the mind and body as well. 
 While Marcuse does not prescribe any definitive solutions to the problem of 
emancipation under advanced capitalism, he does clearly argue that in general “…the 
liberation from this state seems to require, not the arrest of alienation, but its 
consummation, not the reactivation of the repressed and productive personality but its 
abolition. The elimination of human potentialities from the world of (alienated) labor 
creates the preconditions for the elimination of labor from the world of human 
potentialities” (1955:105). Furthermore, “The possibility of a non-repressive civilization 
is predicated not upon the arrest, but upon the liberation of progress” (ibid:198). This 
leaves us in a paradoxical position: the possibility of freedom, at least in the centres of 
capitalism, lies in the completion of alienation, in the total reification of existence. Like 
Marx, Marcuse claims that the progression of capitalism may very well create conditions 
that are incompatible with its own continued existence.35 On the other hand, its ability to 
“obliterate” all opposition may only get stronger. Indeed, Marcuse is calling on us to 
understand that despite a higher standard of living, despite the “luxury” of (what appears 
                                                 
35 This is stated explicitly in the introduction to One Dimensional Man (1964:xlvii).  
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to be) more options than ever before, ours is a mutilated reality and a mutilated 
experience. The barbarism of everyday life can be seen in the very fact that we live in a 
world where alienation has become almost total; we live subjected to an order in which 
we are blind to our subjection and our unfreedom appears as freedom. Now, we should 
not misunderstand Marcuse as making some sort of vulgar historical determinist 
argument advocating that we do nothing because capitalism will “take care of itself”. 
Marcuse, like both Marx and Lukács, is clear that “[a]ll liberation depends on 
consciousness of servitude” (1964:7); the question becomes how to cultivate that 
consciousness in a system so adept at preventing it.  
 Marcuse’s arguments are very narrowly focused on central capitalism. However, 
if we bring them into contact with Amin’s arguments concerning the relations between 
centre and periphery, they can be resituated in the broader context of the imperialist 
world system. It is to the explicit synthesis of the work of Marcuse and Amin that we 
now turn.  
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Chapter 4: Synthesizing Marcuse and Amin 
 
 In our discussion up to this point, I have engaged in some detail with both Samir 
Amin’s and Herbert Marcuse’s analyses of alienation. Amin’s arguments are, as we have 
seen, situated in the context of a capitalist imperialist world system increasingly polarized 
into periphery and centre. Marcuse’s arguments, by contrast, emerge in the context of the 
advanced capitalist centres where the experience of alienation, and the consequent 
identification – and compliance – of individuals with the status quo is totalizing. In spite 
of these different points of departure, their analyses are deeply compatible. This chapter 
highlights the ways in which a synthesis of the work of these representatives of two 
highly influential Marxist traditions can deepen our understanding of capitalist 
imperialism as well as of alienation as a mode of experience and way of being under the 
rule of such a system.  
Amin’s work serves as a supplement to Marcuse’s thought insofar as it situates 
the analysis of alienation in the context of the world system allowing us to be able to 
flesh out Marcuse’s analysis so as to protect it more fully from the critique that it is 
Eurocentric, too narrow, and therefore largely outdated or useful only when applied to 
specific academic contexts/fields (for example, leisure studies, sociology of consumption, 
etc.). Because of his focus on the centres of the world system, Marcuse comes to the 
conclusion that art and the revitalization of critical thought point the way toward 
freedom. While these are certainly important to the possibility of a radical transformation 
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of the given social order, this conclusion is at the same time somewhat unsatisfying and is 
at least partly to blame for the common conception of the Frankfurt School in general, 
and Marcuse in particular, as pessimistic and having little to offer by way of concrete 
alternatives. By resituating Marcuse’s analysis of advanced capitalism into the broader 
context articulated by Amin, we are better able to see Marcuse’s conclusions not as 
absolute, applying to the situation-at-hand in general, but rather as a crucial, albeit 
particular, part of the solution.  
While Marcuse’s argument that freedom is possible only with the reactivation of 
critical thought is both incisive and important, it is incomplete insofar as it is also 
necessary to see freedom as made possible by conditions arising out of the contradictions 
(i.e., crises) of capitalism – for example, by inter-imperialist rivalries in the centre and the 
particular conditions present in the periphery. From the other side, Marcuse is able to 
supplement Amin insofar as Amin’s work is less thorough when it comes to the analysis 
of the ideology of the centres, specifically in terms of the connections between 
Enlightenment thought, instrumental rationality, and alienation and its consequences for 
human experience.1  
The analysis of the capitalist imperialist world system, human experience under 
such a system, and alienation as a mode of being-in-the-world becomes particularly 
strong when the powerful analysis of imperialism offered by Amin and the powerful 
                                                 
1 Recall that Amin himself points to the work of the Frankfurt School, and Marcuse in particular, as 
important for understanding these issues. 
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analysis of human experience under advanced capitalism offered by Marcuse are used to 
supplement each other in this way. For, as Jacoby argues, “The psychic and character 
forms of reification are historically specific in a manner different from the non-psychic; 
each has a different dynamic which is not insular but derived from the dynamic of 
capitalism” (1975:100). These dynamics can only be properly understood from the 
vantage point of the world system and yet, at the same time, the world system cannot be 
adequately apprehended without the understanding of how these dynamics operate in the 
centres of the system, where capitalist domination has become, for all intents and 
purposes, total. This chapter returns to the discussion of alienation and the consequences 
of this analysis for our understanding of the role of class begun in the previous chapters 
before turning our focus, once again, to the question of human freedom. The chapter 
concludes with questions for future research.  
As we have seen, Marcuse’s analysis of alienation begins with his discussion of 
the transformation of two-dimensional into one-dimensional thought, a consequence of 
the progress of capitalism and, more specifically, the emergence of technological 
rationality as dominant. Marcuse’s understanding of alienation generally follows that of 
Marx, however, he goes beyond Marx’s formulation particularly insofar as he integrates 
Freudian concepts into his conceptual framework. It is worth reemphasizing that for 
Marcuse this is necessary due to the fact that with the progress of technological, 
advanced capitalist society, alienation has come to affect individuals not just on the level 
of their consciousness and conscious experience, but rather on the level of their 
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unconscious drives and desires as well (1964:6, 32, 72; 1955:46, 89, 102-103, 129). 
Marcuse historicizes several of Freud’s most important concepts: he argues that Freud’s 
discussion of work and its relation to scarcity, repression, the reality principle, and 
sublimation all must be understood not simply as a part of the biogenetic evolution of the 
individual human being, but rather as products of the mode of production in which they 
arise. In other words, these concepts must “…be paired with corresponding terms 
denoting the specific socio-historical component” (1955:35). Unlike Freud, Marcuse 
distinguishes between alienated and non-alienated work, repression and surplus 
repression, repressive and non-repressive sublimation (and desublimation), and the reality 
and performance principles. In doing so, Marcuse is able to provide a particularly robust 
analysis of the consequences of the progress of alienation for human experience, not just 
of each other, our work, or our environment, but of our very selves, on the most intimate 
and basic levels, as well. These consequences include, as we have seen, the emergence of 
a matter-of-fact attitude and overall psychological neutrality that becomes an integral part 
of the “mechanics of conformity” in technological society (1998 [1941]:48). Our ability, 
therefore, to resist the totalitarianism of advanced capitalist societies, whether terroristic 
or non-terroristic in nature, is deeply compromised.  
Yet, just as Marcuse found it necessary to historicize Freudian concepts in order 
to develop a more complete understanding of alienation, so too is it necessary to socially 
and historically locate Marcuse’s conceptualizations. It bears repeating that Marcuse’s 
concern is specifically with the advanced capitalist centres. It stands to reason, then, that 
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the picture may be somewhat different once we extend the analysis to the world system 
more broadly. It is here that Amin’s work is especially useful. Marcuse and Amin both 
understand economic alienation in generally similar terms, largely due to the fact that 
both draw here specifically from Marx’s analysis. Yet, unlike Marcuse – and due to his 
focus on the history and nature of the world system – Amin introduces further 
distinctions into our understanding of this concept. First of all, Amin argues that the form 
of alienation dominating tributary societies is actually metaphysical rather than economic 
in nature due on the one hand to the “transparency of the economic relations of 
exploitation and, on the other hand, from the limited degree of mastery over nature at the 
corresponding levels of development of the productive forces” (1980:ix; 2011:180, 182; 
1998:54-55; 1977:76-77; 1976:70-71). In tributary societies, the “politico-ideological 
instance…dominates social life” (1976:25; 1989:5, 22; recall Chapter 2). Of course, in 
the capitalist mode, this relationship is inverted and the political becomes subordinated to 
the economic. Again, on this Marcuse and Amin agree. However, it is here that Amin 
takes the analysis yet another step further: by taking into account the imperialist character 
of the global context, he goes beyond Marx and Marcuse, arguing that within the world 
system operates a “pyramid of alienations” (2011:189). 
It is worth restating what Amin means by this term. Because the contemporary 
world system, though dominated by capitalism, is still nonetheless characterized by 
mixed modes of production, a conflict between various forms of alienation arises. The 
advanced capitalist centres are typified by an increasingly totalizing economic alienation; 
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however, in the peripheries, tributary modes can still be found and because of this, there 
is a conflict between the economic alienation resultant from the capitalist nature of the 
system as a whole and the metaphysical alienation that persists as a result of its retention 
of tributary features. This conflict plays itself out within the peripheral societies 
themselves; while in the centre the contradictions of capitalism are largely smoothed out 
(for all of the reasons both Amin and Marcuse identify),2 in the periphery these 
contradictions may remain more visible. This has implications for our understanding of 
the possibility of transformative social change as well as of the role of the proletariat in 
such a transformation.  
It is precisely the mechanics of the interrelationship between alienation and the 
increasingly totalitarian nature of advanced capitalist society that leads Marcuse to 
wonder if perhaps the proletariat is no longer the motive force of social transformation. 
But this apparent impasse is breached if we take Amin’s “pyramid of alienations” 
argument seriously. The fact that mixed modes of production are still present, particularly 
in the periphery, means that we can no longer think of class simply in terms of 
“proletariat” and “bourgeoisie”. Rather, what we have seen is that these categories must 
be further subdivided into the imperialist bourgeoisie (i.e., the central bourgeoisie), the 
central proletariat, the peripheral bourgeoisie (i.e. the national bourgeoisie of the various 
peripheral societies), and the peripheral proletariat (i.e., the super-exploited). In other 
                                                 
2 See Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
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words, when Marcuse asserts that the proletariat may no longer be the locus of societal 
transformation, what he is identifying are the limitations of the transformative potential 
of the central proletariat. Understood this way, we see that Marcuse and Amin agree that 
the proletariat of the centre is largely integrated into the society such that their ability to 
pose a real threat to the status quo is apparently – at least in the present moment – 
limited. This integration occurs not just on the level of the actually existing mechanics of 
the society (e.g., the interrelationship between democratic ideology, for example, and the 
market; the effect of mechanization and standardization on workers’ labour) but also in 
terms of the actual experience of workers in this society (e.g., along the axes of alienation 
articulated by Marx and developed by Marcuse further to encompass psychoanalytic 
dynamics) as well. Furthermore, this integration is not simply the result of the dynamics 
operating in the centres themselves, in isolation, but is rather also the result of the 
dynamics of the world system in general. Indeed, if we ignore one locus in favor of the 
other, our understanding is necessarily limited in ways it need not be. It is therefore 
perhaps helpful to briefly revisit Amin’s and Marcuse’s arguments concerning the 
integration of the central proletariat before turning to some further discussion of the 
periphery. 
For Amin as for Marcuse, economic alienation “…functions…to hide the 
elimination of the autonomy of the political” (2004:45) but it is not simply that 
democracy and the market have converged. Rather, the former is subjected to the latter 
(ibid:46). What we are left with is “… a theory of imaginary politics” that “…forms, in 
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its own sphere, the counterpart of ‘pure economics,’ which is not the theory of really-
existing capitalism, but of an imaginary economy” (ibid:47). We are faced with the 
mystification of both economics and politics. The way in which the system truly 
functions is obscured. As a consequence of this, “…there appears to be no alternative to 
the dominant ideology” (ibid:46, 21); “Subjection to the established facts is total” 
(Marcuse 1964:178). For the central proletariat, one consequence of this is that they come 
to accept the “hegemony of social democracy” (Amin 1976:378-379). This partly stems 
from the fact that the working class has made real gains through social democratic 
mechanisms (for example, the formation of unions and the resultant establishment of 
labour laws, the establishment of welfare state policies, etc.) and indeed, one could 
interpret this as an indication that there is in fact the possibility that some transformation 
along this route may be possible.3 However, the prevailing tendency has on the contrary 
been the emptying out “…of all content [of democracy] which restricts and is potentially 
dangerous for the market. It becomes a ‘low-intensity democracy’. You are free to vote as 
you choose: white, blue, green, pink, or red. In any case, it will have no effect; your fate 
is decided elsewhere, outside the precincts of Parliament, in the market” (Amin 
2004:46).4, 5 Or, in Marcuse’s words, “[d]emocracy would appear to be the most efficient 
                                                 
3 Yet, even if we were to accept this interpretation, recall that Amin argues that these gains have actually 
been made possible as a result of imperialist rent; the central proletariat can only enjoy these benefits 
because such advances are to a large extent not possible in the peripheries (2011:168, 163; see page 104 
above). 
4 For more on “low-intensity democracy” see Amin 2004:21, 29, 42-48, 68, 70.  
5 Indeed, today the weakness of social democratic mechanisms is increasingly apparent. For example, union 
membership in the centres, particularly in North America, has dramatically declined; legislation aimed at 
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system of domination” (1964:52) precisely because under its rule, unfreedom is actually 
experienced as freedom; “Domination appears as freedom because people indeed have 
the choice of prefabricated goods and prefabricated candidates. Behind the technological 
veil domination of man by man continues as it did before and operates within the 
conception and context of free individuals” (2001 [1965]:86; see also, 2001 [1961]:38, 
40, 49-50; 1964).  
The integration of the central proletariat is apparent in more than just their 
acceptance of social democracy as an end-in-itself, however. Rather, on the domestic 
level, we have seen that the assimilation of jobs is another factor. So too is the ability of 
many members of the class to participate in the consumptive practices of the society as a 
whole. As Marcuse points out, this domination-through-integration is not only physical 
but also psychological in nature; the conditions of the centre “…promote a false 
consciousness which is immune against its falsehood” (1964:12). It is necessary to 
reemphasize, however, that these conditions arise out of the context of a polarized and 
polarizing world system. It is not simply the totalitarianism of the centres of capitalism 
(both on the material and ideological levels) that is to blame for the integration of the 
proletariat. In other words, the dynamics that lead to its assimilation are not simply 
“local”. They are, quite literally, international. The integration of the central proletariat is, 
                                                 
undoing the gains made by unions – such as so-called “Right to Work” and “Back to Work” legislation – 
has become increasingly popular; the welfare state is being systematically dismantled in favor of, 
domestically, austerity measures and, generally, a turn towards “globalized neoliberalism” (recall that this 
is Amin’s term; see 1998:43 or page 86 above for further discussion). 
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in other words, a direct result of the autocentred accumulation of the centres and the 
concomitant super-exploitation of the periphery (Amin 2011; 2010 [1978]). Taken 
together, the “external” dynamics of the imperialist world system and the “internal” 
dynamics of the central societies themselves come together in such a way so as to blunt 
the transformative potential of the central working class by inoculating them against both 
understanding and experiencing themselves as the “living contradiction to the established 
society” (Marcuse 1964:32). It is precisely this consequence of the interplay between 
these dynamics that leads Amin to reach a similar conclusion to Marcuse and to further 
argue that given this – and especially given the specific dynamics of autocentred 
accumulation – the “main nucleus” of the proletariat is no longer in the centre 
(1976:360); rather, “…it is necessary to leave behind the viewpoint of the popular classes 
in the rich centres alone, to see the reality of the globalised capitalist system” (2011:191). 
What then of the peripheral proletariat? 
To begin, Amin argues that contrary to the assertions of those like Hardt and 
Negri (2000), the world system has not left imperialism behind and instead entered into a 
stage of “empire” but rather has developed a “new imperialism” that differs from 
previous forms in some important ways.6 This, he argues, is “…by nature an imperialist 
system exacerbated to the extreme” (Amin 2004:22). Indeed,  
                                                 
6Amin’s critique of the “currently fashionable intellectual discourse” (2004:22) represented by books like 
Empire (2000) follows the same line as that of liberalism generally and post-modern discourse in particular 
and is discussed in some detail in Chapter 3. For explicit discussion of Empire see Amin 2004:19-27.  
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…accumulation in the prior imperialist stage was based on the binary 
relation between the industrialized centers and the non-industrialized 
peripheries, while in the new conditions of the system’s evolution the 
opposition is between the beneficiaries of the centers’ new monopolies 
(technology, access to natural resources, communications, weapons of mass 
destruction) and peripheries that are industrialized, but still subordinated by 
means of these monopolies (2004:23; 2011:6). 
Furthermore, while  
[i]mperialism in the past was multiple (‘imperialisms’ in conflict)… the 
new one is collective (the Triad, even if this be in the wake of United States 
hegemony). From this fact, the ‘conflicts’ among the partners of the Triad 
are only minor, while the conflict between the Triad and the rest of the world 
is clearly the major one (2004:22-23).  
For Amin, the consequences of this imperialism – an imperialism that has become 
increasingly violent (ibid:22, 34; 2011) – are dire, especially but not only for those in the 
peripheries.  
 Perhaps the greatest threat stemming from the emergence of this “new 
imperialism” is that it operates according to a logic that “…is no longer able to ensure the 
simple survival of humanity” (Amin 2011:106). This is the case whether we look in the 
direction of the continuing and intensifying environmental degradation/destruction or 
whether we look toward the expansionist requirements of the system. Indeed, these two 
outcomes perpetuate and reinforce each other. The consequences of climate change, 
habitat destruction and pollution, and the need for rapid and rabid expansion to ever 
bigger and newer markets can and will also be felt in the centres, though for the moment 
our experience of their effects are (or at least appear to be) mitigated by our monopoly 
over access to, and use of, technologies, financial systems, natural resources, media and 
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information systems, and weapons of mass destruction (Amin 2011:60, 62; 2004:23; 
2003:13, 63-65; 1998:26). However, our ability to mitigate these consequences as a result 
of our ‘enjoyment’ of these monopolies is at the same time necessarily the intensification 
of these destructive tendencies themselves. And the consequences of these tendencies are 
nowhere more – immediately – devastating than in the periphery, where, as Amin argues, 
the only prospect the system can truly offer is “…a planet full of slums and billions of 
‘too many’ human beings” (2011:105-106; recall also the discussion on pages 78-80 and 
footnote 33 on page 95, above).7 Furthermore, it is the peripheries of the world system 
that disproportionately bear the burdens of the state of permanent war that is a “natural” 
outgrowth of the polarizing expansion of the world system. 
 Both Amin and Marcuse have much to say about the emergence and mobilization 
of a state of permanent war. Marcuse couches his discussion in terms of the way the 
                                                 
7 Of course, the consequences for people in the centres have also been, and continue to be, devastating as 
well, albeit in a different way. Marcuse’s analysis of the consequences of capitalist development for human 
reason and experience is particularly important in this regard. The price we pay for the comforts we 
“enjoy” as a consequence of the super-exploitation of the periphery is an alienation that is absolutely 
totalizing; our unfreedom is understood and experienced as freedom and as such our ability to mount a 
defense against the increasing deficiencies of experience and the short-term, irrational rationality 
characterizing the contemporary scene is compromised. Indeed, as we have seen, a significant implication 
of Marcuse’s analysis is that the question of liberation itself no longer even appears relevant; the 
transformation of society not only appears impossible, but rather this transformation and by extension real 
freedom has become undesireable. This begs the question of what responses are still possible both within 
the centre and beyond it. If what is required in the centres is, as Amin argues, substantive internationalist 
solidarity with “the struggles for emancipation of the peoples in the peripheries” (2011:191), how do we 
cultivate this, particularly given not only that our standard of living is dependent upon a continuation of the 
status quo but, perhaps more troubling, that it is becoming more and more difficult for the average person 
to develop the sociological imagination (Mills 2000 [1959]) required for apprehending these connections, 
both intellectually and emotionally. At the same time, even if these connections are made, the entire system 
itself is mobilized to contain the potentially liberatory forces of society. This seems a bleak picture, indeed. 
We return to the question of a way forward, below. 
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liberation of “destructive and aggressive energy” (2001 [1965]:91; 1955), necessitated by 
the repressive desublimation prevalent in the advanced capitalist centres, impacts 
unconscious drives and desires. This, he argues, is a clear symptom of the matter-of-fact, 
technological attitude. This attitude, as the outcome of the totalizing force of 
technological rationality, is characterized by (sometimes extreme) rationalization on the 
part of the individual; wars, scarcity, toil – injustices of all kinds – are seen as reasonable 
and/or pragmatic. This leads to a standpoint of detachment and resignation (2001 
[1961]:49; 1998a:187-188; 1998 [1941]:44-48); everyone and everything in the society is 
mobilized, consciously and unconsciously, against “the Enemy”, the “real spectre of 
liberation” (1964:52). However, this mobilization has consequences not just for the 
centres, but for peripheral societies as well. Marcuse, of course, remained focused on the 
former. But it is clear in this instance, as in all the others we have discussed so far, that 
the veracity of both Marcuse’s and Amin’s arguments is enhanced once they are brought 
into conversation with one another in the specific context of the imperialist world system.  
The psychological neutrality that Marcuse argues characterizes the viewpoint of 
those in the centres in fact serves not only to inoculate people against recognition of the 
actual origins and nature of the injustices of life domestically but importantly against 
recognizing their complicity in the oppression and exploitation of the peoples of the 
periphery as well. Compliance and obedience at home enables and reinforces the 
intensification of globalized “accumulation through dispossession” (i.e., the autocentred 
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accumulation of the centres at the expense of the vast majority of the world’s population) 
(2011:19, 112; 2004; 1980:225-230).8 Amin argues,  
…the global expansion of capitalism, because it is polarizing, always 
implies the political intervention of the dominant powers, that is, the states 
of the system’s center, in the societies of the dominated periphery. This 
expansion cannot occur by the force of economic laws alone; it is necessary 
to complement that with political support (and military, if necessary) from 
states in the service of dominant capital. In this sense, the expansion is 
always entirely imperialist… In this sense, the contemporary intervention 
of the United States is no less imperialist than were the colonial conquests 
of the nineteenth century. Washington’s objective in Iraq, for example, (and 
tomorrow elsewhere) is to put in place a dictatorship in the service of 
American capital (and not a “democracy”), enabling the pillage of the 
country’s natural resources, and nothing more. The globalized “liberal” 
economic order requires permanent war – military interventions endlessly 
succeeding one another – as the only means to submit the peoples of the 
periphery to its demands (2004:23-24; 2011:1-18).  
Furthermore, 
…in order to maintain their status as affluent societies, the countries of the 
imperialist Triad are henceforth obliged to reserve access to the planet’s 
natural resources for their own exclusive benefit. This new requirement is 
at the origin of the militarisation of globalisation… In line with the 
Washington project of military control over the planet and the waging of 
pre-emptive wars under the pretext of the war on terror, NATO has 
                                                 
8 There are, of course, moments of resistance in the centres (for example, demonstrations against 
government cuts to social services of various kinds, marches against Western intervention in various 
countries throughout the world), however, their impact is limited not only structurally but also by the 
dominant ideology itself, which Amin argues promotes a culturalist approach in which “nations and classes 
have already left the scene and ceded political space to the individual, who is now the active subject of 
social transformation” (2011:14; 2004:57-58; 1998:33-35). Marcuse argues something similar when he 
states, “Theories of society and social change which imply objective historical tendencies and an objective 
evaluation of historical alternatives now appear as unrealistic speculation, and commitment to them as a 
matter of personal (or group) preference” (2001 [1961]:39). As a result, “in the current state of affairs, 
social protest movements, despite their visible growth, remain as a whole unable to question the social 
order linked to the capitalism of the oligopolies in the absence of a coherent political project that can match 
up to the challenges” (Amin 2011:15). As we saw in Chapter 2, under these circumstances the way in 
which the system actually operates continues to be obscured and this further leads to a fundamentally 
reformist orientation to the present state of affairs.  
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portrayed itself as the representative of the international community and has 
thereby marginalised the UN…Of course, these real goals cannot be openly 
acknowledged. In order to mask them, the powers in question have chosen 
to instrumentalise the discourse on democracy and have arrogated to 
themselves the right to intervene so as to impose ‘respect for human rights’. 
…[T]he new political management of the society of oligopolistic 
capitalism, established by means of a systematic depoliticisation, has given 
rise to a new political culture of ‘consensus’ (modelled on the example of 
the United States) which substitutes the consumer and the political spectator 
for the active citizen – who is a condition for an authentic democracy 
(2011:13-14).  
Amin’s language here recalls Marcuse’s. His discussion of the relationship between the 
shift in material conditions from the tributary to the capitalist mode and the concomitant 
changes in the dominant ideologies characterizing these forms paired with Marcuse’s 
analysis of the development of technological rationality and its relationship to the 
emergence of the matter-of-fact attitude in the centre permits a clear understanding of 
how this “systematic depoliticisation” and “culture of ‘consensus’” arises. Here is the 
place where the analyses of these two thinkers most clearly and explicitly converge. 
Marcuse is especially adept at offering a more thorough explanation of how the 
substitution of “the consumer and the political spectator for the active citizen” occurs in 
the centres while Amin is able to provide further insight into the ways in which 
“[e]mbracing the ideological alienation which is caused by capitalism” (2011:15) affects 
those in the periphery alongside those in the centre. According to Amin, “The peoples of 
the peripheries, who are for the most part deprived of access to acceptable levels of 
consumption and blinded by aspirations to consume like the opulent North, are losing 
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consciousness of the fact that the logic of historical capitalism makes the extension of this 
model to the entire globe impossible” (ibid).  
This “loss of consciousness” is not simply the result of consumerist aspirations; it 
is an outcome of the conflict between economic and metaphysical alienation that 
continues to characterize the peripheral situation. These forces, always in contention, are 
symptomatic of the fact that in the periphery the homogenizing tendency of capitalism 
has not yet won out, or, stated differently, the homogenization of social, political, and 
economic life has not progressed to the same extent as it has in the centres. Therefore, the 
tendency to “lose consciousness” of the way in which the capitalist system actually 
operates itself occurs alongside the fact that the “homogenization of the whole of the 
planet” (Amin 1980:240) is in reality impossible due to the fact that the centre-periphery 
contradiction is fundamental.9 Recall that though the necessity of capitalist markets to 
continually expand forms the “material basis” for capitalism’s homogenizing tendency – 
a tendency that, Amin argues, also envelopes “all aspects” of social life and culture – it is 
at the same time “held in check by the effects of unequal accumulation”, i.e., by the very 
polarization inherent in the world capitalist imperialist system (ibid:30-32). This dynamic 
ensures that the majority of the world’s societies will remain – indeed must remain – 
                                                 
9 Also important to remember are the actual historical struggles on the ground of those in the peripheries. 
Amin pays particular attention to the Russian and Chinese revolutions, as well as to the historical situations 
in Cuba and Vietnam. He also emphasizes the Bandung era of 1955-80. These “advances that have been 
followed by dramatic retreats” also affect people’s consciousness of the current state of affairs. 
Unfortunately, discussion of these events is beyond the scope of this project. See in particular Amin 
2011:78-99 for more on these issues.  
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underdeveloped, and is, as Amin emphasizes, the very reason that the contradictions of 
capitalism remain (at least potentially) more visible in the peripheries of the world system 
(1977:80, 83). Notably, in dealing with the totalizing character of advanced capitalism, 
Marcuse appears to come to a similar conclusion, although he does not elaborate on its 
implications. He argues,  
…large sections of the laboring classes in the most advanced areas of 
industrial civilization are led from “absolute negation” to resignation and 
even affirmation of the system. In the absence of demonstrable agents and 
agencies of social change, the critique is thrown back to a high level of 
abstraction: there is no ground on which theory and practice, thought and 
action meet. …Insulation against [the] context [of objective historical 
tendencies and an objective evaluation of historical alternatives] falsifies 
the facts and their function in the society because it insulates the facts 
against their negation, i.e., against the forces which make for their 
trancendence [sic] toward modes of existence rendered possible and at the 
same time precluded by the given society. If the insulation is corrected, the 
facts appear as other than they are in the immediate (insulated) experience. 
Now they are “comprehended”, understood in the light of a historical reality 
which joins capitalism and communism, overdeveloped and 
underdeveloped areas, pre-technological and technological cultures, the 
affluent and the miserable society in one global historical structure. The 
latter is the empirical ground for the formation of the concepts and criteria 
for the critique of contemporary society (2001 [1961]:39 [emphasis added]).  
If both Amin and Marcuse are correct that the “empirical ground” for a 
transformative praxis is to be found through comprehension of the “global historical 
structure” and by extension through the recognition of the particular status of the 
“miserable societies” in such a structure, then what we must further comprehend is that 
while “…obsolescent capitalism, by means of a violent imperialism, is busily annulling 
all of the emancipatory possibilities” (Amin 2004:27), its success is potentially limited by 
the nature of the capitalist imperialist world system itself. This system requires the super-
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exploitation of vast swaths of the world’s population so that those in the “affluent 
societies” may maintain their level of comfort. And this fundamental contradiction 
remains more visible in the peripheries of the world system, where the consequences of 
the organization of the system are most strongly felt. How, then, might the transcendence 
of the current state of affairs be possible? This is perhaps one of the most important 
questions of our time; indeed, now, perhaps more than ever before, Rosa Luxemburg’s 
warning that we stand at a crossroads between socialism and barbarism (1915:6) demands 
recognition. Faced with a state of permanent war, increasing environmental degradation 
in the name of profit, and the omnipresent, existential threat of climate change, something 
has got to give. In 1964 Marcuse wrote, “…unless the recognition of what is being done 
and what is being prevented subverts the consciousness and the behavior of man, not 
even a catastrophe will bring about the change” (xlvii). Amin, too, argues that “[u]p until 
now the world is more engaged on the road to chaos because the movements in the 
struggle have not measured up to the challenge” (2011:192).  
There is no formula, no perfect solution to finding a way forward. It is possible 
only to point in certain directions where the possibility of successful transcendence 
toward an organization of society and of daily life that is not based on exploitation, that is 
truly satisfying, that is free, are increased. Marcus and Amin agree that nostalgia for 
some romanticized version of the past and veneration of “traditional values”, is 
dangerous; going down that road leads us in the direction of fascism, religious or ethnic 
fundamentalisms, and terror, though it seems, distressingly, to be a road more and more 
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people in more and more places are taking.10 This ideological outgrowth of the material 
conditions of the organization of the world system, characterized by short-term rationality 
and one-dimensional thinking, must be combated. Marcuse, writing specifically about the 
situation in the centres argues that, 
…underneath the conservative popular base is a substratum of the outcasts 
and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, 
the unemployed and unemployable. They exist outside the democratic 
process; their life is the most immediate and the more real need for ending 
intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is 
revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the 
system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an 
elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, 
reveals it as a rigged game. …Their force is behind every political 
demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start 
refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the 
end of a period (1964:256-257). 
However, despite this, 
Nothing indicates that it will be a good end. The economic and technical 
capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for 
adjustments and concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces 
sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations. 
However, the spectre is there again, inside and outside the frontiers of the 
advanced societies. The facile historical parallel with the barbarians 
threatening the empire of civilization prejudges the issue; the second period 
of barbarism may well be the continued empire of civilization itself. But the 
chance is that in this period, the historical extremes may meet again: the 
most advanced consciousness of humanity and its most exploited force. It 
is nothing but a chance. At the beginning of the fascist era, Walter Benjamin 
                                                 
10 Think for example of the 2014 European Parliament elections, which were the “…first time openly neo-
Nazi parties [sat] in Brussels as representatives of their nations” (Elgot 2014:para. 2); the 2016 election of 
Donald Trump as President of the United States and the concomitant entry of the so-called “alt-right” into 
the American mainstream; the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria; the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece (and other 
nationalist, populist parties throughout Europe); the Harper Government’s “Strengthening Canadian 
Citizenship Act” (Bill C-24); increases in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; and so on.  
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wrote: …It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to 
us (ibid:257 [emphasis added]). 
If this is ultimately a pessimistic conclusion (notwithstanding the mention of “hope”), 
perhaps this can be mediated by extending Marcuse’s argument and pairing it with 
Amin’s. Marcuse has been proven right; the central societies have been very adept at 
containing social change and dealing with the dissent of those within it; power has made 
concessions and adjustments. Alienation has continued to progress. At the same time, 
dissatisfaction even within the centres is growing. Though we are faced with the danger 
that this dissatisfaction will be increasingly harnessed by fascist attempts to “reject the 
Other” (Marcuse 1964:245) there are some indications that more and more people can see 
the game is rigged, and that rather than turning toward right-wing populism, they instead 
seek a more egalitarian and “just” society.11 One need only think of the Occupy 
movement and its spread across various cities in the centre to see this possibility. Yet 
Amin too is correct that movements such as Occupy have been unable to adequately 
“match up to the challenges” (2011:15, 192); these projects were and are doomed to fail 
given that their demands for an end to inequality largely remain beholden to the myths of 
the liberal democratic ideology in which they are immersed. As such, their ability to 
adequately critique the prevailing order, or to mount a substantive challenge to it, is 
inadequate and incomplete. What, then, is needed? 
                                                 
11 This is the case perhaps especially since the “beginning” of economic crisis in 2008, which has resulted 
in various austerity measures being put in place by governments as a means of “coping”.  
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 Marcuse argues that in the centres what is required is that the “…repressed 
dimensions of experience can come to life again” (1964:245). Fundamentally, this 
necessitates that our very needs be redefined (ibid). As we have seen, for Marcuse, the 
potential for this development can be found in the reactivation of critical thought, both in 
the realm of philosophy (i.e., Critical Theory) and in the realm of art. In the case of the 
former, this philosophy can challenge the technological attitude due to the fact that the 
reemergence of the critical judgment it entails not only imagines and articulates how 
things ought to be but is also, therefore, explicitly political (1964:123f). As an 
immanently critical endeavor, the “intent of its concepts” is to “comprehend the 
unmutilated reality” (ibid:199). This theoretical approach must shatter the myths that 
enslave us; it must help us to shed our illusions about the nature not only of the society in 
which we live but of our very experience as well. The reemergence of artistic alienation 
is a part of this project; the reactivation of art’s negative power would mean the 
conscious effort to communicate art’s truth without allowing it to become absorbed by, 
and integrated into, the prevailing order (ibid:66). It would mean breaking our 
identification with the given society in order to produce a “dissociation in which the 
world can be recognized as what it is” (ibid:67). This may not be as abstract as it sounds. 
If we extend Marcuse’s argument that the opposition of “outsiders” is “revolutionary 
even if their consciousness is not” (1964:256), if we elaborate on his claim that “the 
spectre is there again, inside and outside the frontiers of the advanced societies” 
(ibid:257), the possibility exists of connecting Marcuse’s calls for the “Great Refusal” in 
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the centres to a truly international and internationalist emancipatory project. If the Great 
Refusal is, as Marcuse identifies, “…a refusal of repression and injustice, a saying no, an 
elemental opposition to a system of oppression, a noncompliance with the rules of a 
rigged game, a form of radical resistance and struggle”, if it is “…based on a subjectivity 
that is not able to tolerate injustice and that engages in resistance and opposition to all 
forms of domination, instinctual and political” (Kellner 2000:para. 26), then this project 
must necessarily take as its foundation understanding of the world system and the 
struggles of exploited peoples in both the centres and the peripheries. As we have seen 
there are places where Marcuse acknowledges this, but his project was such that 
following this line of thought very far was beyond his scope. Recognition of the need for 
such an approach is, however, a cornerstone of Amin’s work. 
 For Amin, we must look to the periphery as the primary locus of the potential for 
revolutionary change. Like Marcuse, and for similar reasons, he is ambivalent about 
whether this potential will be realized or whether capitalist imperialism will continue to 
develop into something increasingly barbaric and destructive (2011; 1977). Unlike 
Marcuse, the courses of action he identifies are – at least immediately – more concrete. 
As was discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, Amin identifies delinking as necessary in 
the peripheries so as to promote the transition from the current state of affairs, in which 
the periphery is extraverted, to conditions under which the periphery may become 
autocentred (2003:160; 2011:37, 58). Indeed, 
Historical capitalism must be overtaken and this cannot be done unless the 
societies in the peripheries (the great majority of humanity) set to work out 
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systematic strategies of delinking from the global system and reconstructing 
themselves on an autonomous basis, thus creating the conditions for an 
alternative globalisation, engaged on the long road to world socialism 
(2011:58; 2003:158).  
These strategies are crucial to the project of the Great Refusal not only insofar as 
they require a fundamental reshaping of the organization of the world system but also 
because the required approach is “…critical of the world as it is today, in all its 
dimensions, and mobilizes the inventive imagination characteristic of creative 
Utopianism” (Amin 2003:159). Furthermore, though both the central and peripheral 
bourgeoisie “cannot really imagine delinking”, for the peripheral proletariat, including 
the peasant population, “…delinking becomes a necessity as soon as they try to use 
political power to transform their conditions and to free themselves from the inhuman 
consequences of the polarizing global expansion of capitalism” (ibid:160). As we have 
seen, what is ultimately necessary here is a new wave of national liberation struggles, 
which are by their nature anti-imperialist (2011:162; 1980:252-253; 1976:382-383) and 
in which the strategies for delinking come from the peripheries themselves as a result of 
their specific historical and material conditions. Indeed, “Self-reliant [i.e., autocentred] 
development and delinking can…never become ready-made formulas valid for all 
situations and moments; they have to be considered afresh in the light of the lessons of 
history and the evolution of capitalist globalization” (2003:162). Nonetheless, Amin 
points us in two directions in particular that may increase the likelihood of delinking: 1) 
peripheral nations must form alliances with one another against their continued 
domination by the centre and 2) this project begins with the fight for food sovereignty. 
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According to Amin, given the current situation, there is no alternative to this battle 
(2011:106-108, 124, 141).12 Furthermore, because the transition from capitalist 
imperialism to communism (by way of the transitionary period of socialism), if it is to 
occur at all, will be a long one, Amin argues that recognizing and understanding “…the 
requirements of the state in the transition period…acquires a central importance” 
(2011:188). This  
…does not only concern the national, popular, democratic state of the long 
transition based on the revolutionary advances in the peripheries of the 
system. It concerns every state in their no shorter transition in the developed 
centres. It requires the articulation between the needs for the socialization 
of economic management and those for the progress in the democratization 
of society. It requires the articulation between the policies of (national) 
states and the implementation of a multipolar globalisation (ibid). 
In other words, rather than fall into the trap of believing that the state is in decline, it must 
be recentred as a fundamental part of any attempt to adequately understand the dynamics 
of the world system.  
Given all of this, the question facing those in the centres who are committed to the 
emancipatory transformation of society – not just ours, but all – becomes how best to 
support the struggles of those in the periphery. This does not mean that we ignore the 
conditions in our own societies or that we stop fighting for their improvement. Rather, it 
means recognizing that there is continuity and connection between the struggles we face 
domestically and the struggles of exploited people everywhere. It means taking the nature 
                                                 
12 Recall the discussion of this issue in Chapter 2.  
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of the imperialist world system, and its consequences materially, ideologically, 
psychologically, and experientially as our starting point. This is true for academics, for 
artists, for teachers, and for activists. Our work – of all these various, interrelated kinds – 
must be oriented toward solidarity in a truly substantive sense. It must aim to fully 
understand the imperialist nature of the world system and be fundamentally anti-
imperialist in orientation. In other words, it must be critical in precisely the way that 
Marcuse ultimately describes and internationalist in precisely the way that Amin 
envisions. Without this orientation, any project interested in the alleviation of suffering is 
destined to fail. Yet, even with this orientation success is far from assured. As we have 
seen, this system is particularly adept at absorbing dissent; every apparatus is mobilized 
against “the spectre of liberation” (Marcuse 1964:52), wherever it is to be found, whether 
central or peripheral. Nonetheless, we have to try. 
 If we accept that there is merit to the synthesis of Marcuse and Amin as a means 
of apprehending the world capitalist imperialist system as it operates in both the centres 
and peripheries, some topics for future empirical research emerge. Much like the work of 
the Frankfurt School historically, this analysis could be used as a means of crossing 
disciplinary boundaries and interrogating topics largely treated as disparate. Such an 
approach is mandated by the analysis itself. That said, we are also able to focus on more 
traditionally “sociological” and “political” questions; for example, while the analysis 
presented here focuses on the underdeveloped peripheral nations as the primary locus of 
change for the system as a whole, it is important to interrogate “peripheral elements” 
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within the central societies themselves. Both Marcuse and Amin neglect the question of 
those circumstances under which the periphery is present within the centres. Synthesis of 
Amin and Marcuse, such as is offered in this dissertation, could be used to analyze the 
increasingly significant issue of migrant labour, migrant labourers, and other 
undocumented workers in the centres, not just in terms of what such work means on the 
level of material conditions but also on a more experiential level as well. Could these 
workers and solidarity with their struggles be a place for a more substantial challenge to 
the system as a whole from within the centres themselves?  
Also of interest could be analysis of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa), their emerging alliances, and what this means not only for the Triad and 
American hegemony but also in relation to Amin’s arguments concerning delinking. The 
BRICS countries are currently attracting academic attention, largely in the areas of 
economics and international relations. Is there any progressive potential in the 
development of alliances between the BRICS countries, or in the inclusion of other 
peripheral countries like Indonesia and Turkey? How should their annual summits and 
projects be understood? What can be made of the fact that several other countries have 
expressed interest in joining? Perhaps most significantly, how should we understand the 
development of the “BRICS Bank”, established in 2013, which is meant to offer both an 
alternative and a rival to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank? Is this just a 
reflection of the imperialist aspirations of the member states or does it have the potential 
to be something else?  
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Amin argues that the “collective imperialism” of the Triad implies the 
“obliteration of the European project” and that,  
Only if social struggles in Europe acquire a political dimension strong 
enough to impose a political and social bloc less exclusively in the service 
of transnational capital will a genuine ‘European project’ conceivably make 
headway both internally (through the market regulation it requires and 
enables) and externally (through relations of a different kind with the 
South). Europe will be on the left, in a serious sense of the term, or there 
will be no Europe (2003:76-77; see also 2004:89-97). 
Amin further argues that the possibility of a “renaissance of the left” in “certain European 
countries” exists due to the fact that their “political culture” differs from that of the 
United States (2004:90), particularly as represented by American-style liberalism.13 This 
could go either way, however. Instead of a renaissance of the left, we may begin to see an 
“anti-Europeanism of the right” (ibid:93); indeed, one could argue we are seeing this 
already. It could therefore be interesting to develop a project based on applying the 
analysis presented in this dissertation to the current situation in Europe, including recent 
European Parliament elections, the eurozone crisis that began in 2009 (which Amin 
forewarned), and the implications of this for the European Union itself and its 
relationship to the periphery. More specifically, how might we understand, for example, 
events like the resignation of the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’ government on 
August 25, 2014 or the success of far-right parties in more recent elections in Germany 
                                                 
13 Given this assertion, and the broader context of the analysis that the synthesis of Amin and Marcuse 
affords, it would also be interesting to examine the 2016 American primaries, particularly the success of 
Bernie Sanders, and the failure of Hilary Clinton, contra the election of Donald Trump. 
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and Austria? Or, more broadly speaking, of an increased share of European Parliament 
votes going to both extreme right and “extreme left” candidates? How should Brexit be 
understood? What is the significance of these developments? Further, how has the 
landscape shifted for both Europe and the United States as a result of the election of 
Donald Trump? Not only Amin, but Marcuse too, might help us to better understand not 
merely what is going on but what might be possible. 
A synthesis of the work of Marcuse and Amin offers us a path to a more insightful 
analysis and critique of contemporary social movements; an original and thorough 
analysis of contemporary central social movements and their potential connections to the 
periphery. It would be important to examine where, for example, events like the World 
Social Forum, which has been meeting since 2001, and newer developments like the 
Peoples Social Forum, which was held in Ottawa in August 2014 and is the “first ever 
pan-Canadian social forum” (Rashi 2014:para. 1) fit in and where they pose a challenge. 
These are preliminary suggestions; development of them is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. I raise them here only as a means of signaling potential starting points for 
future inquiry. These are merely a few examples; the possibilities are both numerous and 
exciting.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Inspired by the belief that some of the most productive analytical frameworks 
have been the result of the synthesis of the work of seemingly disparate theorists (the 
Frankfurt School stands out as a prime example), I set out to combine the theoretical 
perspectives put forward by Herbert Marcuse and Samir Amin. My objective in doing 
this is to produce a more robust theoretical approach capable of increasing our 
understanding of the world and positioning us to better meet the challenges posed for 
human emancipation from an exploitative, alienated existence of suffering. For this 
reason, the dissertation began with C. Wright Mills, who argues that this concern must be 
at the core of the sociological imagination and the sociological approach more generally.  
 This dissertation was not undertaken as a mere thought experiment; above all, the 
assertion of this dissertation is that we have much to gain by bringing Marxist theories of 
imperialism and Western Marxism into engagement with each other. To that end, I 
deliberately chose to concentrate on the work of Marcuse and Amin. The real-world 
impact of each of these thinkers has been profound. Marcuse has been extremely 
influential to the development of both the Western Marxist tradition itself and the New 
Left, due to his incisive critique of the totalitarian tendencies inherent in the advanced 
capitalist centres as well as of the consequences of this for the lived experience of those 
reared under such a system. The connection between – to use Mills’ terminology – 
personal troubles and public issues is a clear and central focus of Marcuse’s work. 
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Despite this, Marcuse’s work has been subject to the critique that it is of limited value 
given its ostensibly inherent Eurocentrism. It is frequently approached as relevant only to 
specialized disciplinary subfields. Amin, despite having pioneered the centre-periphery 
distinction foundational to both Dependency and World Systems Theory and being 
named “the greatest living Marxist analyst of imperialism” (Monthly Review Vol. 
59:No.7), is no longer widely read in North America. The ghettoization of these two 
thinkers goes beyond being merely unfortunate. In the years since his death, Marcuse’s 
work has only become more relevant to our understanding of advanced capitalism in the 
centres and the concomitant alienation of human experience, while Amin’s work remains 
of critical importance to our understanding of the imperialist world system and its 
development, the nature of alienation in the differing social formations, and the 
increasing polarization of the world. Synthesizing the work of these two deeply 
influential thinkers has been productive and worthwhile task, pointing to new directions 
for analysis of advanced capitalism, centre/periphery relations, and social 
transformation.  
 In order to undertake this task, the dissertation began, in Chapter 1, with a 
discussion of the intellectual background shared by Marcuse and Amin. Particular 
attention was paid to the work of Karl Marx, Georg Lukas, and Sigmund Freud. The 
Marx section of this chapter focused specifically on his arguments concerning the 
development of alienation before turning to his arguments concerning the possibility of 
human emancipation. The second section, on Lukács, focused specifically on the concept 
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of reification and its consequences for the development of class consciousness. The final 
section, which took up Freud, focused on the relationship between the development of the 
individual psyche and the demands of civilization, with particular attention paid to his 
conceptualization of repression, sublimation, and the pleasure and reality principles.  
 From here, the dissertation moved to explicit discussion of Amin’s work. Here, 
the focus was on Amin’s understanding of the world capitalist imperialist system and its 
development. Chapter 2 began with discussion of the transition from the tributary to the 
capitalist social formation in order to explain the role this transition played in the 
development of the centre-periphery distinction constitutive of the contemporary world 
system. This analysis covered the differences between tributary and capitalist ideology 
and the development of alienation. Particular attention was paid to the emergence of 
“pure economics” and the pervasiveness of short-term rationality as a means of 
understanding the world. Especially important for our purposes was the discussion of 
Amin’s argument that alienation has a different character in the tributary mode than in the 
capitalist and that there therefore currently exists not one type of alienation, but rather a 
“pyramid of alienations”. The chapter then moved on to discussion of the consequences 
of Amin’s analysis for our understanding of class and the possibility of human 
emancipation and the “de-alienation” that this emancipation requires. For Amin, this 
project requires a long view and will not be resolved in the immediate. The focus was 
therefore on Amin’s arguments concerning the importance of food sovereignty, alliance 
building, and state policy reforms amongst and within peripheral nations, as these are 
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important steps in what he sees as the long and crucial process of delinking. The chapter 
concluded by engaging with Amin’s analysis of the ideological perspective dominant in 
the capitalist epoch. Given Amin’s argument that the fight against an increasingly 
barbaric and genocidal capitalist imperialist world system must be fundamentally 
internationalist in orientation, and that such an orientation is only possible if we are able 
to understand the “ideological absolutism” of the centres of advanced capitalism, the 
dissertation then turned to discussion of the work of Herbert Marcuse who, according to 
Amin himself (1980:217), was one of the first to undertake such a project. 
 We began our discussion of Marcuse with analysis of the emergence of “one-
dimensional thought” and “technological rationality”, emphasizing the relationship 
between this rationality and alienation, which Marcuse argues infects even our 
unconscious drives and desires. Because of this, much of our discussion was focused on 
the ways in which Marcuse is able to historicize some of Freud’s central concepts, 
specifically repression, sublimation, and the reality principle. These concepts are, he 
argues, actually socio-historical in nature and as such can be further refined. Marcuse 
therefore re-introduces these concepts as surplus-repression, repressive desublimation, 
and the performance principle, and they are central to his analysis of the development of 
the “matter-of-fact” or technological attitude that dominates under advanced capitalism. 
This attitude, he argues, not only serves the self-preservation of the system as a whole 
but, perhaps worse, actually becomes perceived by individuals themselves as necessary to 
their very survival. Indeed, the development of technological rationality and the 
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alienation that accompanies it leads Marcuse to argue that even the ostensibly 
“democratic” centres of capitalism are totalitarian in character. This totalitarianism not 
only characterizes these societies on the level of their organization, but also on the level 
of human experience, which is fundamentally mutilated. From here, the chapter examined 
the implications of this for the possibility of transformative social change and the 
overcoming of alienation. This analysis included discussion of the consequences of this 
for both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The chapter concluded with the assertion that 
Marcuse’s arguments here are, in reality, focused on central capitalism and that it is 
therefore necessary to consider the consequences of resituating them in the broader 
context of the imperialist world system, which was, as we have seen, the main focus of 
Amin’s work. We therefore moved on to our final chapter to present a synthesis of their 
work. 
 Chapter 4 began by rearticulating the twin aims of this dissertation: 1) to deepen 
our understanding of capitalist imperialism and alienation and as a result to more 
adequately engage with the question of the possibility of human freedom, and 2) to 
revitalize the work of both Marcuse and Amin. The chapter initially focused on a return 
to the discussion of alienation and its implications for class raised in the previous 
chapters, before moving once again to the question of emancipation. Here, the discussion 
emphasized that the same critique Marcuse applies to Freud can be applied to him as 
well: conceptualizations must be socio-historically situated. This led into discussion of 
the ways in which Amin’s understanding of both alienation and class can be used as a 
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corrective to Marcuse’s. The chapter then moved on to discuss permanent war as a 
feature not only of the advanced capitalist centres but rather of the world system as a 
whole. Indeed, compliance and obedience in the centres of the system enables and 
reinforces intensified autocentred accumulation of the centres at the expense of the vast 
majority of the world’s population; “[t]he globalized ‘liberal’ economic order requires 
permanent war – military interventions endlessly succeeding one another – as the only 
means to submit the people of the periphery to its demands” (Amin 2004:24). Finally, the 
chapter revisited both Marcuse’s and Amin’s arguments concerning the possibility of 
emancipation and the recuperation of human experience, and sought to bring together 
Marcuse’s project of the Great Refusal and Amin’s project of delinking; the conclusion 
here is that the question facing those in the centres who are committed to the 
emancipatory transformation of the social, economic, and political order – not just at 
“home” but necessarily on the level of the world system as well, since, the two cannot be 
understood separately – becomes a fundamentally and profoundly internationalist one. 
The chapter concludes with some speculation about using the synthesis as a theoretical 
basis for future research. 
 This dissertation seeks to provide a means of reinvigorating the work of Marcuse 
and Amin by arguing that their synthesis is useful for, and important to, increasing our 
understanding of the world, not a particularly humble claim. In undertaking this project, I 
was under no illusions that the result would be a complete theoretical framework. Rather, 
this project was undertaken with the awareness that theory is “…a process; that is, theory 
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[is] an ever-developing entity, not [a] perfected product” and therefore, a “discussional” 
approach to theory generation is important (Glaser and Strauss 2006 [1967]:32, 9). This 
dissertation was undertaken in the hope it would help clear a path in a new direction. 
Whether this path leads to a dead end remains to be seen, however, I believe the 
theoretical approach I offer shows promise and that walking further down this path is 
worthwhile. I hope to continue the work that this dissertation began, and I hope that 
others will one day be interested in taking this approach up as well.  
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